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UN Security Council Confirms SFRY Resolution

LD0901042192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0029 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] New York, January 8 (TANJUG)--While in session here today, the UN Security Council confirmed with a new resolution (Number 727) the decision of UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali to send to Yugoslavia a group of 50 "liaison officers" to help with cease-fire maintenance.

The resolution is based on Ghali's report made on the basis of data given him by his special emissary, Cyrus Vance, after his fifth trip to Yugoslavia. The UN mission should work together with the EC team of monitors, Ghali particularly emphasized.

The council also adopted the Ghali report, welcomed the Sarajevo Vance-sponsored cease-fire agreement and sent out another urgent demand to all sides in the conflict to stick to the preceding agtreements on the cessation of hostilities, especially so to the Sarajevo and Geneva agreements.

All the sides in Yugoslavia are being demanded to take measures for protecting the UN and the EC personnel, but this demand is in no way associated with yesterday's downing of a helicopter or with the EC decision to put for a time on ice its monitors' activities.

The resolution confirms the earlier decision on the embargo on exporting arms to Yugoslavia, particularly pointing out that it is to be applied to the whole geographical entity of Yugoslavia regardless of possible political changes.

Under the resolution letter, Sir David Hanay, the British ambassador and the January Council president, explained that the said embargo is to remain in force irrespective of independence recogitions possibly granted to individual republics. Sir David once again appealed to all the sides to the conflict in Yugoslavia to observe the present cease-fire and so create conditions for a timely start of action by a peacekeeping force of some 10,000 troops and policemen.

Sir David would not comment on the news of Yugoslav General Veljko Kadijevic's resignation as the federal secretary for defence, one of the personalities Vance had come into contact with during all his five missions in Yugoslavia to date.

To us, not of importance is a personality; but the army with which we maintain contacts. All the rest is Yugoslavia's internal affair, Hanay said, announcing that Vance is to further stay in permanent contact with all sides in Yugoslavia, so as to keep an eye on the situation's development, with a hope for making a success of the efforts to send a peacekeeping force there.

SFRY CSCE Delegate Criticizes Neighbor Nations

LD1001015392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1951 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Prague, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—Ambassador Vladimir Pavicevic, chief Yugoslav delegate to a meeting of CSCE high officials, assessed today that Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania had taken advantage of the incident of downing an E.C. helicopter in Croatia to relaunch attacks on Yugoslavia at the CSCE meeting. The four neighbour countries, Pavicevic said in a statement to TANJUG, "once again showed how much they want an end to be put to Yugoslavia as the state." A debate on Yugoslavia culminated on Wednesday in adopting a declaration of the committee of CSCE high officials.

Pavicevic explained that he would not at all reply to such attacks had not the attacks contained incomprehensible roughness and hostility. The key point in Pavicevic's explanation was that the cause of the Yugoslav crisis was not lying in Serbia's desire to "preserve hegemony," as Austria and Bulgaria explicitly assert. The cause of the crisis, said Pavicevic, was lying in Slovenia's and Croatia's undermining unilaterally the Yugoslav federation and actually breaking away from it by force.

At the CSCE meeting, this stand was also backed up by the chief delegate of Liechtenstein Count Lederbour who stated that the "gist of the Yugoslav issue rests in the forcible secession of Slovenia and Croatia." These two republics, said Lederbour, "have actually exercised by force their right to self-determination, while Croatia at the same time forcibly prevented the Serbian people to materialize for themselves this same right." Lederbour added that the CSCE should pay greater attention to this stand, especially because it has so far been hushed up.

Pavicevic identified similarities in the stands taken by the ambassadors of Portugal, as a representative of the E.C. countries, the U.S., Malta, Sweden, and then also Italy and France, the two countries directly hit by the incident on Tuesday. They strongly condemned armed actions against E.C. aircraft but "they did not aim at discrediting either Yugoslavia or the JNA (the Yugoslav People's Army)," said Pavicevic.

He denied the assertions that the U.S. has raised the issue of "confidence" concerning the legitimacy of the Yugoslav Government in Belgrade and of the Yugoslav delegation to the CSCE high officials meeting, when he said that the "American delegate John Mareska was not referring to legitimacy, nor denying it, but was only raising the question of the representative nature of our delegation in view of the fact that two Yugoslav republics do not want us to represent them." Pavicevic added that neither Slovenia nor Croatia were denying the right of the Yugoslav delegation to represent those who want to be represented by this delegation.

The chief U.S. delegate just as the United States, in Pavicevic's words "have not yet presented any stands that would question Yugoslavia in its present or in its smaller future form."

Alia Instructs Political Prisoner Rehabilitation

AU0901193792 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] On the basis of Law 7,814 of 30 September 1991, On the Innocence, Amnesty and Rehabilitation of Former Political Prisoners and Victims of Persecution, President Ramiz Alia has instructed the Directorate of Awards under his cabinet to consider and accomplish the restoration of titles of honor and decorations to all persons benefiting under this law.

The directorate is also instructed to examine individually all applications from working people and citizens who, although not victims of political persecution, have been deprived of their titles of honor for one reason or another. Interested persons are asked to submit their applications to the Presidential Cabinet, enclosing data about the date of their award, the nature of the award, the reason for its removal, and the name of the institution making the relevant decision.

With the aim of restoring titles of honor and decorations within as short a time as possible, the working group will coordinate its work with the organs of justice and other institutions. At the same time, the Presidential Cabinet will fundamentally rethink titles of honor, awards, and decorations in the Republic of Albania, with the aim of honoring basic human, national, and civil values and avoiding ideological domination.

Invalidation of Lenin School Diplomas Sought

AU0901143192 Tirana ATA in English 0957 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Tirana, January 9 (ATA)—The newspaper "RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE" carries a report of some deputies of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Party proposing to declare invalid the law "On Unification of the 'V. I. Lenin' Higher Party School With the Higher Schools of State System" of 1974. They demand that the graduates from this school be not considered higher cadres.

The Deputies Arben Imami, Ylli Vejsiu, Maksim Konomi, and Albert Kariqi justify this demand based on the Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions where there is an article declaring that political parties are completely separated from the state, as well as based on the fact that the graduates from this school are educated with knowledge which serve only the SP [Socialist Party] and not the present Albanian state and on the negative valuation of the contribution of these graduates in running the country in the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Political Leaders Campaign Throughout Country

AU1001114892 Tirana ATA in English 0949 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Tirana, January 10 (ATA)—Of late representatives of various political parties had meetings with their members and sympathizers in various districts of the country.

The chairman of the Democratic Party Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha had of late a meeting in the district of Durres. In the speech held on this occasion, after pointing out the achievements of the last year, he underscored that alongside the freedom of belief and of speech realised last year, but we have attained also the freedom of property. There can not be political freedom, he said, without freedom of the private property. Sali Berisha said that DP in power will realize the compensation of the land owners, because there is no transition onto another kind of property without respecting the previous one. Later, speaking of the launching of the reform in the army, the forces of order and the organs of justice, he stressed that in order to allow them to assume full form the communist system should be eradicated and that in the next elections votes will be given to the opposition.

In the meeting the chairman of the Albanian Social-Democratic Party Prof. Dr.Skender Gjinushi had in the district of Shkoder with sympathizers and members of this party in the first conference of the branch of this party in the district, it was spoken of the extension of this party in the economic enterprises and institutions, the increase of its participation in the local power, etc., and were evaluated as great victory the creation of the opposition front, the reformation of the television and admission of the ASDP to the Socialist International etc.

The branch of the Union of Albanian Independent Trade Unions for Vlore district held a meeting recently. There were raised many problems of the independent trade unions for the protection of the interests of the working people. Participating in the conference was also Valer Xheka, chairman of the Independent Trade Unions of Albania, who spoke of the ultimative requests addressed to the current government regarding the anomalies witnessed in the delivery of food aid as well as on the importance of the victory of the opposition political forces in the coming elections, the full triumph of democracy in our country.

Government Endorses Law on New Banking System

AU0801104192 Tirana ATA in English 0902 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Tirana, January 8 (ATA)—The meeting of the Council of Ministers, presided over by the Premier Vilson Ahmeti, was held on January 7. It endorsed the draft-law "On the Bank System in Albania" and the draft-law "On the Bank of Albania".

These two draft-laws, to be forwarded for approval to the People's Assembly constitute the basis of the bank system reform in our country, as one of the most important links of the economic reform in Albania. They have been drafted with the help of specialists of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other foreign specialists.

The draft-law on the bank system creates the legal basis for the setting up of a bank system with two levels: a central bank, which would be the Bank of Albania and a

network of other state, stock- holding, cooperativist, private banks with joint capital or wholly foreign capital. The draft-law defines the procedure of the opening of these banks, their functioning, as well as their relations with the Bank of Albania.

The draft-law "On the Bank of Albania" defines the functions of this bank, which is the Central Bank of the Republic of Albania. According to the provisions of the draft-law the Bank of Albania emits the national currency, arranges the economic needs for credits, manages the currency in the exchange market with foreign counties, acts as fiscal agent for the government, maintains a regular market of valuable papers. The Bank of Albania gives the licenses for the creation of other banks in our country.

The draft-law defines in detail the way of functioning of the Bank of Albania, its main activities, the relations with the other banks of Albania, the relations between the bank and the state, the duties and competences of its steering organs etc. According to the provisions of this draft-law, the Bank of Albania that responds to the People's Assembly, attains in this way a greater independence from the government, at a time when the growing role of the bank in economy, the loosening of the monetary system, the improvement of the bank service etc., enhance.

In continuation, the Council of Ministers adopted several decisions, among which the decision for the creation of the politechnical university of Korce on the basis of the Agricultural Institute of Korce.

Contract for Offshore Oil Exploration Signed

AU0901142792 Tirana ATA in English 0953 GMT 9 Jan 91

[Text] Tirana, January 9 (ATA)—The contract for the oil research and production in Ionian Sea was signed in Tirana on January 8 between the General Oil and Gas Department and Hamilton Oil Corporation (U.S. firm centered in Denver of Colorado state, part of the powerful British-Australian-American BHB Grouping). This contract has as object the Albanian part of the Ionian Sea beginning with the Sazan island up to Sarande. This is the fifth contract and the last for the first round of contracts on sea. In the meantime the research work has started in a broad scale in the four first ones. Studies are carried out in the three first blocks in the Adriatic in about 5,000 km of seismological profiles where the firms Deminex, Chevron and Occidental Petroleum work.

On December 30, the seismological ship Western Harbour completed its mission in the No. 3 Block and on the same day it started workings in the No. 2 Block contracted with the Italian Agip. The proceedings in this block will be over within January and the ship will be transferred in the block included in the contract signed with Hamilton. At the same time, during January, the recorded seismological information in the sea will be processed in powerful computers and then will followed by the interpretation and designing of the wells.

The workings in the sea are going on as planned.

Zhelev Interviewed on SFRY, Domestic Issues

AU0901162992 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Jan 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, by Maria Vasileva; place and date not given: "Bulgaria's Geopolitical Situation Is An Excellent Opportunity We Would Be Foolish Not To Take Advantage Of"]

[Text] [Vasileva] How would you comment on events in Yugoslavia? Do you see any danger involving our country with regard to the Macedonian question?

[Zhelev] As we all know, we are in favor of granting the right of self-determination to all nations living on the territory of Yugoslavia, the right of establishing independent, sovereign states included. We declared this as early as three to four months ago when the majority of states were not ready to recognize this right. Yugoslavia is disappearing from the scene, but it is likely to cause great damage in the course of its disintegration. As early as on the occasion of my talks with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Eagleburger and with Germany's Foreign Minister Genscher, I explained my view that Yugoslavia is heading for a Lebanese model of civil war in which it will become increasingly difficult to arrest the course of events, considering that this war is based on ethnic, national, religious, and political conflicts, which virtually eliminates any possibility of control over developments.

It was my thesis that the EC armed forces, in joint action with NATO forces, and under the aegis of the UN, could perhaps enter Yugoslav territory and put an end to the conflict in its initial stage. Unfortunately, however, the influential EC member states were not able to reach an agreement on the question, as a result of which Yugoslavia is precipitously following the example of Lebanon.

Naturally, we refrained from any categorical interference on the account of our status as a neighbor country and any effort to adopt a more energetic stand would certainly be interpreted as an attempt to exploit Yugoslavia's difficulties to Bulgaria's advantage. Propaganda in Belgrade and even in Skopje has long since been accusing us of territorial claims toward Macedonia, accusations that are totally unjustified. For these reasons, we refrained from increasing our Army's combat readiness on the western borders.

We are convinced that all Yugoslav republics, without any exceptions, should be granted the right of self-determination and sovereignty. We categorically oppose the current EC stance, namely that Macedonia should be separated from the two other republics [Croatia and Slovenia] that are to be granted the right of self- determination, while the question of Macedonia should be discussed at a later stage. I think that this could become the cause of military operations extending to the territory of Macedonia. If this should happen, there is no guarantee that our country would not get involved in the events to some extent or another. In the most favorable scenario, we could expect a interminable stream of refugees invading our country. Generally speaking, the situation would certainly deteriorate.

[Vasileva] Do you have any solution for nationwide unemployment?

[Zhelev] The questions of unemployment are identical or similar throughout the country. The introduction of reforms, the promotion of investments, the supply of sufficient financial resources for workers' requalification, and new job opportunities are the effective means for overcoming unemployment and avoiding the critical point beyond which our social stability could be seriously affected. Nevertheless, we should understand that the introduction of the market economy is a painful process for all countries, and unemployment is inevitable under such circumstances. Nevertheless, I am convinced that these problems could be gradually settled and a certain rate of unemployment, as it exists in all countries with a market economy, will be a regarded as a normal process of development balanced by a free labor exchange system. There are the rudiments of such a development in Bulgaria today. In 1991, for example, approximately 300,000 people changed their jobs, which means that there are opportunities of flexibility in our economic system and that a person can remain without a job because he is looking for a certain type of work according to his interests and special training, rather than for the total lack of employment opportunities. This is a privilege that everyone should be entitled to, but which our society cannot provide for the time being.

[Vasileva] The first bill discussed by the new National Assembly should have been aimed at combating crime. Do you think that the police is acting with the necessary severity?

[Zhelev] Within the framework of my authority, I intend to adopt very drastic measures against crime, which should be nipped in the bud, and I am convinced that this is one of the most important tasks today. A great danger exists that organized crime may expand, while because of its geographical situation at the crossroads of the continent, our country is particularly exposed to drug and arms traffic. There was even an attempt to smuggle a nuclear bomb warhead through Bulgaria some time ago! I intend to use all the authority granted to me by the presidential institution in order to consolidate our country's national security precisely in the context of guaranteeing law and order and internal stability.

Nevertheless, it should be clearly understood that legislation alone cannot solve the problem. Changes should be introduced in the structures of the law courts, the prosecutor's offices, in the investigation, and police organs. We are already working on these changes. Those people who are incapable of or unwilling to combat crime should be dismissed. Moreover, we should get rid

of those people who are interested in fanning tension and deliberately refraining from action against drastic forms of crime.

This is the occasion on which the discussion about capital punishment should be mentioned. As a matter of principle, I am an opponent of capital punishment. Nevertheless, a temporary postponement of the moratorium on capital punishment may become necessary, considering the great number of severe and even sadistic crimes being perpetrated by hardened criminals, against whom the full weight of the law should be applied. [Vasileva] As a result of restitution, the old bourgeoisie is likely to restore its property, while the Privatization Law would provide the Red bourgeoisie, which has the largest financial resources today, with the opportunity to acquire new property. Would this not mean that the majority of the people would be deprived of all opportunities and be underprivileged again?

[Zhelev] I think that the Privatization Law should provide all guarantees against abuse. This should also extend to the possibility of investigating the source of income in the cases of people who are purchasing the majority of shares in a given enterprise. Privatization must guarantee, using all possible means, that a certain percentage of shares should be provided for the employees of the enterprise in question or for the retired personnel on a priority basis. Our goal is not to create new moneybags. Naturally, rich people will exist, but let them acquire their wealth through their brains and their spirit of enterprise, rather than through illegal business transactions. In order to achieve this goal, however, we should provide the opportunity for the overwhelming majority of our people to participate in privatization. This is not a question of "equal opportunities at the start," but rather of equal legal opportunities for all people to participate in the economic processes for people who are not equal as such.

[Vasileva] Modesty is not always a positive quality for a statesman. Do you not think that you should more often bang on the table or "produce the hatchet?"

[Zhelev] As a matter of fact, it is easy to "produce the hatchet" and I have observed how some people do it on all occasions, but are forced to put it away. Politics is a very complicated matter. One should act with consideration, examine the situation in all its aspects, assess the possible consequences, and only after doing so, take firm and resolute action, without necessarily banging on the table. Histrionics is not always a guarantee of resolute and serious political behavior.

[Vasileva] If Bulgarian land were sold to foreigners, you should know that I would be prepared to leave the country! How do you evaluate such a sellout?

[Zhelev] I declared on several occasions that there is no danger of purchasing and selling the land. No one is capable of taking away arable land from Bulgaria and transferring it abroad. Unlike any other form of goods or capital, arable land cannot be exported. Let us take a very simple example: Suppose that an Austrian company purchased land in Bulgaria on which it wanted to build an enterprise, a joint venture establishment, or something of this kind. What would happen? Naturally, part of the profits would be exported—this is legally guaranteed in order to provide the capital from abroad. The other part, however, would remain in Bulgaria, which would be to our advantage. If, for some reason, the foreign company gave up production, then the enterprise would remain here and be sold to Bulgarians. Why should we be afraid of selling land to foreigners? One third of the land in New York is owned by Arab sheiks from the Middle East or by Japanese, and so what? Has anyone ever exported a skyscraper from New York to another country?

[Vasilieva] When are we, the young people, going to learn what we are allowed and not allowed to do?

[Zhelev] The young people will have to excuse me, but I am convinced that everyone should discover certain truths for himself. Other people should not prescribe to him what he should and should not do. Certainly, there are some things that are settled by the law, but anything that is not forbidden should be allowed. This is an ancient legal principle.

[Vasileva] The power of the former nomenklatura in enterprises has remained unchanged. For how long?

[Zhelev] The nomenklatura can be eliminated by liquidating the structures that support it. Everything else can only be a temporary remedy. You cannot just replace a red manager with a blue manager, if the structure remains the same, nothing will change. Apart from this, changes have been introduced and we have replaced several managers in various institutions. Nevertheless, not much has changed in the enterprises, as a matter of fact.

[Vasileva] Can the existence of 30 parties, who are scattering the votes in elections, be considered as a communist provocation?

[Zhelev] Well, a natural process of development exists in this connection. Therefore, let us not be overly suspicious in this respect. Naturally, I do not deny that an element of provocation may be involved or that it could be exploited for obtaining certain political advantages. However, the emergence of numerous parties is a characteristic feature of all Eastern Europe. Russia is currently undergoing this process. Evidently, there is a certain logic to this development. With the first wave of the democratic process, numerous parties emerged, prompted by personal ambitions and by the striving of individual groups to prevail and to participate in power structures. Eventually, in accordance with natural selection, determined by the elections, the very small parties are likely to disappear one by one, while some major parties will remain.

[Vasileva] Why is there so much interest in Bulgaria in the United States? What can the United States be expecting from us?

[Zhelev] I think that this is determined by Bulgaria's special geopolitical situation in the world. We are situated at the very center of the Balkans. This creates great opportunities for space and other communications. The Americans would like to build airports in our country, or to purchase some of our airports using them as a basis for flights to the Middle East. This geopolitical situation, as a matter of fact, was a curse for Bulgaria in the Middle Ages, when our territory was a crossroads for all migrations. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria was always the victim of its geographical position at the crossroads. Under the present circumstances, however, considering the modern forms of communications, our geopolitical situation is a formidable asset for us and we would be the greatest fools not to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

[Vasileva] Why did you favor a communist as vice president at your side during presidential elections at the time of the Grand National Assembly?

[Zhelev] When people insinuate some secret deal, some conspiracy in that connection, I can only say: There has been no conspiracy whatsoever, no secret deal. This was an overt deal negotiated between the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in the Grand National Assembly. We could also describe it in a different way—namely as an open political dialogue. However, it would be more important to talk about the future. Why is Mrs. Dimitrova at my side today? She can confirm that I invited her to be my running mate in the presidential elections a long time before the question was discussed by the SDS, since I consider her a charismatic figure who demonstrated her civil courage throughout several decades. I have not discovered her for the SDS. This was not my first meeting with her in the ranks of the SDS.

Podkrepa 'Condemns' 8 Jan General Strike

AU0901170392 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Commentary by Konstantin Trenchev, leader of Podkrepa Labor Confederation: "It Is Unlikely To Reach Strike Action"]

[Text] Strike action ought to be used only as a final measure. In actual fact, the aim of such action is to exert pressure when specific problems are being resolved. If it is a local strike, pressure is brought to bear on the establishment's management, and when it is national, on the government and parliament. It must be clear how prepared the other side is to react to trade union pressure. The present government and parliament have inherited a ruined state for which they have no moral or legal responsibility. It is difficult to draw a conclusion in such a short period of time on whether a policy is good or bad. The qualities of a newborn child cannot be determined. It has to grow up. This is why we believe that the government must be given a specific time allowance.

The Podkrepa Labor Confederation does not support and condemns the strike planned by the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB]. It is not aimed at resolving problems but at intensifying them. It is obvious in which political force's interests it is to increase tension in Bulgaria. We recommend our organizations not to join in the strike action. Even in places where strikes are at present being conducted, we recommend that symbolic action is taken instead on 8 January. We believe that our members will show common sense and will not assist an organization that is out to increase social chaos. Note that we adopted this decision at a Confederative Council meeting attended by representatives from all federations and local structures and not only by the Executive Council. However, the KNSB Executive Committee consisting of 10-20 people decided to have a general strike! There is one rule: The greater the responsibility, the more structures need to be consulted; the bigger the action, the bigger the forum to take the decision on putting it into practice.

An analogy can be made with the general strike that we conducted in November 1990 against the Lukanov government. The decision to strike was taken by an extraordinary Confederative Council. I do not know the KNSB's statute, but I believe that at the least it is unfair to the trade union's members not to carry out wide-scale consultations. Perhaps this is why large groups from the KNSB have sharply disassociated themselves from the leadership's decision.

The national campaigns that we conducted at the end of 1989 and the end of 1990 were aimed at totalitarian governments and achieved their important results, namely the roundtable and Lukanov's downfall. They had a moral justification and deep-rooted motivation. No such similar situation exists at the moment. However, I do not think that we will reach strike action. I am certain that reconsideration will be given on whether to conduct the strike.

General Views Greek, Turkish Security Policy

AU0901172992 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 4 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Lieutenant General Stoyan Andreev: "A Model For Young Democracies"]

[Text] One week ago, precisely during the visit of General Gures, the chief of the Turkish Army's General Staff, the so-called "Sofia Document" was signed. According to this document, a system of confidence measures between Bulgaria and Turkey was established. The measures exceed by far the measures envisaged by the Paris Treaty and create one of the trends of constructive work in the second round of the Vienna negotiations and "Helsinki-2" talks. They were appreciated in Europe and approved by NATO as a positive model of establishing regional security. Our country is most vitally interested in such regional security measures, because the bloc approach that resolved the problems of European security in the past, greatly damaged our country in particular. Thanks to the sensible policy of our state

leadership today, positive opportunities emerged for compensating the loss of military guarantees through military-political and purely political means. This should be duly appreciated by all parties and all Bulgarians, especially considering the fact that we have no other alternative for the time being.

It is, however, very strange that such considerations are still missing from the pages of the daily DUMA. Instead of this, an article signed by Vasil Popov mentioning the so-called "80 kilometers zone" appeared in the 29 November issue of the daily in question. I refrain from any comment on the personal insults addressed against me in this article. I would just like to express my amazement that a discussion on the problems of the country's national security can arouse such a pathological form of personal hatred and that it is unrestrictedly propagated on the pages of the daily DUMA.

Nevertheless, the basic principles that are prompting the articles in the aforementioned daily on the subject of our national security problems can no longer be passed over without comment. They are evidently aimed at disinformation and at misleading part of our public, a fact to which I cannot remain indifferent.

How is it done?

As far as the "80 kilometers demilitarized zone" mentioned by DUMA is concerned, the article states that this idea "emerged in Paris one evening and was subsequently pompously announced at the NATO Headquarters." Everyone knows, however, that the president's visit to Brussels took place one week before his Paris visit. The Brussels visit was covered by 27 journalists from nearly all our mass media. The question was not even mentioned on that occasion. However, what do facts count anyway? The important thing is to create a hostile attitude to the idea in particular and to our state leadership as a whole. The president mentioned the question during his Paris visit describing it as a specific implementation of the proposal submitted by Mr. Mitsotakis, the Greek prime minister, on establishing demilitarized zones around the borders of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. It is very strange indeed, that DUMA should base its arguments trying to prove the unfeasibility of the idea precisely on the fact that Greek security would allegedly be affected. The Greek Government proposed the idea as a matter of fact. In addition, Mr. Mitsotakis' initiative was appreciated by the representatives of all political parties in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] included. This happened at a special session of the National Security Council devoted to the issue. The representatives of the BSP supported the Mitsotakis proposal, praising him as a statesman who is concerned about our country's interests. Why are these facts not mentioned in the DUMA article?

I am convinced that our experts owe something to the Bulgarian public for failing to disclose the constructive link between the Mitsotakis and Zhelev proposals and the agreement reached between Bulgaria and Greece, on the one hand, and the recently signed "Sofia Document," on the other hand. This link precisely shows how political steps can be useful for our country's security, regardless of their authors and those who implement them. This is what counts, and not selfish party interests!

Numerous articles and reports appearing in DUMA are trying to suggest that our state leadership is not applying a well-defined strategy in its national security policy, but is simply trying to improvise on the spur of the moment. All sorts of personal insults, directed at the authors of Bulgaria's national security concept, were invented for the DUMA readers' entertainment on the occasion. A little better education and a little more information, in addition to some elementary decency, would have been required on the part of those who are criticizing the aforementioned concept in order to explain to all Bulgarians that the concept was adopted as a working option and was approved as such by the members of the national Security Council in the presence of three BSP Supreme Council members. The paper in question was translated into six languages and recommended by the UN Disarmament Committee as a model for a new national security system in countries that are currently undergoing the democratization process. The policy of our state leadership, which was based on this concept, rescued Bulgaria from the complete international isolation to which it was doomed under the former regime. The concept and policy in question created favorable conditions for the civilized and principled solution of our national and ethnic problems.

I do not claim that this concept is perfect, but it is workable. In addition to this, it is open to any sensible proposals, from whoever they may be submitted. I mentioned the problem of information. I would like to add that the new NATO strategy, which was adopted at the "Rome meeting," is not very different from our concept, as regards its structure. The security systems of Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Albania are built along the same lines. This is by no means unusual, but a natural result of the profound, critical reassessment of the military and political realities of the recent past. The old military-political way of thinking created large accumulations of weapons and gigantic armies, it precipitated the peoples into a profound crisis, and prompted the disintegration of the socialist system on a national and worldwide scale. Therefore, it was precisely the scientists and scholars, rather than old diplomats and generals, who searched for new methods of building our country's security. This new form of security should be based on the realities in our country, in the Balkans, and in Europe, it should be based on the worldwide political processes rather than on the dead delusions of dreams about past glories.

Vasil Popov's frequent articles published in DUMA on national security questions, especially those appearing over the last weeks, are raising a question of moral standards? Is it realistic to defend national interests from anonymous positions? Such attempts show a lack of elementary intellectual and civil courage. There is even more:

DUMA has provided sufficient evidence of the clearly defined circle of its anonymous sources—they can be identified as some officers and generals of our Army's General Staff. I am asking those anonymous sources, whether, having depoliticized themselves, they would so generously share their ideas on our national security with correspondents of the dailies DEMOKRATSIYA and PODKREPA. One of the basic theses of our national security concept is the independent approach to its problems, unaffected by party bias. What we need today is a national security concept that applies equally to all Bulgarians, is supported by all political parties, and is approved by all states. This is the link that will consolidate the unity of our long-suffering people.

Defense Minister Ludzhev Describes Army Reform

AU0901195792 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Today Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev gave his first news conference. He opened it with the words: The reform has started in the ministry. It will mainly be directed toward ensuring openness and transparency, and giving everyone the chance to find out and check on everything that happens in the Ministry of Defense.

The concept on the development of the Bulgarian Army during the period from 1994 to 2000 may be regarded as the start of the reform. The military academies and the ground forces are also expected to prepare draft projects as part of the process of shaping the comprehensive concept on national security.

Minister Ludzhev stressed that prime place must be given to a change of approach toward the country's security problems. The new feature in this field is that whereas until recently military strength was considered the main factor for our defense, at the moment the chief factor is the political one. It is therefore necessary to develop a political system of security. The Army must become a professional tool that is loyal to the state and the political leadership. All this will be embodied in the new laws on security, defense, and the Armed Forces, which will most likely be ready by the beginning of February.

Comments on National Security

AU0901185492 Sofia BTA in English 1820 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—"The Bulgarian Army is under control and most officers support the reform," the minister of defence, Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev, told BTA.

A few minutes earlier, at his first press conference since he took office, Mr. Ludzhev said that Bulgaria was no longer looking for an enemy. In his opinion, the events in the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia have proved that the internal factor is the most important one for a country's security. "Necessary minimum or rather reasonable sufficiency would be the proper definition of the national security measures which Bulgaria is taking now," Mr. Ludzhev said.

In his opinion, the neighbouring states have not given up their intelligence-gathering activity in Bulgaria. But the military counter-intelligence was disbanded, as it had been related to the former Communist Party and had involved a drastic violation of human rights. A new military intelligence which will observe the law has been set up. Although reforms are being carried out in that system, the Ministry of Defence is well informed about the foreign intelligence agencies' activities in Bulgaria.

Mr. Ludzhev said that the Army should turn into a loyal and professional instrument in the hands of the country's leadership.

List of Political Parties Published

AU1001091192 Sofia PRESSLUZHBA KURIER in Bulgarian No. 255, 30 Dec 91 pp 12-14

["Full list of political parties and organizations with the status of parties in Bulgaria," recorded by decision of the Sofia City Court in the official register maintained according to the Political Parties Act]

[Text]

Register of Political Parties in Bulgaria

The parties and organizations included in the following list are arranged in the order in which their names were registered at the Sofia City Court and officially published in "DURZHAVEN VESTNIK," as required by the Political Parties Act.

1. Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [Bulgarski zemedelski naroden suyuz-Nikola Petkov]
2. Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [Bulgarska sotsialdemokraticheska partiya]
3. Democratic Womens Union [Demokratichen suyuz na zhenite]
4. Bulgarian Democratic Constitutional Party [Bulgarska demokrat-konstitutsionna partiya]
5. "Prosvetlenie" Association [Druzhestvo "Prosvetlenie"]
6. Liberal Democratic Party [Liberal-demokraticheska partiya]
7. Independent Democratic Party [Nezavisima demokratichna partiya]
8. National Party of Labor, Private Owners, Producers, and Creative Workers [Natsionalna partiya na truda, chastnite sobstvenitsi, proizvoditelite i tvortsite]
9. Liberal Congress Party [Partiya Liberalen kongres]
10. "ERA-3" Union of Democratic Parties and Movements [Suyuz na demokratichnite partii i dvizheniya "ERA-3"]
11. Bulgarian Christian Democratic Party-Center [Bulgarska khristiyandemokraticheska partiya (tsentur)]
12. Union of Party Nonmembers [Suyuz na bezpartiynite]

13. "Party Nonmembers for Democracy" Movement [Dvizhenie "Bezpartiyni za demokratsiya"]
14. National Patriotic Union Party [Partiya Natsionalen patriotichen suyuz]
15. Party of Free Democrats [Partiya na svobodnite demokrati]
16. Bulgarian People's Party [Bulgarska narodna partiya]
17. *New Social Democratic Party [Nova sotsialdemokraticheska partiya]*
18. Party of Labor [Partiya na truda]
19. Socialist Youth Union [Sotsialisticheski mladezhki suyuz]
20. Bulgarian Socialist Party [Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya]
21. Conservative Party [Konservativna partiya]
22. Republican Party [Republikanska partiya]
23. Christian Republican Party [Khristiyanrepublikanska partiya]
24. Democratic Party [Demokraticheska partiya]
25. Alternative Socialist Association-Independent [Alternativno sotsialistichesko obedinenie-nezavisimi]
26. Union of Nonparty Guarantors [Suyuz na bezpartiynite garanti]
27. "Civic Initiative" Movement [Dvizhenie "Grazhdanska initsiativa"]
28. Union of Thracian Cultural and Educational Societies in Bulgaria [Suyuz na trakiyskite kulturnoprosvetni druzhestva v Bulgariya]
29. Fatherland Party of Labor [Otechestvena partiya na truda]
30. Bulgarian Fatherland Party [Bulgarska otechestvena partiya]
31. "New Democracy" Bulgarian National Union [Bulgarski natsionalen suyuz "Nova demokratsiya"]
32. Federation of Glasnost and Democracy Clubs [Federatsiya na klubovete za glasnost i demokratsiya] (proceedings are under way for reregistration as Liberal Party) [Partiya Liberali]
33. Bulgarian National Radical Party [Bulgarska natsionalno- radikalna partiya]
34. Union of Invalids in Bulgaria [Suyuz na invalidite v Bulgariya]
35. Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party-Varna [Bulgarska revolyutsionna mladezhka partiya-Varna]
36. Bulgarian National Democratic Party [Bulgarska natsionalna demokraticheska partiya]
37. "Zveno" People's Union [Naroden suyuz "Zveno"]
38. Club of Victims of Post-1945 Repressions [Klub na represiranite sled 1945 godina]
39. Bulgarian Democratic Forum [Bulgarski demokraticheski forum]
40. "Obnovlenie" Political Party-Association [Politicheska partiya-druzhestvo "Obnovlenie"]
41. United Democratic Center [Obedinen demokraticheski tsentur]
42. "Ecoglasnost" Political Club [Politicheski klub "Ekoglasnost"]
43. "New Bulgaria" Movement [Dvizhenie "Nova Bulgariya"]
44. Radical Democratic Party in Bulgaria [Radikaldemokraticheska partiya v Bulgariya]
45. *Christian Democratic Party in Bulgaria [Khristiyandemokraticheska partiya v Bulgariya]*
46. Alternative Social Liberal Party [Alternativna sotsialliberalna partiya]
47. Liberal Party-Pernik [Liberalna partiya-Pernik]
48. Democratic Party-Plovdiv [Demokraticheska partiya- Plovdiv]
49. Fatherland Union [Otechestven suyuz]
50. "Stefan Stambolov" People's Liberal Party [Narodnoliberalna partiya "Stefan Stambolov"]
51. Party of Liberty and Progress [Partiya na svobodata i progresa]
52. Rights and Freedoms Movement [Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi]
53. Organization of Heart Patients and the Socially Disadvantaged in Bulgaria [Organizatsiya na surdechnobolnite i sotsialno slabite v Bulgariya]
54. Free Democratic Party [Svobodna demokraticheska partiya]
55. "Vrabcha 1" Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [Bulgarski zemedelski naroden suyuz "Vrabcha 1"]
56. "Democracy" Club-Lovech [Klub "Demokratsiya"-Lovech]
57. Christian Radical Party [Khristiyanradikalna partiya]
58. Monarchist Conservative Union [Monarkhichesko- konservativen suyuz]
59. Bulgarian Communist Party [Bulgarska komunisticheska partiya]
60. "Edinstvo" Cultural and Educational Organization-Plovdiv [Kulturno-prosvetna organizatsiya "Edinstvo"-Plovdiv]
61. Green Party in Bulgaria [Zelena partiya v Bulgariya]
62. Republican Party in Bulgaria [Republikanska partiya v Bulgariya]
63. Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United [Bulgarski zemedelski naroden suyuz-edinen]
64. Bulgarian Workers and Peasants Party [Bulgarska rabotnichesko-selska partiya]
65. Party of Free Democrats-Center [Partiya na svobodnite demokrati-tsentur]
66. Free Cooperative Party [Svobodna kooperativna partiya]
67. Bulgarian Democratic Party [Bulgarska demokraticheska partiya]
68. Union for a Civic Society [Suyuz za grazhdansko obshtestvo]
69. Bulgarian Liberal Party [Bulgarska liberalna partiya]

70. Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party [Bulgarska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partiya]
71. Democratic Movement for a Constitutional Monarchy [Demokraticheskо dvizhenie za konstitutsionna monarkhiya]
72. Ruse "Kingdom of Bulgaria" Union [Rusenski suyuz "Tsarstvo Bulgariya"]
73. Democratic Party in Bulgaria [Demokraticheska partiya v Bulgariya]
74. United Agrarian Union [Obedinen zemedelski suyuz]
75. Movement for Legality and Democracy-Varna [Dvizhenie za zakonnost i demokratsiya-Varna]
76. Bulgarian Union for a European Federation [Bulgarski suyuz za Evropeyska federatsiya]
77. New Christian Democratic Party [Nova khristiyandemokraticheska partiya]
78. Federation of Anarchists in Bulgaria [Federatsiya na anarkhistite v Bulgariya]
79. Bulgarian Socialist Youth Federation [Federatsiya na bulgarskata sotsialisticheska mladezh]
80. Christian Womens Movement Party [Partiya Khristiyansko zhensko dvizhenie]
81. Bulgarian Communist Party (Marxist) [Bulgarska komunisticheska partiya (marksisti)]
82. Movement for Democracy and Social Justice [Dvizhenie za demokratsiya i sotsialna spravedlivost]
83. Bulgarian Agrarian Youth Union [Bulgarski zemedelski mladezhki suyuz]
84. Bulgarian Business Party [Bulgarska biznes partiya]
85. Anarchist Youth Federation [Federatsiya na anarkhistichnata mladezh]
86. "Rodolyubie" Association-Slivnitsa [Sdruzhenie "Rodolyubie"-Slivnitsa]
87. Bulgarian Business Bloc [Bulgarski biznes blok]
88. Bulgarian Democratic Party for European and World States [Bulgarska demokraticheska partiya za evropeyski i svetovni shtati]
89. Christian Radical Democratic Party [Khristiyanradikaldemokraticheska partiya]
90. Union of Democratic Forces-Serdika [Suyuz na demokraticheskite sili-Serdika]
91. Constitutional Union Party-Plovdiv [Partiya konstitutionen suyuz-Plovdiv]
92. Christian Democratic Front [Khristiyandemokraticheski front] (court proceedings are in progress to change name to Christian Democratic Union [Khristiyandemokratichen suyuz]
93. Christian Democratic Community [Khristiyandemokraticheska obshtnost]
94. "Preobrazhenie" Political Forum [Politicheski forum "Preobrazhenie"]
95. Party of Property Owners in Bulgaria [Partiya na sobstvenitsite v Bulgariya]
96. Democratic Circle "Bulgarians for Common Sense and a National Conscience" [Demokratichen krug "Bulgari za razum i natsionalna suvest"]
97. "Bulgarian Eagle" Association Political Party [Politicheska partiya druzhestvo "Bulgarski orel"]
98. "Party for Justice" United Democratic Union [Obedinen demokratichen suyuz "Partiya za spravedlivost"]
99. United Democratic Forces-Right Democratic Alliance Party [Partiya suedineni demokratichni silidesen demokratichen alians]
100. Green Liberals Party [Partiya na zelenite liberali]
101. Democratic Party-Conservative Pact [Demokraticheska partiya-konservativen sgovor]
102. "Constitutional Forum" Political Club [Politicheski klub "Konstitutsionen forum"]
103. "Constitutional Rights and Freedoms" Political Club [Politicheski klub "Konstitutsionni prava i svobodi]
104. Union of Victims of Repressions in Bulgaria Since 9 September 1944 [Suyuz na represiranite v Bulgariya sled 9 septemvri 1944 godina]

(The above information reflects the position on 30 December 1991)

Correction to Ludzhev Receives Greek Delegation

WA1001153592

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Ludzhev Receives Greek Military Delegation," published in the 9 January East Europe DAILY REPORT, page 6:

Column two only paragraph, first sentence, make read: ... between Colonel General Ionnasis Verivakis, chief of...(correcting name "Ionnasis")

Groups React to Havel's Draft Election Bill

Jicinsky Expresses Doubts

AU0901113592 Prague CSTK in English 0829 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Prague Jan 8 (CSTK)—[passage omitted] In an interview with the farmer's daily ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY First Deputy Chairman of the Federal Assembly (parliament) Zdenek Jicinsky discusses the new election law, scheduled to be approved by the end of January. Commenting on President Havel's draft, which combines majority and proportional representation, Jicinsky says Havel's proposal will not create a closer tie between deputies and voters, as intended. He added the president's draft law would also result in an extremely unclear political spectrum in parliament.

Civic Movement To Support Law

LD0801151392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] The Civic Movement Council Presidium has recommended that Civic Movement deputies in the Federal Assembly support the draft electoral bill submitted by President Vaclav Havel. Jan Chudomel, Civic Movement press spokesman, announced this today. The Presidium also proposes that the law should be amended in order to strengthen the majority and propotional representation system which will increase the chance of the president's proposal being adopted.

Czech Committee Rejects Proposal

LD0901092192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Today, the Czech National Council Constitutional and Legal Committee failed to endorse the proposals of President Vaclav Havel to publish a law on elections to the Federal Assembly, on the changes in the Federal Assembly, and on the formation of a Federal council. Deputy Michal Sedlacek from the Civic Democratic Party said in the rapporteurs' report that the draft of the election law does not conform with our conditions. He criticized the system of first and second vote, which should be at the electorate's disposal. He also pointed to the problem linked with determining election wards, the number of whose voters can differ, as per the proposal, by as much as 25 percent.

Slovak Democratic Movement Critical

LD0901091592 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Excerpts] We, too, want to be critical but not at any cost. So, we will try to voice constructive criticism. That is why we are entering 1992 with the slogan: Attack in the New Year. It should be an attack on misleading statements, demogogy, dishonesty, and leftist populism.

Dear listeners, I have been quoting the words of the secretary of the Slovak National Democratic Movement at the opening of today's regular briefing. When it ended, correspondent Igor Matlon asked Peter Brnak, chairman of the Movement, for an interview.

[Begin recording] [Matlon] The Slovak National Council Presidium agreed in principle yesterday on the name and wording of the treaty between the Czech and Slovak Republics, or rather, between the parliaments of the republics.

[Brnak] We think this step is a retreat from the positions of the Slovak National Council Presidium and a retreat from the Slovak positions as such. We think that, overall, the change of name from the State Treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic to that of the Treaty on the Principles of the State Set-Up of the Joint State is significant for the reason that the change of name indicates the fact that there exists a legislative initiative connected with the adoption of the Federal constitution, and not a treaty between two sovereign state-forming entities.

[Matlon] Do you think there is a realistic chance that the treaty will be adopted in the near future?

[Brnak] We think that neither the constitution of the Slovak Republic nor the treaty between the Czech and Slovak Republics will be adopted, or approved, before the new election. [passage omitted]

[Matlon] President Havel submitted a proposal for a new election law.

[Brnak] Our movement, like other political parties, opposes the majority principle. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovak Parties Likely To Reject Bill

AU0901112892 Prague CSTK in English 0809 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Bratislava— The Slovak independent paper NARODNA OBRODA discusses Slovakia's attitude to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's proposed draft electoral law, suggesting to substitute the current system of proportional representation by the majority system.

The daily says the Slovak parliament committees are likely to recommend to the Federal parliament not to accept Havel's proposal but to pass a proposal of Federal parliament deputies for a partial amendment of the existing electoral law.

The daily quotes Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky as saying that approval of the president's proposal would mean a fundamental turn in the current tradition of elections in Czechoslovakia, which started in 1920. Carnogursky said it would not be workable. [passage omitted]

Civic Movement Suspends Talks With Conservatives

AU0901112592 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 92 p 3

[CSTK report: "The End of the Coalition"]

[Text] Prague—The director of the Civic Movement's election campaign, Ivan Gabal, has categorically rejected the possibility of concluding an election coalition with the Conservative Party-Free Bloc. He made this clear yesterday following talks between Civic Movement representatives and Conservative Party Chairman Jiri V. Kotas. "I will advise the Civic Movement Presidium to immediately suspend negotiations on an election coalition with the Conservative Party," said Gabal. Kotas stated earlier that his party had submitted a memorandum to the Civic Movement in which it attempted to formulate a possible preelection coalition between the two entities. However, according to Civic Movement Press spokesman Jan Chudomel, the Civic Movement Presidium decided during the evening to break off coalition talks with the Conservative Party-Free Bloc. He refused to comment on the reasons for this decision.

Finance Minister Klaus Explains Budget Deficit

LD0901045192 Prague CSTK in English 1325 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 8 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus today told CSTK that deficits of the Federal, Czech, and Slovak Republics' 1991 budgets are estimated at about 17,000 million crowns ($567 million).

"The explanation is easy and pretty clear: The republics behaved in a socialist way," Klaus said. "In the last weeks and days of the previous year they spent much more money than they should have. It was an attempt to curry favour before Christmas," Klaus said. He pointed out that the final deficit of the budgets will not be so high because regional budgets have not yet been included. "Unfortunately we have no precise figures on the state of the regional budgets until now," Klaus concluded.

Klaus Discusses Role of State in Market Economy

AU0901152592 Prague EKONOM in Czech No 1, 3-9 Jan pp 16, 17

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, CSFR deputy prime minister and minister of finance, by Irena Satavova; place and date not given: "The Key Word of 1992—Privatization"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Satavova] The frequently raised question of defining the role of the state in a market economy is becoming topical. We have abandoned one extreme, central planning, while another, that of total market self-regulation, is often a topic of discussions by experts, and laymen.

[Klaus] The fundamental idea, on which we are building our economic system, is the principle of market self-regulation. Of course, this principle does not at all imply that the state will have no role in the economy, it only means that the market truly dominates as the self-regulating principle.

The state acts on several levels. One of them is defining the basic frameworks—the so-called "marking of the courts." The second task is protecting public goods in the broadest sense of the word, because it includes, for instance, air pollution. Macroeconomic regulation can also be considered public property: At a time of inflation, we must implement restrictive policies; if we have unutilized potential that we could release by developing the appropriate state projects, then the state certainly must implement expansive policies.

Some of our reform critics act as if we were introducing the capitalism of the end of 18th century when the role of the state in the economy was minimal. That would have to be reflected in the state budget reaching an almost zero level. The 1992 state budget in Czechoslovakia represents, however, approximately 45 percent of the gross domestic product. This means that 45 halers of each koruna passes one way or another through the state. Hence, the criticism to which we are constantly subjected, i.e. that the state does not intervene at all in the economy, is complete nonsense. It would be justified if only 15 or 20 halers of the koruna went into the state budget [treasury], with 45 halers, however, no one can claim that we have eliminated the state's involvement in the economy.

On the other hand, it is absolutely correct for the state to use its own money when involving itself in the economy. Of course, "own" is a controversial term here, for, in fact, it is the taxpayers' money. The important thing is, however, that the state influences the economy by means of money rather than advice, instructions, or other forms of intervention.

I will not budge an inch from the claim that the market is the dominant self-regulating principle. Like all principles, it has its positive and negative sides—none of the advocates of the reform idea has ever claimed that the market is flawless. We know, however, that it brings results that are far superior to any alternative system.

[Satavova] After the transfer to a market economy was announced, many people immediately "scrapped" all their planning tools. Can planning be compatible with a market-economy system? If so, how?

[Klaus] If you consider human activity to be a conscious activity, i.e., that man does not only look back but also forward, and if you want to call this "looking into the future" planning, then, in this clearly defined sense, planning is an inseparable part of human activity. The important thing is who is planning. In the past 40 years, planning normally meant that someone was planning another person. This was the meaning of the term planning, which is firmly entrenched in our thinking.

and which certainly does not belong to a market economy. Today, if you want to talk about planning, it can only mean that everybody is to plan for himself, or to contemplate himself in the future, and on this basis decide on the strategy of his future activities. [passage omitted]

Czech Finance Minister Reviews 1991 Budget

LD0901130492 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Interview with Czech Finance Minister Karel Spacek by correspondent Barbary Tacheci; place and date not given— recorded]

[Text] [Tacheci] Minister, the preliminary results of the budgets of both the Federation and the two republics are now known. The Federal budget ended with a 6 billion korunas [Kcs] surplus, the Slovak budget ended up with a deficit of roughly Kcs 9 billion, and the Czech budget recorded the worst result in the form of a Kcs 14 billion deficit. From which resources will this Czech budget deficit will be met?

[Spacek] First, I would like to correct you. The fact is that the end result of the Czech budget was not the worst. The reality, in terms of the scale of the budget—the Czech budget forms half of the overall budgetary system—the result is better than in Slovakia. I am saying this in order to make the matter clear. Otherwise, the amount of Kcs 14.26 billion has to be reduced by surpluses which we will have within the framework of the budgets of villages and towns, where the surplus will be Kcs 4.8 billion. Furthermore, we are to receive Kcs 3.3 billion from delayed levies on wages of agricultural organizations. Therefore, I myself estimate that the real deficit will amount to roughly Kcs 6 billion.

[Tacheci] Minister, if I am not mistaken, a surplus of about Kcs 1 billion was originally planned in the Czech budget. Therefore, I would like to ask: At yesterday's Slovak Government session, Minister Danco declared that he expected a subsidy from the federation to meet the deficit of the Slovak budget amounting roughly to Kcs 3 billion. Do you envisage something similar?

[Spacek] Look, for instance the postponement of the payment of levies on wages in agricultural organizations was carried out on the basis of the recommendation of the Federal Government, and it will be necessary to agree on how to resolve this matter: whether farmers will have enough resources to repay these rescheduled amounts or which budget will carry this expenditure. All these budgets will again come on the agenda and we will have to come to an agreement about these matters.

[Tacheci] In any case, minister, to formulate this issue somewhat more specifically: In order to balance the deficit of between Kcs 5 and 6 billion, which will remain after deducting the items you have mentioned, do you still envisage a subsidy from Federal resources or not?

[Spacek] So far we have agreed that there will not be a special subsidy from the Federal budget but that individual budgets will deal with their deficits by themselves.

[Tacheci] You are therefore talking in essense about issuing government bonds? Is this so?

[Spacek] I do not know as yet what specific form this will take. It will apparently take form of government bonds. However, you have not asked me a question which I regard as fundamental—the overall assessment of the situation. I do not think that this is a catastrophic result. This is because we have to reckon with the fact that the economy declined further than we envisaged originally so that the whole problem is developing on the side of revenues.

[Tacheci] Minister, what you have just said is somewhat at variance with what Deputy Federal Finance Minister Kocarnik told MLADA FRONTA today. He said that the problem of the budgets of the two republics does not rest in the shortfall of revenues but in that too much money was spent at the end of the year. What is the truth?

[Spacek] The facts must decide. On 31 December last year overall expenditure of the Czech budget was Kcs 1.3 billion lower against the annual budget. The shortfall, therefore, is not because we spent extra resources. It lies truly in revenues. Naturally, I am not quite satisfied with the results because a deficit is always an unpleasant matter. However, I believe that despite certain worries and complications that accompanied 1991, this complicated year of transformation, the results in essense show that our budgetary management was in line with the possibilities of the Czech government.

Czech Minister Discusses Foreign Investments

AU0901134992 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

["(ru)"-signed report: "Recovery in Proportion to Injection"]

[Text] "I consider too optimistic the expectation of economic growth in the next six months." This is what Jan Vrba, Czech Republic minister of industry, said to reporters at a news conference yesterday, and he added that halting the production decline is a matter of long-term investments.

By the end of November, the output in enterprises in the Czech Ministry of Industry sector declined by 28 percent. However, for the entire year this drop will certainly be even higher, due to interrupted operation in many enterprises in December. Compared with November 1990, the output dropped less than 40 percent and sales by 45 percent. That is, the buildup of unsold stock continues to grow.

We cannot consider this development sound because, among other things, this development is not a result of

desirable structural changes. For example, the indiscernible drop in the output of the metallurgical, heavy engineering, and chemical industries is conspicuous. On the other hand, sectors producing mostly final products—that is, wood processing and electrotechnical industry—show an incomparably larger decline.

According to Minister Vrba, the current marketing difficulties cannot be alleviated without fundamentally restructuring production, which requires investments. However, enterprises do not have enough means of their own to achieve this. They are burdened with debt—insolvency allegedly climbed to 80 billion korunas—and the development of profits is not a pleasant sight. In January last year, profits reached 12.7 billion korunas, yet they gradually slipped to 1.3 billion korunas in November.

It is not easy to obtain long-term loans under the banks' current policy. Statistical data show that banks prefer directing their financial means toward short term credits. In the third quarter, banks provided 32 percent of all the loans, compared with 26 percent in the first three months.

Minister Vrba said that the debt write-off is a positive step. However, this step should have been taken a year ago. The effect of the debt write-off is inevitably smaller now, and the discussions that preceded it were too theoretical since there is no recipe to overcome the current transitional period. The ministers refused to comment on the selection of enterprises designed for the write-off.

Regarding development last year, it has been stated that the achieved trade surplus is a positive fact. However, global figures are involved here, and, according to the minister, we must also realize that this surplus has been mostly achieved by exporting products with small added value. "We can accept such development as an intermediate step, but not as the end goal we want to achieve," said the minister, and he added that the composition of our exports, too, indicates the necessity to start changes leading to restructuring.

We hope that foreign investors may help start them. Based on agreements—according to which privatization projects were drafted—foreign partners will invest 26 billion korunas in the modernization of the Czechoslovak industry in the next five years. This represents more [money] than previously released during an entire five-year plan.

Despite the fact that this scope [of investments] obviously corresponds to the current possibilities and conditions in the CSFR, it does not cover what would be needed for modernization and restructuring. According to the minister, we cannot expect the production drop to be halted without making necessary investments. We must not rely on the regulating function of the market, either.

The minister sees the main source of means in a revived economy. According to him, it is necessary to consider what this goal requires. However, at the same time, it is necessary to arrive at a decision that we want to achieve this goal, that is, a political consensus in necessary. "If we give priority to such a decision, then I am convinced that we will be able to find a technical solution," the minister said. He thinks that a longer time span, during which the expenditures and income of the state budget would be balanced, would be a possible step. "If the investments yield profits next year, then I would not be afraid of the production drop," said J. Vrba.

Slovak Government on Legislation, State Credits

LD0801114192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Correspondent Jan Palascak report on the Slovak Government's first session in 1992]

[Text] The government first approved its legislative plans for the first half of this year. It will discuss about 60 bills for the Slovak parliament or their amendment, 15 bills or amendments of the laws of the Federal Assembly, and legislative proposals in the form of decrees of the Slovak Government.

The Slovak Government voiced its disagreement with the proposal of the group of deputies of the Slovak National Council to amend the constitutional law of the Slovak parliament according to which the current election period of the deputies of the Slovak parliament is to be shortened from 24 to 22 months. This would mean that the elections to the Slovak parliament would be declared already in April 1992.

The Slovak Government approved a number of the bills of the Slovak parliament, for example the air protection bill and the bill of the Federal parliament to amend the foreign currency law.

The Ministry of Control of the Slovak Republic submitted a report on the results of its inspection, conducted by tax and small business administration authorities, of observance of the legal provisions for enterpreneurial activity by citizens. The Slovak Government acknowledged this report. It also acknowledged the report on the assessment of privatization projects in the first wave of privatization in Slovakia. It was said that of 174 assessed projects only one fulfills the criteria for approval. The government decided that relevant ministers and the other heads of central bodies will have to submit completed privatization projects within two weeks after discussing them with the ministry and with enterprises. This will be preceded by discussions in the Slovak Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property.

Last but not least, the Slovak Republic approved with reservations the procedure and the conditions for assuming state guarantees for credits provided by the

commercial banks to businessmen with the aim of implementing structural changes in the national economy. It also agreed with the guarantee framework in which the state budget assumes guarantees for newly provided credits in 1992 amounting to 8 billion korunas.

Former VPN Leader Gal Quits Active Politics

AU0901114592

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 7 January on page 1 carries a 450-word interview with Fedor Gal, former chairman of the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, by Ivan Rajecky entitled "I Have Not Given Up Membership!" The interview was conducted by telephone (with Rajecky in Bratislava and Gal in Prague). The date is not given.

In the interview, Gal is asked to respond to the rumor that he "parted ways with the Civic Democratic Union [ODU]-VPN and gave up his party membership." Gal denies that he gave up his party membership, but concedes that "at the last session of the Executive Committee of the ODU-VPN Slovak Council, of which I have been a member since the Poprad congress, I asked to be released from my post in this body." The reason for his resignation, Gal says, is that on 1 February he is to take up the post of head of an unspecified "workplace for political analysis," which he regards as incompatible with being a "top-level politician."

Asked whether this means his "definitive departure from the political scene," Gal says that he has the feeling that he has "fulfilled his role" and that he wants to devote himself fully to his civilian profession. Henceforth, he will therefore be "citizen and scientist."

At the same time, Gal does not rule out his return to active politics at a later point. He says: "It is not written anywhere that I will work as a social scientist forever, that I will not accept a place in the [political] structures after the elections, should such an offer be made to me."

Discussions Continue Over Mosnov Airport Issues

LD0801222792 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The mayors and representatives of towns and villages in the vicinity of Mosnov airport met Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky and Air Force commanders this afternoon. Our correspondent Pavel Smid has filed this telephone report:

[Smid, in Czech] Whereas massive demonstrations were in progress in front of the airport this time last year, civilized roundtable negotiations, though protracted at times, were held today. According to some mayors their results were not specific enough and provided evidence that the problem of negative impact exerted by the airport on the population of 10 adjacent villages has not markedly improved, irrespective of certain specific measures introduced by the army to restrict fighter aircraft flights.

Minister Dobrovsky's statement made today that the presence of the air force at this airport is envisaged at least until the year 2005 has disappointed those who believed the assurances made last year that the fighter aircraft regiment would be deployed in Mosnov for a one-year trial period. This decision is based on strategic reasons of the defense of the state, and it is therefore inevitable that people will seek other forms of compensation for negative influences.

One such method of compensation has been applied by the Mosnov air force when they transport, practically free of charge, sick children and adults to specialized hospital units in Prague. Since 4 November, 392 patients have been flown in this way. The Ostrava ambulance service, which participates in the transfers, has high praise for the soldiers' assistance. Nevertheless, the basic step, the evidence of which the inhabitants of the worst-affected villages could really see, has to be taken by the army's administrator, that is, the state. For example, in parts of the Novy Jicin region the aircraft noise exceeds 105 decibels.

Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky sees a feasible solution in legislative measures such as tax relief or specific subsidies to improve the environment for affected residents. This is nothing new under the sun; steps like this have been discussed a number of times. Let us hope that this year the Gordian knot of constant dispute is cut.

Resignations From Police Expected After Screenings

AU0901133692 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Jan 92 p 8

["(rk)"-signed report: "Screenings and the Interior Ministry"]

[Excerpt] Prague—Some 3,500 police officers, that is, 10 percent of the overall number, will leave the force as a result of the screenings law. This is the opinion held by Lieutenant Colonel Zelenicky, the police chief. While everyone in the Interior Ministry security section and in the police directorate will be screened, only the functionaries among serving police officers will be screened. Corrective Education Corps Director J. Karabec expects that all his subordinates will be screened; some 600 people (7 percent) will leave. However, this will not endanger prison operations (last year alone 900 people joined the Corps). [passage omitted]

Impact of Reform on Consumers in 1992 Viewed

AU0801152392 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 3 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Emanuel Sip, director of the Federal Ministry of Finance consumer prices department: "Reform in the Second Year"]

[Excerpts] The liberalization of prices started on 1 January 1991 by a fast and single liberalization of approximately 70 percent of prices in the economy, including

the majority of consumer prices. Prices in the retail system rose 30 to 40 percent almost immediately and consumers' purchasing power dropped in the same proportion. However, at the same time, an important reversal in market conditions took place. The surplus of money, compared with the available goods on all the markets, disappeared and the situation arose in which supply prevails over demand. With the level of actual demand having dropped below the level of supply, the price growth inevitably stopped for several months.

As expected, this made it possible to abolish, by the end of 1991, short-term regulatory measures that were supposed to alleviate the price shock (for example, maximum prices for basic food and feed grain, maximum trade markups, regulation of prices in a number of industrial sectors). The scope of price regulation in the CSFR attains some 30 percent compared with the previous situation and does not differ too much from the situation in the EC countries. It is even smaller than in neighboring Austria, for instance. [passage omitted].

At the present time, certain changes are taking place in the orientation of price policy. After short-term price regulation is lifted, the movement of prices will be slower this time, and since there will be less need for emergency interventions in prices, more room will be left for a balanced concept. Some 6 percent of prices will be regulated in the economy. This will apply to publicly [as published] regulated sectors such as electricity generation, water, post offices and telecommunications, railroads, housing, and health care. As early as this year, more changes will be introduced in regulated prices. Providing subsidies and adjusting the level of [domestic] prices to the level of world prices will be gradually discontinued.

The first 80 percent increase in rents in the so-called state owned apartments will take place at the beginning of this year. During the first part of the year, it is likely that it will be decided to double postal tariffs and to adjust prices for telephone calls in both directions, which will have a little impact on the overall price increase. The second increase in rents—amounting to 100 percent on average—in the so-called state owned apartments is planned for July 1992. Changes in the maximum tariffs for some types of energy and fuel are expected to take place in the fall. Despite the fact that it seems that the impact of these prices is large, they do not cause the overall price index to rise more than 6 percentage points, that is, about twice as much the current increase in food prices. However, in contrast to the price development in 1991, the problem is that these necessary adjustments will have a different impact on different consumers. Therefore, it will be necessary to find good solutions in the sphere of the social safety net and to protect the rights and interests of the consumers.

It is not and it will not be the goal of price policy to allow the above-mentioned monopolistically organized sectors to satisfy their ambitious demands for higher prices and price liberalization. According to the Principles of the State Energy Policy, a concept approved by the CSFR Government recently, the development will be gradual and will be linked to corresponding restructuring, far-reaching privatization, establishment of competitive relations corresponding to new trends on the European level, elimination of subsidies and nontransparent internal redistribution processes, and last but not least, substantial improvement in the quality of services. The objective is to transform these monopolistic and very often insatiable and apathetic institutions into a sector running its business with necessary courage and to the benefit of a wide spectrum of consumers. More differentiated effects on the consumer caused by partial adjustments to the price levels will necessarily require a sensitive and balanced approach.

Despite the fact that the main objective of the economic policy will be to stop the economic decline, the consistent restrictive policy will still remain an important priority. By lifting wage regulation and writing off the debt of some enterprises, more room for further growth of income will be gained. However, this growth will have to be linked to the production of marketable goods. As long as the relation between wages and labor productivity is not at a reasonable level, we will have to face expected inflation of 10 to 20 percent in the better case. In the worst case we will be on our way to the zone of disruption east of our borders.

New Periodicals Launched at Beginning of 1992

AU0801094492

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers on 3 and 6 January publish a number of items on the launching of new periodicals at the beginning of the new year.

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 3 January on page 2 carries the following CSTK report: "The zero issue of BUSINESS REVIEW [English title as published], a new 16-page monthly for international economic and commercial contacts, was introduced to readers yesterday. The publisher of BUSINESS REVIEW is Konzulta, a Brno-based cooperative."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 3 January on page 2 carries the following CSTK report: "The first issue of TELEGRAF [Telegraph], a new daily that professes allegiance to the political right wing and to conservative orientation, appeared at the newsstands yesterday. The daily will mainly place emphasis on the CSFR's economic situation and on the ties of its economy with foreign economies. The editorial office regards as a priority the provision of uncommented news. The daily leans toward the views of the Civic Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Christian Democratic Party, and other right-of-center political organizations."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 3 January on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,000-word NARODNA OBRODA correspondents' roundup, entitled "Really, an Entirely New Year," reviewing various changes going into effect at the beginning of 1992. The report includes

the following passage on new publications in Slovakia: "Several new periodicals have come into being with the arrival of the new year. The Postal Newspaper Subscription Service [PNS] in Slovakia offers subscribers the daily NOVY SLOVAK [New Slovak], but the monthly W + W INTIM [W + W Intimate] and the biweekly MEDZINARODNE OTAZKY [International Affairs], too, have appeared at PNS newsstands."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 6 January on page 4 carries a 150-word CSTK report entitled "EXTRA S Independently." The report states that the "first separately published issue of EXTRA S [Extra S], the Weekly for a Democratic Slovakia, will hit the newsstands on Wednesday, 8 January." The report, which characterizes EXTRA S as a "nationally oriented opposition newspaper," notes that, "until now it has been published as a supplement of the independent weekly SLOBODNY PIATOK [Free Friday]."

Pithart To Discuss Economic Issues in Ukraine

LD0801142692 Prague CSTK in English 1312 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 8 (CSTK)—"Ukraine might be for Czechoslovakia a more important partner than Russia", Czech Premier Petr Pithart told CSTK today before a visit to Ukraine starting tomorrow. Pithart noted it will be the first visit a Czech Government delegation will pay to Ukraine after the split of the Soviet Union. The Czech representatives will discusss economic issues, particularly Ukraine's current insolvency in connection with its debt towards Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia has a 90-kilometre common frontier with Ukraine.

Trade With Romania Shows Significant Surplus

AU0801181292 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 7 Jan 91 p 8

["(jk)"-signed report: "Problems in Economic Relations With Romania"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Average overall trade turnover with Romania was about 664 million rubles per year. In 1990 this turnover dropped significantly (27 percent against 1989) and Romania's debt toward the CSFR increased to some 172 million rubles. [passage omitted]

As a consequence of the economic situation, the center in Romania furnished no desirable systemic solutions allowing Romanian companies to eliminate Czechoslovakia's trade surplus that had arisen on 31 December 1990 in transferable rubles. A positive shift took place only in the second half of last year, when a contract was concluded on Czechoslovakia's initiative for the delivery of two tankers in the period between 1992 and 1993 (117.5 transferable rubles). This fact facilitated the signing of important commercial and political documents between the governments on 11 September 1991. They are:

—The protocol signed between the CSFR and Romanian Governments on compensating reciprocal claims and obligations existing on 31 December 1990 and arising out of the transition to payments in freely convertible currencies on 1 January 1991.

—The agreement between the CSFR and Romanian Governments on mutual trade and payments.

The protocol, including its supplement, was signed on Romania's initiative on 19 November 1991. The protocol was to help eliminate—on or before 31 December 1991—The Czechoslovak payment surplus by deliveries of goods and services payable in transferable rubles from Romania. [passage omitted]

New conditions for mutual trade after 1 January 1991 require that the goods and services offered on national markets be more competitive. As expected, the overall volume of mutual trade dropped significantly. This was caused by Romania's internal problems—owing to which our partner does not pay sufficient attention to the elimination of the debt owed in transferable rubles to the CSFR—and also by lower marketability [of Romanian products] on the Czechoslovak market.

The level of mutual trade on 31 October 1991 can be seen from the following table of Czechoslovak customs statistics (in millions of U.S. dollars):

	Export	Import	Turnover
Total	88.6	28.5	117.1
Convertible currency	77.4	9.6	87.0
Nonconvertible currency	11.2	18.9	30.1

The statistics show that Czechoslovak trade policy remains oriented toward exports under the new condition. [passage omitted]

Despite the proclaimed liberalization of foreign trade, intervention by Romanian state bodies in the implementation of the concluded agreements are still persisting because of an obvious total lack of financial means. [passage omitted]

Government Statement Condemns SFRY Accusations

LD0901175192 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Today, the government issued a statement condemning the Yugoslav accusations. According to these accusations, the training of saboteurs is carried out on the territory of Hungary and our country delivers arms to neighboring Croatia. The spokesman, Balazs Laszlo, reports on the government statement: [Begin Laszlo recording] The Hungarian Government most resolutely rejects all the allegations regarding Hungary in the memorandum sent by the Yugoslav Federal Government to the Security Council on 2 January. It confirms that since October 1990 no arms delivery of any kind has taken place to Yugoslavia from Hungary and the accusations—military training is carried out for any parties concerned in the Yugoslav conflict and that Hungary supports or facilitates the realization of any military or saboteur actions vis- a-vis Yugoslavia—lack the slightest of foundations.

In the statement, the Hungarian Government also points out that in Yugoslavia, the resolutions of international organizations, which were also adopted by Yugoslavia, are harshly violated. The latest shocking evidence of this is the fatal attack on the EC observer mission members, which Hungary, the same as other states of the international community, considers a cynical and barbaric action.

Finally, the Hungarian Government sincerely hopes that the Yugoslav authorities will withdraw the accusations in the memorandum and at the same time it expects an explanation as to what sort of intentions they are guided by, regarding the forming of their relation with the Hungarian Republic.

Incidentaly, in the Foreign Ministry, the statement was handed over in the form of a note to the SFRY ambassador to Budapest during the course of the day.

Supports UN Force, SFRY Cease-Fire

LD0701174892 Budapest MTI in English 1428 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 7 (MTI)—EC monitors will now be in Hungary to monitor the ban on arms deliveries to Yugoslavia under an agreement with the EC, foreign affairs spokesman Janos Herman said at a press briefing today.

Hungary wants to avoid involvement in the Yugoslav conflict and seeks to help make peace between the republics. After EC recognition of the Yugoslav republics on 15 January, Hungary will follow and honor all republics seeking recognition, Herman said, adding Hungary wants equal relations with all Yugoslav republics.

Hungary hopes the Yugoslav ceasefire will hold and international efforts succeed. As a UN Security Council member, Hungary will vote to send UN peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia, Herman said.

In another development, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky will head a delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) leading officials' session in Prague from 8 to 10 January. During the session, 38 European states' representatives will discuss new developments and prepare a CSCE foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for 30-31 January, Herman said today.

On January 13, Jeszenszky is to hold talks in Kuwait on bilateral ties and regional issues. Hungary actively contributed to Kuwait's liberation, and helped extinguish the burning oil wells there, Herman recalled. Presently, Hungary is a member of both a UN Security Council committee in charge of sanctions imposed on Iraq and another one in charge of a compensation to be paid to Kuwait.

A visit to Turkey will figure in Jeszenszky's schedule between 14 and 16 January, Herman said. The Hungarian foreign minister and his Turkish counterpart are to discuss bilateral ties and sign an investment protection agreement. During the visit, Jeszenszky will meet the Turkish president and the prime minister, and meet with leading business people of Istanbul.

Downed EC Helicopter Took Off From Hungary

LD0901182392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Contrary to the original plans, the trilateral talks on Yugoslavia can be held only on Saturday at Pecs. [Passage omitted] Evelyn Forro spoke to Hanos Herman, foreign affairs spokesman: [passage omitted]

[Forro] Yesterday the Evening Balance [television program] had information that the helicopter that was shot down by the Yugoslav Air Force set off from Hungary. Is this true?

[Herman] Yes, this is true. On 4 October the representatives of the EC and Hungary signed a protocol, and according to this protocol, there is an opportunity for the EC observers to use Hungarian airspace for transit. This has happened several times since then, and this time the two helicopters that were later attacked afterwards had set off from Hungarian territory.

Croat Conference Rescheduled for 11 Jan

LD1001030292 Budapest MTI in English 1415 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 9 (MTI)—A conference of Croat Government representatives, Yugoslav Federal Army officials and EC observers, postponed because of the EC helicopter shot down by Yugoslav Federal forces on Tuesday, is to be held in Pecs (Hungary) 11 January, an EC official told the Hungarian Foreign Ministry today.

The conference, originally scheduled for today, aims at reaching a settlement in crisis-ridden Yugoslavia.

Hungary had already consented to the meeting in Pecs, a foreign affairs spokesman told MTI.

Walesa, Skubiszewski View Ties With Lithuania

LD0901172392 Warsaw PAP in English 1610 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—President Lech Walesa received Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski Thursday [9 January] to discuss the latter's forthcoming visit to Lithuania and some aspects of Poland's relations with the republic.

After the meeting the minister said that the president pinned cautious hope on the visit. Skubiszewski commented that "international documents are important, Polish-Lithuanian declaration is very important but that putting it into effect and practically implementing it will be even more important."

The minister reminded journalists of the uneasy history of Polish-Lithuanian relations and said that the post-war stagnation, caused by Soviet domination, also badly influenced them. He assured journalists that as for Poland, he was going to Lithuania full of goodwill.

Asked whether President Walesa gave him instructions before his visit, Skubiszewski replied that the president was cooperating with him rather than giving instructions. He said that the president presented his opinions, conclusions and that both of them always adopted a common stand, despite the fact that his position as foreign minister is lower in the chain of command.

Asked whether the president planned to visit Moscow in the coming future, Skubiszewski recalled that such a visit was prepared "in a different configuration." The minister said that Russian President Boris Yeltsin was invited to Poland but one could hardly give the timing of these visits.

Canada Plans To Expand Military Cooperation

LD1001022192 Warsaw PAP in English 1900 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—Canadian Ambassador to Poland Peter J. Hancock said during the Wednesday [8 January] meeting with Minister of National Defence Jan Parys that Canada was willing to expand military cooperation with Poland.

According to spokesman for the Ministry of National Defence Ireneusz Czyzewski, the cooperation of Polish and Canadian military forces thrives, mutual visits of high-ranking Polish and Canadian military officials being an evidence.

Sejm, Senate Committees Discuss Budget Bill

LD0901051392 Warsaw PAP in English 2144 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 8—Sejm (lower house) and Senate committees met on Wednesday [8 January] to discuss the provisional budget bill for the first quarter of 1992 which due to the large budgetary deficit satisfies none of the budget-financed sectors.

The Sejm committees for economic policy, budget and finances and for legislation failed to agree on draft tax laws, related to the budget bill, and decided to set up a working team to continue work on the drafts. Members of the committees differed as to the need to increase personal income tax to 50 per cent as this move might result in tax offences. They also pointed to the need to compare the draft tax law with the assumptions of the socioeconomic programme to find out whether they are compatible.

The Sejm Agriculture Committee concluded that the means earmarked for agriculture were insufficient and proposed to increase budgetary revenues by raising taxes on luxury goods, including foodstuffs, imported from the West. The committee also opined that the means for financing the rural market agency were insufficient.

Also the Senate Agriculture Committee said that the means for the rural market agency should be increased from 200 billion zlotys (17 million dollars) proposed by the government to 400 billion (35 million dollars) to ensure the interventional procurement of livestock and wheat.

The Sejm Committee for Spatial Planning, Construction, and Housing approved the budget bill "due solely to higher reasons" but warned that many families may be unable to pay the increased fees for energy, gas, and central heating.

The Senate Committee for Legislative Work voiced no formal or legal reservations to the provisional budget but had some doubts as to the draft law on personal income tax and some amendments to tax regulations. Finance Deputy Minister Danuta Demianiuk explained that the changes in tax laws, regardless when they are passed, had to take effect as of the beginning of a new fiscal year, that is January 1, 1992.

At a meeting of the Senate Health and Welfare Committee, Senator Zygmunt Hortmanowicz proposed to take up a legislative initiative on giving the government special powers instead of passing the budget bill. Members of the committee pointed out that the bill together with the proposed amendments to other laws "were actually equal to decrees which the parliament would only have to approve."

Olszewski Stresses Confidence in Cabinet Members

LD1001021192 Warsaw PAP in English 1057 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—Polish Premier Jan Olszewski in an extensive interview for the latest edition of the TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC weekly once again stressed that his government is composed of distinct personalities adding that he has full confidence in the qualifications of his cabinet members.

Referring to economic issues, Olszewski said that the government plans to present, in two months' time, a comprehensive programme for the next two, three years.

When asked about the process of decommunisation the premier replied that despite personnel changes at top posts, the general structures of the civil service are unchanged and do not correspond with present tasks and social needs. "First, we will remodel the government, the next stage will be the reorganization of local state organs and economic structures," stated the premier.

He came out in favour of qualifications, loyalty and effectiveness as basis criteria in work appraisal, underlining however, that there is no place for persons who played prominent roles under the communist regime.

Speaking on the role of the president and parliament the premier expressed an opinion that "currently, in the transitory situation full of dangers, the role of the presidential office should be... strongly marked. The president should be an equal partner for parliament in the present situation."

"However, I see this matter differently in the future, when the republic's system is firmly consolidated. I think that a declaration that the national representation is the supreme organ would correspond with the tradition of the Polish parliamentary system," said Premier Jan Olszewski.

Peasant Party's Pawlak on Supporting Olszewski

AU0901151592 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 3 Jan 92 p 3

[Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, PSL president and chairman of the PSL Parliamentary Club, by Joanna Jachmann; place and date not given: "In Six Months' Time We Will Be Pleased"]

[Excerpts] [Jachmann] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has returned to the center of the Polish political scene in a spectacular fashion. Your speech in the debate on whether Prime Minister Olszewski's resignation should be accepted made a further attempt at creating a government under the same leader possible; a government that members of the PSL will no doubt enter. Why did you decide to support Jan Olszewski? Common sense would suggest that the PSL should have remained calm and waited until everything fell apart, especially as there was much talk of forming another coalition, made up of the PSL, Democratic Union, and the Liberal-Democratic Congress.

[Pawlak] By formulating your question in that way, you have given an indirect answer to what journalists have been pestering me about for the past two days and you are stating that a price was paid by the prime minister and his coalition partners in terms of government posts in order to buy the support of the PSL. If we were solely concerned about posts, then perhaps we would have behaved the way dictated by "common sense." Our decision stemmed from a sober assessment of the situation and from the ability to foresee the effects of prolonging both the cabinet crisis and the conflict between the coalition and the president. We believe, above all, that at the present time there is no alternative to Prime Minister Olszewski's candidacy, and we realize that all the maneuvering and reversals that occur behind the scenes are not only viewed negatively by the public, but also unnecessarily delay the commencement of work on rebuilding the republic. Even the best possible remedy for restoring the health of the Polish economy may prove to be ineffective, if the medicine is administered too late, and we—I have all deputies and senators in mind—have an obligation toward people to fulfill the promises that were made before the elections. [passage omitted]

[Jachmann] In my opinion, the most serious conflicts are those plaguing groupings representing similar political tendencies, and I am seriously concerned that disputes will arise between the PSL and the Peasant Alliance.

[Pawlak] The differences are being unnecessarily exaggerated by people from outside the peasant movement; essentially, the differences are not great. There is, of course, a conflict between the PSL and the Peasant Alliance in the field of ideology, but when the discussion focuses on concrete issues, it turns out that our positions on many issues are identical or, in the worst case, similar. I am not afraid of there being a conflict with the Peasant Alliance.

[Jachmann] Let us return to what happened in the Sejm on 18 December. However noble the PSL's motives may have been, such gestures are never performed in return for nothing. The victor dictates his terms. What conditions did you set in your talks with the prime minister?

[Pawlak] Without going into details, in the sphere of politics, we expect measures that will stabilize the political setup and will permit all those who won approval through free elections to participate in public life. These are measures that we do not expect solely at the top, but, for example, in the whole state administration. We cannot afford—I am thinking of the state—to change our whole army of officials every time there is a change of government just because they are associated with the wrong political tendency. A good example in this respect is provided by Italy, which is, incidentally, similar to Poland in terms of climate, temperament, and the range of parties on its political scene.

Regarding the economy, we expect mechanisms to be introduced that will reverse the recession. We also expect Poland's relations with the World Bank and IMF to be discussed with a view to taking account of the situation in which our country finds itself.

Finally, regarding agriculture, we expect the formulation of a long-term program that will make it possible to halt the decline in farming as quickly as possible. These are surely not excessive demands? [passage omitted]

Peasant Group, Center Accord Form Link

AU0901171992 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Jan 92 p 2

['PS'-signed report: "Center Accord and Solidarity Polish Peasant Party Form Close Cooperation"]

[Text] The Center Accord and Solidarity Polish Peasant Party are planning close cooperation. Jaroslaw Kaczynski's opponents in the Center Accord claim that the purpose of the pact by the two parties is to push the Polish Peasant Party out of the government coalition and introduce the Democratic Union in its place.

The presidiums of the Center Accord and Solidarity Polish Peasant Party reached their decision concerning cooperation on Saturday. Both parties have to coordinate their stances on major political issues. Although each party's parliamentary club will retain its distinction, the party presidiums will henceforth hold joint meetings.

The communique from the Saturday meeting says that the decision to cooperate was made on account of an ideological similarity between the two parties. Kaczynski said both parties can complement each other well because they each have their own spheres of activity. The Center Accord is mainly urban, and the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party mainly rural.

Jacek Maziarski of the Center Accord told PAP that the Saturday decision is a prelude to a complete merger of the two parties, but Kaczynski said one cannot expect the two parties to become fully integrated.

The decision by both parties to cooperate was the subject of a heated debate at a meeting of the Center Accord Parliamentary Club. The anti-Kaczynski faction said that the Center Accord's involvement with the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party, which is market-orientated and opposed to Jozef Slisz's Polish Peasant Party, will be condemned by that party's leadership. "In this way. the Kaczynski brothers are trying to push the Polish Peasant Party out of the government coalition and introduce the Democratic Union instead," said representatives of that faction. They also feared the new pact would spoil contacts between the Center Accord and Gabriel Janowski's People's Accord.

"I do not want to push the Polish Peasant Party out of the coalition," said Jaroslaw Kaczynski, "but I do think the Democratic Union should join the coalition because in the present situation the country needs something like a 'government of national salvation'."

Kaczynski's followers in the Center Accord fear that the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party will insist on replacing several voivodes belonging to the Center Accord with new ones belonging to the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party. They claim that the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party has already voiced demands like this, but the anti-Kaczynski faction of the Center Accord denies it.

Ministries Appoint New Vice Ministers

LD1001020792 Warsaw PAP in English 1703 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—Piotr Naimski was appointed vice-minister of internal affairs and undersecretary of state in the same ministry, the spokesman for the ministry announced Thursday [9 January].

"I presume that the new vice minister will supervise the Office for the Protection of the State (UOP)," the spokesman added.

Also Thursday, Stanislaw Padykula was appointed undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Zbigniew Sulatycki was appointed undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Transportation and Maritime Economy.

Bielecki's Warnings of Banking Fall Contradicted

LD1001020492 Warsaw PAP in English 2345 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—Two banks which are owed billions of dollars by the state treasury are not in danger contrary to statements made by former Premier Bielecki in the U.S., according to the Ministry of Finance.

The debt was incurred at the Pko S.A. Bank and Bank Handlowy (commercial bank) during the eighties. Defined as an internal debt, it meant that foreign currency deposits were used to service the foreign debt.

Last year, in line with the budget, the finance minister issued dollar securities to restructure the internal debt. The servicing of this debt began in September and insures that the banks have a complete flow of foreign currency.

This explanation of the matter was given to PAP in connnection with former Premier Bielecki's current visit to the U.S. where he said that the problem of the Polish debt is being worsened by the internal debt, which is a consequence of the use of the publics foreign currency deposits by communist governments.

"If the treasury does not redeem this debt from the commercial banking system, then these banks will quite simply collapse", said Bielecki."

Deputies Warn Against Rise in Inflation

AU0901171492 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Maria Nowak report: "Deputies Warn Against a Rise in Inflation"]

[Excerpts] The interim budget for the first quarter of 1992 and a package of accompanying legislation received their first reading during Saturday's [4 January] Sejm session. Following a debate, the legislation was referred to the Sejm Economic Policy, Budget, and Finance Committee and Legislative Committee for reconsideration.

Over 40 deputies scheduled to take part in the debate did not do so, as a result of which the hall was virtually empty. Following a vote, it was resolved to adjourn the talks. Many deputies objected to this. Deputy Bronislaw Geremek said that the Sejm Presidium should never allow such an important debate to be interrupted.

Prior to the debate, Prime Minister Jan Olszewski delivered a speech. [passage omitted].

Next, the debate commenced. Deputy Antoni Furtak from the People's Accord said that the Council of Ministers was wrong to say that it had been compelled to adopt the interim budget because of the country's disastrous financial condition caused by the previous government. Not the previous government, but previous governments, said Deputy Furtak.

Deputy Witold Gadomski from the Liberal-Democratic Congress said that 1991 contained a situation identical to the present one. The government at the time also adopted a budget that had been prepared by the previous government. If the elections had taken place in the middle of 1991, instead of October, we would not be in the present muddled situation, and the government would not be issuing ambiguous statements, because it would have had enough time to establish an economic program and prepare a budget. Gadomski said the Liberal- Democratic Congress feels jointly responsible for the draft interim budget, but nevertheless the draft requires adjustments. The 17.6 trillion zloty budget deficit for the first quarter, envisaged in the draft, exceeds the safety margin and must be reduced. If such a high budget deficit is maintained for the rest of the year, inflation will rise to over 100 percent on an annual scale, said Deputy Gadomski. The poorest sections of society will be hit hard.

Deputy Marek Dabrowski said that the rules governing the functioning and financing of the health service, education, social security, and housing services must be reformed, and yet the prime minister dealt with these matters with restraint in his Sejm expose. Deputy Dabrowski also expressed concern over the populist rhetoric delivered on television by some ministers.

Unless the budget deficit is brought firmly under control, there is no question of renegotiating our agreements with the IMF and implementing the debt reduction accords concluded with the Paris Club and London Club, Dabrowski said. He said his parliamentary club would produce an alternative to the draft interim budget presently under discussion because the present draft is too optimistic.

Next, Deputy Ryszard Bugaj discussed the reasons for the disastrous condition of the economy. Industrial output has fallen by 45 percent since 1989, he said. Minister Syryjczyk [former industry minister] once said output would drop to zero, so we do not have much further to go, said Bugaj, And that is the prime reason for the collapse in the budget. Other reasons are insufficient taxation on the private sector, and corruption. Bugaj said that the economic stabilization program has failed because of an absence of reform in the state sector, tax discrimination against state enterprises, the absence of a macroeconomic policy, an excessive opening up of the economy to foreign countries, and a restrictive monetary policy. Like many other deputies, he deplored the government's failure to present an emergency economic program.

Many deputes shared the view that the burden of emerging from the crisis must be distributed among everyone fairly. They demanded the return of stolen money and radical action against corruption. Deputy Henryk Goryszewski from the Christian National Union said that three of the biggest cases of tax evasion currently being investigated by the Warsaw Fiscal Chamber involve a sum in excess of 1.2 trillion zlotys, more money than the increased energy prices will provide. Edmund Krasowski from the Center Accord said his club possesses documentary evidence of various scandals, and it knows who stole how much. Over 40 trillion zlotys are missing, said Krasowski.

Graduates May Choose To Take Military Training

LD1001021892 Warsaw PAP in English 1519 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—University graduates who choose to skip military training in cadet schools after leaving the university will be transferred to the reserve after 18 months from the graduation, the Defence Ministry spokesman announced on Thursday [9 January].

Volunteers wishing to take the training will be welcome, the spokesman said adding that the new decision of Defence Minister Jan Parys will permit savings of dozens of billion zlotys.

Stolojan Meets Trade Union Leaders, Managers

AU0901204492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1926 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 9/1/1992—Thursday, 9 January, talks continued at Bucharest Victory Palace between the trade unions and the government, on salaries' indexing and the new system of salaries in Romania.

In the morning, after more than five hours of talks between Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and members of the government, on the one hand, and representatives of the National Council of Romania's Trade Unions, on the other hand, it was established that Friday, 10 January, experts analyse the level of the family budget based on a computation supporting the variant of the minimum salary proposed by the unions.

Thursday afternoon, discussions continued between Miron Mihu Biji, government commissioner and leaders of the National Government-Trade Unions Joint Commission.

Thursday afternoon Romanian Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan met with managers of state-run commercial companies in industry, construction and transport to analyse the influence on prices of the minimal wages variant in the economy within the 1992 payment system, as proposed by the National Trade Union Council of Romania. It was agreed upon that talks should continue Friday, January 10.

Noteworthy is that a couple of days ago "Alfa" trade union cartel suggested that the minimal salary per economy should amount to 24.000 lei (135 U.S. dollars).

Nastase Interviewed, Denies Political Aspirations

AU0901142992 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1200 GMT 9 Jan 92

["Exclusive" interview with Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase by Nicu Popescu in Bucharest on 9 January—recorded]

[Text] [Popescu] Mr. Minister Adrian Nastase, 1992 has begun and, as of today, foreign guests, that is, your counterparts, have started visiting us. How do we continue our diplomatic policy, and what are the major evnts we can expect in our so-called diplomatic policy?

[Nastase] The year 1992 has indeed started in a very dynamic way as far as diplomatic activity is concerned. There will be numerous visits to Bucharest in the coming weeks. In a way, this is the result of some of the visits that I made abroad recently, and so this is a continuation of the diplomatic dialogue, this time mostly in Bucharest, which I believe is a very positive aspect.

Apart from the visit of the Czechoslovak foreign minister, in the coming weeks we will be visited by the French foreign minister, the Lebanese foreign minister, and in February probably the Polish foreign minister; and there will also be visits to Spain and Turkey. These are only a few parts of our future activity. The Prague meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers will definitely be a very important meeting, and I certainly could mention many other activities that practically represent a natural result of concerns with this period of extraordinarily rapid changes in Europe, which involves numerous problems awaiting positive answers and solutions.

These are the major activities for the coming weeks.

[Popescu] You mentioned changes in Europe, but there will be changes in our country, too. We are in the midst of the electoral campaign for local elections that will be followed by general elections: Will all these influence Romanian diplomacy?

[Nastase] As I have always stressed, in a way there is a connection between domestic political life and Romanian diplomacy. As a matter of fact, diplomacy only reflects, or I could say, is only an echo of the domestic political changes and of the domestic political atmosphere, but certainly based on very clear and perennial ideas, that is, the national interest.

However, we are certainly also talking about personal activities and about seeking political directions, which also means to involve political leaders in this domestic political activity, which I believe will have positive reactions on the external plane because it will again prove that our political life is heading toward the normal European standards of political life.

As far as I am concerned, in my capacity as foreign minister, in accordance with the statute of this position, I have no right to get involved in domestic political life and no right to become a member of a political party. That is why certain commentaries and certain speculations made regarding the possibility of my involvement in political life in the near future, maybe as the leader of a fraction of the National Salvation Front or in some other position, surprise me very much.

There is a principle that I respect very much, and this is [Laurence Johnston's] Peter principle, namely that is that each person tends to rise to his level of incompetence. I have the impression that I have reached this level, and I do not go any further only to avoid the possibility of aggravating this difficult personal situation, which means an effort in a very difficult area.

Thus, as far as I am concerned, I do not wish to get involved in political life; I do not wish to become a party leader, and, moreover, I do not think that I would be suitable for such an activity. However, I hope that for the time being, I will make efforts to cope with my current mission, as long as I am asked to do so; and I repeat what I said on other occasions, that the participation in the activity of exercising power—a syntagma that is used very often—is eroding enormously and creates terribly many problems, thus, I do not believe that we should advance toward a tense political climate. Leaders should naturally come from within the party, and as far as I am

concerned, I must repeat that I would not be suitable for such a position. I also want to repeat that I do not desire such a position.

[Popescu] So will you stay true to the principle of working in Romanian diplomacy?

[Nastase] As long as I am asked to do so. I am convinced that at a personal level I will always be able to carry out any other activity. I continue to have the so-called appetite for the activity of analysis and research, and I believe that I could be a good professor or researcher anytime, and on a personal level this thing would give me enormous satisfaction.

[Popescu] Mr. Minister, thank you very much for this interview.

PNL Leader Favors Opposition Unity at Elections

AU0901204592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1910 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 9/1/1992—We hope the oncoming local elections will change the mentality, inertia and negative character of the measures the present administration has taken, and we also think that the state administration's inclusion of representatives of the National Liberal Party (PNL) and of other opposition parties is conducive to efficiently fighting corruption in the country, stated Mr. Radu Campeanu, president of the National Liberal Party and deputy speaker of the Senate, at an interview with a ROMPRES reporter.

Announcing that his party will participate in elections on lists common to all the parties in the Democratic Convention, Mr. Campeanu specified among other things: We are consistent with the unitary strategy we adopted though now, when the lists are completed, we have realized that the PNL is the most important opposition party. After a recent survey per counties and communes, we noticed that we lost by sharing the idea of unity. Unitary lists have never succeeded in gathering a number of votes that could at least be tantamount to the total votes on separate lists, a principle well known in politology, the PNL leader said. The PNL has accepted such a strategy because it considers the Romanian public opinion wants it, Mr. Campeanu stressed. Referring to some articles and commentaries in the press according to which the PNL would not have been for the unity of the opposition, Mr. Campeanu qualified such assertions as "groundless and irresponsible."

FSN, Democratic Convention Present Candidates

AU0901131092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1114 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/1/1992—Political parties presented their candidates for the local administrative bodies in Brasov, in the afternoon of January 8.

Speaking at a meeting with members and supporters of the National Salvation Front, FSN National Leader Petre Roman introduced the FSN candidate to the office of Brasov Mayor, Engineer Ioan Gontea, and the candidates to the office of councilors, stressing inter alia that the dispute that has become public of late between himself and President Iliescu "is not a mere conflict; it is something far more serious: It is about the conception of how to go forward".

The meeting was attended by a large crowd, some remaining outside the building where it was held, listening to the FSN leader's speech on loudspeakers. The attendance cheered at length in support of the FSN and Petre Roman.

Before that, Petre Roman had interviews with the Executive Bureau of the FSN County Council, with mayors and candidates for the mayor's office in communes, towns and villages of Brasov County, with enterprisers and employers, as well as with executives of state-owned enterprises. The discussions focussed on the ways and means to ensure the success of the reform and Romania's development, the local elections and local autonomy having a decisive role.

Also in Brasov, the Democratic Convention presented its candidate to the office of Brasov Mayor, in the person of Engineer Adrian Moruzi, chairman of the "Prodemocratia" association. The attendance was addressed by Corneliu Coposu, chairman of the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party, Nicolae Manolescu, chairman of the Civic Alliance Party, Kolomban Gabor, Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania deputy chairman, Petre Mihai Bacanu, Simina Mezincescu, Ticu Dumitrescu, Nae Bedros, deputy chairman of the National Liberal Party, etc. Numerous participants in the meeting shouted "Down with communism", "King Mihai", "Free Romania", "Bessarabia".

Several speakers accused the Romanian Television of misinformation and demanded the dismisal of its executives. The local elections were considered to be a fundamental moment in the democratic construction in Romania.

Calarasi FSN Branch Excludes Members

AU0901204392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1830 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 9/1/1992—A press release of the Coordinating Council of the National Salvation Front [FSN], Calarasi branch, announces that, following repeated violations of the party's statute and destabilising, separatist actions stemming from strictly personal interests of the following FSN members, the Council decided:

To exclude Senator Ion Neagu from its membership and deny him any further parliamentary support;

To exclude sub-prefect Mihai Arbagic from the County Coordinating Council;

To give a warning to Senator Doru Ion Taracila.

Natase: Not Ready To Recognize SFRY Republics

AU1001103492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0838 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/01/1992—In a statement to daily ADEVARUL Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase said that "Romania is not ready yet to recognize the independence of the Yugoslav republics." "We however follow with great interest what is going on there and we will make a decision pending on the stand the EEC and the UN will take", the Romanian chief diplomatist said.

Hungarian Daily Views 'Ragged' Romanian Army

AU0801131892 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Jan 92 p 9

[Report by Attila Ara-Kovacs: "Romanian Accusations, Hungarian Illusions—The Army Has the Final Word"]

[Text] Over these last few weeks, there has been great feigned indignation in Bucharest over the fact that certain Hungarian experts actually have an opinion on the state of the Romanian Army and on the security policy aspirations that still apply after Ceausescu's reign.

According to Hungarian analysts, a military takeover is not to be expected in Romania (despite existing difficulties) because the Army's lamentable situation—both staff-wise and equipment-wise—precludes this from the start. The quoted experts add that for similar reasons, Hungary does not really need to fear an attack from the southeast.

In connection with the indignation in Bucharest—which mainly focuses on the fact that the Hungarian experts apparently humiliated the Romanian Army—it is quite difficult to determine what it is that actually hurts the Bucharest leadership most. Is it the fact that it is no longer a secret, even abroad, that Ceausescu not only embittered the lives of millions of civilians but also turned the Army into a kind of ragged guard? Or is it the fact that Hungarians are not too frightened of an army that "so far, has occupied Budapest twice, and will do so again and again?" (The quote stems from a certain Nicolae Ceausescu, but Radu Ceontea, one of Vatra Romaneasca's leaders, recently said exactly the same thing.)

A similar question, but a question that is somewhat more important to the Romanians, is whether the Hungarian experts' opinion on Romania's security policy was correct? Of course, one can hardly challenge the remarks made about the state of the Romanian Army. In the 1980's, the leadership doomed Romanian soldiers by making self-sufficiency their main task. Consequently, it is not a miracle that the sight of ragged foot-soldiers prowling around looking for food (and drink, of course) became a symbolic sight, so to speak, not only abroad but also for the Romanian population. The arsenal's total amortization also became a proverb, despite quixotic military investments and developments.

Furthermore, Ceausescu took every available opportunity to stress that he valued the security service much more highly than the Army. He was perfectly right in doing so, because continental assets (the Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki process) guaranteed the country's security anyway, and at most, it was internal forces that threatened the authorities.

The December 1989 events largely confirmed the aforementioned reasons, and we can hardly be wrong in saying that these events were nothing but the internal power struggle between the Army and the Securitate. The two years that have passed since then clearly show that although the former Securitate gradually regained many of the positions it lost in 1989, it is the Army that undeniably has the final word today. There are two reasons for this: First, the Army has succeeded in developing its own security and intelligence apparatus—thanks to former Securitate agents, to a large extent. Second, the split that has appeared in the governing party, the National Salvation Front [FSN], has enabled the Army to enter the Romanian political scene as an extremely influential factor again. The "leftist" force centered around Ion Iliescu (going beyond the "miners") is basing its own power on the new security service led by General Virgil Magurcanu, while the increasingly aggressive right wing led by Petre Roman is building its future political plans together with the Army these days.

That is one reason why some kind of military power solution cannot be excluded for the Romania of the near future—all the more so because the economic difficulties have somehow made part of the population appreciate the superficial (but real) equality "guaranteed" by total leadership. At the same time, the average citizen is truly grateful to the Romanian Army—and in the light of Romania's history, this can hardly be seen as cynicism—for having shot only some 1,000 people in December 1989 rather than tens of thousands, as it used to do in the old days. Let us remember the example of 1907, when the Army suppressed a famine revolt with unprecedented brutality, leaving 10,000 civilian victims in its wake. Let us also remember the "heroic deeds" committed by General Ion Antonescu on the other side of the Prut between 1941 and 1944, a man who has now been placed in the national pantheon again. The dreadful (but fortunately erroneous) figures that made the front pages in the international press in the days following 22 December 1989 on the victims of the events in Romania were not a coincidence, and they can hardly be written off simply as the machinations of foreign secret services.

The events in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe's spectacular disintegration instantly put an end to the feeling of security (an external stability) that Bucharest had hitherto built its policy on. The external danger—the loss once again of that "ancient Romanian territory," Transylvania, or the other "ancient Romanian living-space" on the other side of the Prut, Moldova, as well as the missed

opportunity to acquire northern Bukovina—once again pushes the Army's potential importance into the foreground. It is not a coincidence that the so-called Romanian National Unity Party (which is particularly popular in Transylvania and Moldova) and the Army concluded th-ir own deal a long time ago, and ever since the Tirgu Mures massacre in March 1990, they have jointly been trying to assert their own interests. The lowest common denominator in this area (need we say it?) is national exclusivity, and although the Army's incomplete equipment could preclude any great adventure from the outset, even the Romanian Army is perfectly capable of creating a fait accompli at home to repel provocations coming from the outside.

The military exercise in the Szeklerland last autumn was one of the preludes to the dictatorial efforts combined with the Army. Even if there is no need for Hungary to fear a third invasion, the internal front along which the Army and the nationalist forces immediately lined up in Transylvania (against the Szeklers) constitutes a sufficient threat. According to the logic of drastic steps, these kinds of actions cannot remain local, and they undermine the stability of the Bucharest leadership (perhaps that is the main reason behind them), but this will hardly disturb determined political agents. Nor will they be disturbed by the fact that "Europe is turning even further away from Romania." Indeed, this has already happened to a certain extent.

International

Carrington, Republic Leaders Assess EC Talks

Carrington on 'Key Question'

LD0901234992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2313 GMT 9 Jan 92

[By Dragan Blagojevic]

[Text] Brussels, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—If Serbs in Croatia receive special status and autonomy, envisaged under a document of The Hague conference on Yugoslavia, and it is accepted and implemented by the Croatian authorities, a key question of the Yugoslav crisis will be settled, chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia Lord Carrington said tonight.

Carrington, after a plenary session of the conference in Brussels, noted that this is accepted also by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Carrington explained that President Milosevic today was absolutely open, saying that if the second chapter of The Hague document on Yugoslavia concerning minority rights is implemented in its entirety on the part of Croats then this would, as far as he is concerned, be appropriate protection for Serbs in Croatia. Carrington wanted to underscore also that it is necessary to have the stand nf the Serbs in Craotia.

The Hague document offered by Carrington and the European Cnmmunity as a basis for resolving the Yugoslav crisis, the second chapter defines "special status", as cited, in regions where persons who belong to national or ethnic groups and are a majority, will receive a special status. The status will ensure the right to have and show a national emblem of the group, the right tn annther nationality for members of the group apart from the nationility in the republic, an educational system which takes care of the values and needs of this group.

The special status envisages also a legal body, administrative structure, including a regional police force and judiciary which would be competent for questions in the region and which are composed of members of the population in the region. Also cited are provisions for appropriate international control. It is also said that the regions are listed in a special annex of The Hague document. So far competent persons at the conference have not revealed which are these regions.

Sources close to the conference were informed that the population in the regions, which would receive special autonomous status, after a certain time would have the right to hold a refenredun and decide on which state it wishes to live in. The second chapter envisages that the regions be permanently demilitarized and that the republics sign mutual agreements with the aim of making possible international control of the special status.

According to information from informed sources in the European Community the view predominates among some members of the E.C. that Croatia, following January 15, could be recognized as an independent state, provided that possible questions, including the special status and autonomy for some territories within today's republican borders of Croatia, would be resolved through the further process of The Hague conference, with guarantees of the U.N. peace-keeping force.

Tudjman 'Not Satisfied'

LD0901212392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1735 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Brussels, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—President of the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman stated today, after the close of a plenary session of the conference on Yugoslavia, that he was not satisfied with the progress made in Bussels. "I am more content with the progress of the truce," said he.

After the session, Tudjman held a private talk with President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and after this talk told newsmen that Milosevic had "admitted that the question of Serbs in Croatia is the question of minorities, not one of territories."

Foreign Minister of Serbia Vladislav Jovanovic told reporters that the conference would resume in panel discussions. He said that a statement made by Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrije Rupel about Lord Carrington "warning Milosevic" at today's session that Yugoslavia does no longer exist, so that Serbia must draw lessons and behave accordingly was not true. Jovanovic added, "no one heard this at today's conference, this was not said at the conference today."

Milosevic Interviewed

AU0901202192 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1926 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic by Dusan Cukic on his return from Brussels at Belgrade Airport on 9 January—recorded]

[Text] [Cukic] Welcome home Mr. President.

[Milosevic] Thank you.

[Cukic] What good news have you brought for us?

[Milosevic] I hope that the fact that we can expect the continuation of the conference with much more respect for the equality of the participants and the options proposed by different Yugoslav republics is good news. As you know very well, we are striving for the continuation of Yugoslavia, and I think that, as regards the chairman of the conference, there was much more understanding for this at today's conference than in our previous plenary sessions.

However, it is obvious that the fact that a realistic cease-fire has been achieved for the first time, and the fact that under conditions of peace one can talk in a much different manner, gave the main tone to the

conference. This means that different interests can come to the fore and that they can now be considered, which was not the case before, under the conditions of a high temperature of war conflicts.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the most important interest of, I would say, all Yugoslavs is, above all, peace, and then the peaceful settlement of the Yugoslavia crisis in these conditions. I think that independent of this conference, which did not produce anything especially new, we can view things with more optimism.

[Cukic] Thank you.

Izetbegovic Seeks Support for Bosnia

LD1001044892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0200 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, January 9 (TANJUG)—Presidency President of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina Alija Izetbegovic said on Thursday evening that he had sought support for the survival of that multi-ethnic republic at the plenary session of the Conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels.

After returning from Brussels, Izetbegovic told journalists that, in his view, Bosnia-Hercegovina was experiencing a crisis because of the current unfortunate divisions, nationalism and extremism. Moslems make up 43.77 percent of the population of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbs 31.46 percent and Croats 17.34 percent.

Commenting on today's proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Izetbegovic said that it was one in a series of unilateral acts by the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and expressed hope that the republic would outgrow such ideas because a vast majority of its citizens accept Bosnia-Hercegovina as it is. Bosnia-Hercegovina, said Izetbegovic, is the target of forces which want to break it and create a single-ethnic and single- confessional environment.

The Assembly of the Serbian People in that republic today denied Izetbegovic and republican Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic the right to represent the interests of Serbs in international affairs. Commenting on the step, Izetbegovic said that he had been "elected by all citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina in a democratic election" and that only those who elected him can strip him of power.

Three national parties-the Party of Democratic Action (rallying Moslems), the Serbian Democratic Party (rallying Serbs), and the Croatian Democratic Union (rallying Croats) - share power in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Serbs have proclaimed a republic inside Bosnia-Hercegovina after deputies representing Moslems and Croats in the republican parliament requested the European Community to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina as an independent state without the agreement of Serb deputies. Before that, the Serbs set up their own parliament after Moslem and Croatian deputies adopted a memorandum on Bosnia-Hercegovina's sovereignty, also without the consent of Serb deputies.

Under the Bosnia-Hercegovina constitution, all decisions relevant to the future of the republic can be adopted only by consensus of its three constituent peoples—Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

Bulatovic on EC Sanctions

LD1001013892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2346 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Titograd, January 9 (TANJUG)—Presidency President of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic said on Thursday evening that all participants in the plenary session of the Conference on Yugoslavia, held in Brussels, "support and absolutely urge" the realization of the United Nations peace mission in Yugoslavia.

Today's plenary session of the Yugoslavia conference, chaired by Lord Carrington, was attented by the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics and the foreign ministers of all republics except Croatia. All participants gave an impression of satisfaction with the progress made in securing a stable and lasting ceasefire in Yugoslavia, assessed Bulatovic after returning from Brussels.

He said that he had presented a strong and principled demand on behalf of Montenegro that the E.C. should reconsider its policy, especially the implementation of economic sanctions against Montenegro. Commenting on the sanctions, Bulatovic pointed out that "punishing during the process of negotiations is not an expression of good-will and political assistance but an expression of something we hoped would be avoided at the very beginning - demonstration of economic and political power."

Serbia, Montenegro Reject 'Latest' EC Solution

LD0901224692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1909 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Brussels, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—President of Slovenia Milan Kucan said after today's plenary session of the conference on Yugoslavia that Slovenia will continue to take part in the work of the conference on Yugoslavia even after January 15, but as "a sovereign and independent state."

Kucan indicated that Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia could mutually recognize each other. Croatia, like Slovenia, last June had adopted a decision on secession, while Macedonia late last year sought international recognition. Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov stated after the session that the Federal authorities in Yugoslavia have degenerated and that it is necessary for the republics or states which have declared their independence and sovereignty to undertake legal obligations over their own territories in order to avert anarchy.

Gligorov added that it is necessary for the conference on Yugoslavia "to observe the actual state of affairs and to transform into a conference of sovereign states which will discuss mutual cooperation in the region and unsettled questions within the federation, including the succession of the federation."

The European Community (E.C.) in December adopted a decision on recognizing the Yugoslav republics, under specific conditions, setting up January 15 as the deadline for doing this. Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia submitted requests for recognition to "the Twelve" together with Bosnia-Hercegovina but without the agreement of Serbs who in this Yugoslav Republic are one of the three constituent peoples, together with the Moslems and the Croats. Serbia and Montenegro on whose statehood the creation of Yugoslavia lies, reject the latest solution of the Yugoslav crisis offered by the E.C.

Milosevic Assesses Peacekeeping Role of UN

LD0901222292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1826 GMT 9 JAN 92

[Text] Brussels, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic here today assessed as necessary that "not only the peace role but also the political one of the United Nations should be reinforced in the negotiations on the resolution of Yugoslavia's state and political crisis."

At the Brussels conference on Yugoslavia, Milosevic stated that "this conference cannot yield results unless it returns to its original principles, above all the equality of all participants and of all options." Milosevic added that he regarded that the "withdrawal of the selective economic sanctions—which express unequal treatment of the conference participants and make up elements of coercion that is contrary to the conference's character—would contribute to its (the conference's) successful proceedings."

The president of Serbia stressed that today's plenary session was being held at the time of "realistic prospects for the lasting and stable ceasefire to hold out" and at the time of the "already taken preparation steps for the sending of U.N. peace-keeping forces to Yugoslavia."

Milosevic voiced content with the resumption of the conference on Yugoslavia "for, we have always maintained that only dialogues can bring about solutions, not one-sided acts, pressures and force." The European Community has lately prejudiced (especially by its declaration of December 17) the political solutions that should otherwise result from the conference work, and the Community also exceeded the mandate it obtained from the CSCE and the U.N. Security Council, Milosevic observed.

"The abolition of Yugoslavia as a state is not and cannot be under the competences of any international factors," said Milosevic. Such a policy and practice, as he put it, do not help resolve Yugoslavia's crisis, but only incite and spur on those who want to achieve their goals forcibly to the detriment of others in Yugoslavia.

Milosevic pointed out that the conference would probably not have been resumed had it not been for the "principled, impartial, and objective role that has been played by the United Nations since the very beginning and way ahead to the latest mission by Mr. Cyrus Vance."

Negovanovic Views International Factors in Crisis

92BA0327A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Dec 91 pp 8-9

["Excerpts" from report presented by Major General Marko Negovanovic, Yugoslav deputy defense minister, at the Military Publishing and Newspaper Center; date not given: "Foreign Factor and Yugoslav Crisis"]

[Text] The influence of international factors on overall political, economic, and military developments in our country is strong, and this is especially true of two conditionally isolated, relevant, profound, and parallel processes on the seething Yugoslav scene. First, the increasingly aggressive manner of those advocating secessionism and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia through use of the military option; and second, the increasingly organized opposition to the policy of accomplished facts and to the inroads of neo-Nazism coming from those who link their historical interests to the establishment of a new Yugoslavia. From abroad, increasingly open support and assistance is being provided to secessionists and to those dismembering Yugoslavia as a community of states and subject of international law, and this is coming primarily—and not coincidentally—from countries that have lost wars of conquest and suffered great losses twice in this century and in this region, failing to fulfill their ancient plans for territorial expansion, beginning with the Adriatic region. Now, as witnesses to and instigators of the profound political schism, they see an opportunity to achieve old revanchist goals, whereby they are greatly helped by the radically altered and newly established balance of power in Europe.

This is the foreign context in which one must consider the developments in and results of the supremely internationalized Yugoslav crisis, at levels ranging from the United Nations and the Security Council to the CSCE and to the EC, so that even NATO, within the framework of its "new strategic concept," is showing direct interest in Yugoslavia, a trend that is being encouraged by, among others, some of the neighboring countries that have fallen directly out of the "overcoat" of one military-political pact and are ready to insinuate themselves under the umbrella of another one, having their own material interests with regard to Yugoslavia.

Attempt to Discredit the JNA

Some of the leading European countries and some of our neighbors are persistently advocating the immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent, sovereign states, winning hesitant members of the European Community over to their option of splitting up Yugoslavia. Naturally, the Vatican, through diplomatic and religious activities and channels, is initiating and supporting such positions. Thus, at play here is an option intended to dismember Yugoslavia by military force, the basic intermediary for which is the Croatian leadership, and the forces for which are its Ustasha-fascist formations.

It is persistently alleged that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] does not intend to remain at the current lines of the armed conflict, the attainment of which marks the successful completion of one stage of the war and the creation of the basic preconditions for resolving controversial questions through political means. They emphasize that it has plans to conquer Croatian territory and advance to the Virovitica-Karlobag line in order to realize some sort of political ideal of a Greater Serbia. They want to prove that the JNA is violating the cease-fire agreement, which they allege in reports, "show" on television, and discuss in detail at meetings of scientists, "peace activists," and others. The goal is to depict the JNA as the aggressor, as an occupying, Serbo-communist, imperialist army, and whatever else they want to call it, because of which it must be crushed, in order that others from the outside, and not we in our own homeland, can decide our fate, respecting the support and assistance only of those with good intentions. And then some from the EC want things to be exclusively as they, with the help of puppets on our soil, want them to be, based on their theory that Yugoslavia no longer exists. And in order for that theory to be confirmed and effective, the JNA too would have to be crushed, the only Yugoslav institution that is not only functioning, but also successfully carrying out its basic duties in accordance with resolutions by the Yugoslav Presidency.

These forces want to discredit the JNA and accuse it of the alleged destruction of Dubrovnik, endeavoring to show that it has a barbarian attitude towards cultural and historical monuments. In conjunction with this, data are fabricated for false reports, television spots are produced, and spectacular humanitarian campaigns are organized. However, one must ask these humanitarians why they do not treat the other side in the war the same way, so that Serb refugees in Papuk, for example, would not have perished en masse due to a lack of medicine, food, and other necessities. Various humanitarian campaigns were also organized to help units of Tudjman's Ustasha army in besieged Vukovar, but it did not occur to the organizers—at least as far as I know—to go into, say, any of the blockaded JNA barracks, where for months on end hundreds and thousands of people were subjected to continuous armed assault and terror and deprived of all basic necessities.

The use of fabricated pictures from Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and Osijek reinforces the propaganda machinery for formulating those positions that are in the interest of those whose goal is the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. This sort of activity abroad, which is tearing Yugoslavia apart, is accompanied by blows by individuals from some opposition parties in this country, who want to crush the JNA through internal activities. This is helpful to the most aggressive group in the EC, making it easier for it to achieve its goals.

Propaganda for Dismemberment of Yugoslavia

Behind all this is an attack on the idea that Yugoslavia can be established as a modern, legal state of citizens and nations on a equal footing from among those of our nations that wish to live in a common state. This is obvious from the documents of the Arbitration Commission and the Council of Ministers of the European Community.

There are also individuals from the opposition in the territory of Serbia who are committed to a position against Yugoslavia and the JNA, while in regions of Croatia where Serbs live, there has been a deepening of certain destabilizing processes, which is sometimes tendentiously exaggerated. The foreign factor is injecting itself into all of this, depicting itself as someone with good intentions who wants to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia by a peaceful course and democratic means, while at the same time doing everything possible to escalate the use of force. This propaganda machinery first supported all the nationalistic forces in Yugoslavia, and then, while winking at neo-fascism, they applied political pressure to directly internationalize the Yugoslav crisis and imposed an economic blockade, only to decide then on military pressure, such as the threats by the Western European Union to the effect that Yugoslav radio communications and air defense must be "nailed shut" and that connections must be blockaded, including those of the naval forces. It is not hard to figure out why the air and naval forces were targeted. Many people were not disturbed when the thousand-year-old megalopolis Baghdad was destroyed, but they are disturbed when we blockade Dubrovnik, Tudjman's major military base, out of which the JNA moved its barracks 20 years ago in order to respect its cultural heritage and promote tourism, but where the Croatian supreme commander, in his campaign to dismember Yugoslavia, has now done everything possible to see to it that this city-monument lose all features of its cultural heritage, because a blackshirt barracks was moved into the city that threatens Prevlaka as the key to the Gulf of Kotor, threatens very valuable military property in Kupari, and threatens eastern Hercegovina, where once, five decades ago, genocide was perpetrated against the Serbian nation, and where today paramilitary, Ustasha units are doing everything they can to draw Capljina, Mostar, and the entire Neretva valley into the war. Add to this the fact that there have been continual armed clashes between the Ustashi in Dubrovnik. They themselves are destroying Dubrovnik, so that they can blame the JNA, even though the JNA has never fired on the old center of that city-monument. Moreover, the JNA has repeatedly reminded the domestic and world public that this is being done by Ustashi, but that information has not made inroads,

because this truth does not fit in with supporting the interests of those dismembering Yugoslavia. Those interests, and not the truth that they know quite well, are in the foreground.

Still, the truth breaks many chains. In the Security Council, the third resolution on Yugoslavia in the last three months, Resolution 724, was adopted, which is intended to bring about a truce and peace in this country. We have the support of the Nonaligned Movement for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international subjectivity of Yugoslavia. The full truth about what is happening here, especially with respect to the neo-Nazi campaign, is beginning, after a long delay, to be understood—although not universally and to the same extent—by the forces that defeated fascism in the Second World War, and this is motivating them to restrain Germany's aggressive political ambitions on the international scene, which begin precisely in the Balkan region with the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, and extend to the world.

There is no doubt that in today's world, after the radical and dramatic changes in the East, there is only one primary pole. This explains the fact that that pole is so expansionist, aware that it has a free hand. Specifically, the processes currently under way in the USSR show that it is so wrapped up with itself that it cannot even exert significant influence over the processes within its borders, let alone in international relations, where only the nuclear potential that it possesses can be a serious limiting factor on expansion by the other side. That which is happening in the USSR could develop into interethnic conflict like in Yugoslavia, which would be very serious, because they have problems that are similar, if not identical, to ours, including that of internal borders and the distribution of Russians, and 75 sites of interethnic conflict, some of which have become active, while many threaten to escalate and explode.

The Truth Breaks Chains

Despite all the warnings, Germany and its followers are sticking to their plans to promptly and unilaterally recognize secessionism in Yugoslavia, and demonstrating their decisive influence over the EC, as manifested by the adoption of the latest EC resolutions in Brussels on 17 December. One consequence of this could be that an official Croatia, using this as encouragement and support, will continue even more aggressively with the military option for dismembering Yugoslavia. This assessment is confirmed by the continuous attacks in western Slavonia and the failure to observe the 14th cease-fire agreement in a row, which was signed in Geneva. The offensive by the neo-Nazi and clerical-fascist military mob will be broadened to the degree that that the foreign factor has an encouraging effect on them. If, however, the balance of power in Europe has an inhibitive effect on the militant factor, then matters could to a certain extent move towards a more peaceful situation. This will depend on the further steps taken by the Security Council in terms of possible UN peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia.

Thus, the militant option is a reality that must be taken into account, and one pointed out by the SFRY Presidency and the Staff of the Supreme Command to all factors inside the country and in the rest of the world, aware that the degree to which we are able to influence any attempt at a military solution to the Yugoslav crisis depends solely on our strength. This is also clear to those political forces in the country that are working on behalf of the standard-bearers of the military option, and they are aware that they will succeed to the extent that we grow weaker. Because of this, some people immediately swooped down on the SFRY Presidency order concerning JNA reinforcements, appealing to reservists for the umpteenth time not to report for training and leave for the front, to desert their military units on the spot, and other things.

Aside from certain factors in Western and Central Europe, outside attempts are also being made to effect an intensification of the crisis in Yugoslavia by some of our neighbors. Representatives of these countries officially act surprised that it is possible that our republics have not yet been recognized as sovereign subjects, whereby they have a simple material interest: It is better to have small states, even if united in a loose association, as neighbors instead of Yugoslavia, which for 73 years has occupied more than half of the Balkan Peninsula. This would increase their importance in the Balkans. This could explain the support of some of them for seeing direct intervention by a foreign military factor in resolving our crisis.

Against Military Option With Own Force

The strong and aggressive foreign influence, especially from the Germanic team, has a base of support in the militant puppets in this country, where a national consensus has almost been achieved against Yugoslavia, especially in Slovenia and Croatia. This team is intensifying and emphasizing the military option, and that is why the armed formations from Croatia formally accept the cease-fire while doing everything they can to violate the agreements and provoke the Army to respond with fire, in order that they can accuse it before the world of violating the cease-fire. The Army consistently respects the cease-fire, responding only when it is forced to do so.

With the loss of Vukovar and defeats in the Knin Krajina, as well as in western Slavonia, the internal integrity of Croatia's armed units has been seriously undermined, so that they are not capable of carrying out serious offensive operations. This is why their attacks are for the most part reduced to actions from a distance—sniper, mortar, and artillery fire, and lately fire from agricultural aircraft as well. These are cowardly tactics, which some of the European gentlemen attributed to the Army in that famous report by its observer mission, written in Zagreb primarily in the language of the supreme commander and his right-hand men. These

same illegal armed forces, which are paramilitary formations in their entirety, are "brave" in campaigns against the weak in dozens of undefended Serbian villages, but not in western Slavonia, which is experiencing genocide and an exodus.

The coming time will not be a time for the Ustasha forces, regardless of how much powerful support they enjoy. They will certainly take advantage of every moment to rearm themselves, because that is a major problem for them. It is possible that under the guise of seized equipment—tanks, artillery, etc.—they will be armed from the outside with similar or other types of weaponry, primarily from the large reserves left over from the army of the GDR. Despite the embargo that is being circumvented, these things can be brought into the country, because ultimately the borders with Austria and Italy are under their control, as is a large part of the border with Hungary.

With good reason it can be expected that Croatia will form the core of a navy, and because it also has access to several airfields, it would clearly come as no surprise if it were to buy a certain number of airplanes as well. They fact that they agreed to the lifting of the blockades around barracks and to the withdrawal of JNA military technology does not indicate that they are simply weak, but rather that their foreign bosses gave them a signal—that they should not exhaust themselves over the equipment in the blockaded barracks, which they did for months by committing all of their forces and violating cease-fires, because they can give them all of that legally—despite the embargo—as soon as they recognize them.

In this situation, the very real danger that the Yugoslav crisis—if some things do not change—will continue to be resolved through the military option gives rise to the assessment that armed conflict in Yugoslavia could spread, primarily into the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and then into the Sandzak and even into Kosovo. This would open up the so-called southern front, the goal being to relieve the Croatian Ustasha armed units and, at the same time, to overextend the JNA.

Following the adoption of its Constitution, Macedonia declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It proclaimed that it has its own army, which constitutes the territorial defense force of Macedonia. Thus, a concept very similar to the one realized in Slovenia has been realized in Macedonia. Initially, it is rushing the development of its formations within the framework of units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and thus developing the police as a configuration for its armed forces, persistently working to procure arms and equipment that are being held in storage by the JNA—in order to create its own national army. For the Macedonian nation, this represents a road into great uncertainty.

All Yugoslav Nations Are Paying the Price of This Crisis

All the Yugoslav nations are paying the price of this crisis, and the Serbs most of all, because this is a question of revanchism towards them, of dividing them and breaking them up. Second on the list of losers would probably be the Muslims, who are also split up among these small states with the status of national minority. In fact, the bill is being paid directly by the Serbs right now, but the others will pay it later, because what is happening is not in the interest of a single nation in Yugoslavia, because for all of them Yugoslavia has been the framework within which they have been able to optimally resolve their national problems and experience development.

Appraisals were revealed in an interview with Army Gen. Veljko Kadijevic with NARODNA ARMIJA to the effect that we, by consistently pursuing clearly formulated goals, have successfully completed this stage of the war that has been forced upon us and ensured the basic preconditions for a resolution of the controversial issues through political means. Although deprived of a significant degree of support from the federal state and subjected to a powerful propaganda war both from inside the country and from abroad, we have successfully overcome our initial weakness in terms of mobilizing and organizing our war units. We have withstood powerful blows to the Army's combat morale and military integrity. We have successfully surmounted and prevailed over all of this. At the same time, under the most difficult war conditions, freeing ourselves from some of our own weaknesses and illusions, the Army has transformed itself and the doctrine pertaining to its wartime use. We have managed to overcome many difficulties and weaknesses, and we have gained valuable experience. The unity of the army leadership, although often questioned in aggressive propaganda, has been completely affirmed through the most difficult tests, with extraordinary significance to Army unity. We have also gained experience in relations with foreign military and civilian representatives and in the conduct of a propaganda war, organizing an information service at 15 centers at the command posts of operative units, which would be part of the state's wartime responsibilities, if we had a state. In any event, this is no longer the army that entered into the war, with certain mistakes and burdens; it is more powerful and more capable. It has attended the brutal school of warfare, it has undergone its catharsis, and it has acquired the training necessary to carry out any sort of combat operations and all types of armed combat.

Federal

Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia Agree on Recognition

LD1001122892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1136 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Skopje, 10 Jan (TANJUG)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov said at a news conference in Skopje today that he had a meeting yesterday with Slovene leader Milan Kucan and that it was agreed that "over the coming days Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia will recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations."

"It is now quite clear that Yugoslavia, as a federation, no longer exists and that there is no effective authority throughout its territory," Gligorov said, expressing satisfaction with the work of yesterday's plenary conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels.

Markovic Reported 'All But Under House Arrest'

LD0901041892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0112 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 8 (TANJUG)—Ante Markovic, Yugoslavia's resigning federal premier, is "all but under house arrest" in Zagreb, capital of Croatia, the Belgrade daily BORBA writes in its tomorrow's issue. In doing so, the newspaper refers to a statement made by a member of the Union of Reform Forces, Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, central Yugoslavia, without adducing his name, quoting Markovic as telling him by phone of being "all but under house arrest."

"For the time being, it seems that Markovic's arrival to Bosnia-Hercegovina will come to nothing," said the member of the Party of Reformists founded in 1990 on an initiative from the resigning Yugoslav premier. Several Bosnia-Hercegovina's politicians, and even Alija Izetbegovic, president of its Presidency, have invited Markovic to move to Bosnia-Hercegovina, BORBA writes. On December 20 last, Markovic submitted his resignation as the federal premier. Under the Yugoslav Constitution in force, the federal parliament should adopt the federal premier's resignation.

Military Commentator on EC Helicopter Incident

AU0901160392 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 8 Dec 92

[Interview with Miroslav Lazanski, POLITIKA military and political commentator, by Belgrade Television journalist Milorad Popov—live]

[Text] [Popov] Besides the resignation of Veljko Kadijevic, yesterday's downing of the EC observers' mission helicopter continues to be at the center of attention both for the domestic and international public. For this reason, we invited our colleague, Miroslav Lazanski, POLITIKA's military-political commentator, to our studio. Good evening.

[Lazanski] Good evening.

[Popov] In the resignation, it is stated that Kadijevic resigned for health reasons. The resignation was submitted a day after the incident. What are your comments on this?

[Lazanski] It is true, the date this resignation was announced is a bit inconvenient. The fact remains that Army General Veljko Kadijevic had a health problem last year. Due to the intense strain at his post and the intensity of living through all the events in Yugoslavia, his state of health has certainly deteriorated in the meantime. However, looking from the journalist's point of view, this resignation announcement was not exactly well-timed. However, what was done was done.

It is a fact that the downing of the helicopter carrying the EC observers' mission probably speeded up his decision to make the resignation public, although my impression is that this helicopter and its downing is a kind of Yugoslav replay of the Mathias Rust case and his Cessna on Moscow's Red Square. All this together was probably the reason for today's resignation announcement by the federal national defense secretary.

[Popov] Will this affect the command and leadership of the Armed Forces?

[Lazanski] According to the principle of military subordination, it cannot influence it, bearing in mind that according to Yugoslav law and the Constitution, the head of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces replaces the Federal Secretary, and globally speaking, an army always has a commander; wherever there is at least one officer, there is always a commander.

[Popov] Let us return to the incident. In the case of the downing of the EC observers' mission helicopter, it is probably most important to ascertain whether this helicopter had been given permission to fly or not, since everything else resulted from this?

[Lazanski] Yes. The story of the downing of the EC observers' mission is actually a complex story, where several types of problems conflict—I would call them several baskets of problems. The state of Yugoslavia, Europe, and the world, and especially the international organizations that deal with civilian air traffic, that is IATA [International Air Transport Association], continue to treat Yugoslav airspace as unified airspace, although the Republic of Croatia, together with the Republic of Slovenia, recently proclaimed sovereignty over its skies. Even the state of Austria, for instance, does not recognize the newly established civilian control, that is to say, regional flight control at Zagreb airport. IATA recognizes SUKLA [expansion unknown] as the general coordinator of civilian air traffic in Yugoslav airspace and recognizes the situation prior to 15 September 1991, that is to say, the situation prior to the emergence of war on Croatian territory.

[Popov] Did they have permission or not? Do you have any information on this? This is my basic question.

[Lazanski] On 6 January, the EC mission requested approval from the authorized Yugoslav bodies—that is to say, from the Federal Directorate for Civilian Air Traffic and from the military bodies—for observers' helicopters to fly between Belgrade, Kaposvar, and Zagreb. They were given permission for the flight between Belgrade and Kaposvar. They were not given permission for the flight from Kaposvar to Zagreb. It is a fact that, if we look at the incident chronologically, on the day the helicopter was downed—and it was downed at approximately 1410 [1310 GMT]—the helicopter had taken off from Hungary, from the Kaposvar airport, but

the Budapest regional civilian flight control did not inform the Belgrade regional flight control, that is to say, the Yugoslav flight control, that the helicopters were moving toward Yugoslav airspace. The Budapest flight control only informed Zagreb flight control, which has not been internationally and legally recognized, and which even IATA does not recognize as a relevant factor in civilian air traffic in Yugoslav airspace.

On the other hand, you also have the order from the SFRY Presidency that Yugoslav airspace is indivisible and all-encompassing, that is to say, it embraces the skies above Slovenia and Croatia as well, and that the Yugoslav Air Force must protect it in accordance with all regulations and combat requirements. It is also a fact that the EC observers' mission pilots knew their flight had been announced earlier on the Belgrade—Kaposvar—Kaposvar—Zagreb route, but confirmation was not forthcoming, and their takeoff from the Kaposvar airport was not reported to the responsible Yugoslav and civilian authorities.

And now we get to the paradoxical situation that the helicopter enters Yugoslav airspace over Varazdin, over the territory of the town of Varazdin, and that the pilots strictly communicate—and this will be shown by the black box and all radio communications with them—only with the newly established regional flight control of Zagreb airport, but not with the regional flight control of Belgrade airport, too—which, according to all the international regulations that are still valid—is in charge of flights in civilian airspace on the whole territory of the state of Yugoslavia.

[Popov] This really was an unfortunate incident.

[Lazanski] It was an unfortunate incident, of course. What happens then? What happens is that the operations officers who are responsible for Yugoslavia's air defense have on their radar screens two small dots entering Yugoslavia's airspace from the territory of the state of Hungary and for which they have no notification or prior announcement or identification whatsoever. Simply put, these two dots appear as unidentified flying objects that are entering our airspace without permission.

[Popov] Could the incident have been avoided?

[Lazanski] It could have been avoided if, for example, Hungary, that is to say, the regional flight control in Budapest had informed the regional flight control in Belgrade in time that, at this or that time, these two aircraft would be entering Yugoslavia's airspace.

[Popov] Do you have any information on the actions of the MiGs? How did they act, and from what distance, and did they know that they were firing at helicopters?

[Lazanski] No, these MiGs, that is to say the MiG-21 that fired the R-60 (?guided) missile at a distance of several kilometers, was not even in visual contact with the helicopter. This helicopter appeared on the radar screen of his airplane as a flying object that was entering airspace without permission from Hungary. As we have repeatedly had instances of arms being illegally smuggled from Hungary in agricultural planes and helicopters in the last few days—which have more or less the same speed as agricultural planes—he could, in any case, treat it as a plane that was illegally entering our airspace.

It is also a very interesting fact that at the time when the initial information was received about the downing of the helicopter, Yugoslav Air Defense phoned the regional flight control in Budapest to see where these helicopters were. This was some time around 1700. The Hungarians replied at 1800 that the helicopters were still in Kaposvar, even though they had already been shot down three hours previously—that is to say, at some time around 1410.

Then Colonel General Zvonko Jurjevic, commander of the Yugoslav Air Defense, who that morning had not been involved in these events because he had some other things to do, called Hungary's Air Defense Operations Center via the Yugoslav Air Defense Operations Center—in accordance with a previous agreement between the two air defenses, aimed at preventing border incidents and flights in the vicinity of the border—and also asked them where these helicopters were, and the Hungarians replied that they would give him an answer after 15 minutes. They phoned back after 15 minutes and said that the helicopters had set off for Yugoslavia some time after 1200, that is to say around 1300, but no one had contacted the competent Yugoslav bodies.

Thus, you see that this means that the Hungarians did not carry out their tasks. The newly established airport authorities of the regional flight control at Zagreb airport behaved as if the sky really is sovereign. On the other hand, the competent Yugoslav bodies behaved as if Yugoslavia's sky was still complete. Then you had the paradoxical situation that everyone carried out their own tasks, responsibilities clashed, and this resulted in a tragedy that is politically very inconvenient at this time.

[Popov] This was a tragic turn of events.

[Lazanski] Yes, a tragic turn of events. Although, I would say that the Yugoslav Air Defense took all the criticism on itself at that moment, even though it did everything professionally, in line with its own procedure and with the rules of its activity according to the regulations of combat requirements in a country that is at war—and we actually are at war, even though no one wants to admit this.

[Popov] Thank you very much. There will certainly be more details about this tragic event.

EC Monitoring Mission Resumes

LD1001135392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1305 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] The EC monitoring mission to Yugoslavia has decided to resume its work this afternoon and this work will continue on a day-to-day basis. This means that a decision will be made each day on whether or not clear

and satisfactory guarantees have been made by both sides concerning the safety of the EC personnel.

The Yugoslav Army's investigation into the downing of the EC helicopter on Tuesday is still in process. EC spokesperson Joao da Silva stated today that the Yugoslav Army has promised to keep the mission up to date on the investigation's progress.

A tripartite meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow at noon in the Hungarian town of Pecs. The meeting will be attended by Croatian Brigadier General Agotic, Yugoslavia's Lieutenant General Raseta, and the EC ambassador. The main topics slated for discussion are to be the establishment of secure communication between the sides on all levels.

Regional Flight Control Administration Units Open

LD1001014892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1533 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Federal Government has set up new regional units of the Federal Administration for Flight Control at the Udbina airport near Gospic in Croatia and at the Zaluzani helioport near Banja Luka in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The two airport flight control and weather services, as the Federal Information Secretariat has announced, were set up to serve the Yugoslav Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence in keeping with legislation on air transport. The Udbina and Zaluzani flight controls were founded as the joint services of the already operating flight controls at Bihac and Banja Luka airports. Located in Bihac and Banja Luka are large air-force airfields which became the country's westernmost air-force bases after the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia broke away from Yugoslavia and after the Federal Army withdrew from the former and pulled out from part of the latter republic.

Federal Army units remain in those parts of Croatia, within the administrative boundaries of this Yugoslav republic, which are populated by Serbs who, after Croatia seceded, voted at a referendum in favour of staying in Yugoslavia.

Brovet Describes 'Attempted Overthrow' in Army

LD0801183292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1617 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Defence Minister Admiral Stane Brovet characterized yesterday's attack on the E.C. monitor mission helicopter in Croatia as "an attempted overthrow within the Yugoslav Army", the Belgrade evening paper VECERNJE NOVOSTI writes today.

Brovet made this assessment in last night's telephone conversation with U.N. secretary-general's special envoy to Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance, as the paper's correspondent in Washington reports. Brovet informed Vance, as reporters at the United Nations were told, that following the attack, commander of the Yugoslav Army's Air Force Zvonko Jurjevic was arrested.

The Yugoslav Defence Ministry last night confirmed that a plane of the Yugoslav Air Force "downed one and damaged another helicopter of the E.C. monitor mission." Five E.C. monitor mission members, including one Frenchman and four Italians, were killed in the incident which occurred yesterday at 14:00 local time (13:00 GMT).

The Yugoslav Defence Ministry has ordered an urgent inquiry and announced that "legal measures" will be instigated against the culprits.

Conflicts Between Kadijevic, Milosevic Viewed

92BA0264A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Dec 91 p 13

[Article by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Kadijevic and Milosevic: Who Will Overthrow Whom?"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] In recent days in diplomatic and informational circles in Europe, reports of the possibility that the army will overthrow the regime of Slobodan Milosevic with a classic coup have become increasingly louder. At the same time Milosevic is hurrying to "liberate" Kadijevic and his mob of soldiers.

Who still remembers the pompous demonstrations on Gazimestan arranged on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo? Reporters noticed a protocol incident then, as it was believed. Among the invited guests in the first row sat Slobodan Milosevic, as the official host; to his left was Dr. Janos Drnovsek, then president of the Presidency of the SFRJ, and to the right of the Serbian leader, also in the first row, was General Veljko Kadijevic, federal minister of defense. Just two rows behind them was Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Government and formally the chief of Veljko Kadijevic. However, the events that followed Gazimestan have shown that not just a simple protocol oversight was involved but a manifestation of a political alliance between Milosevic and official Serbia and the army leadership. On the same occasion, on Gazimestan, the Balkan Saddam Hussein announced the possibility of war confrontations in these areas, but almost no one viewed this seriously. What is happening today in Croatia clearly shows that Kadijevic was not sitting in the first row by accident, right next to Milosevic, and that the Gazimestan threats were no mere figure of speech.

The Shock of the Officers and Their Families

The events on the battlefields in Croatia are, nevertheless, not developing in the way that Milosevic and Kadijevic expected. Moreover, the Serbian-military bloc, under pressure from the international public, should have agreed to the withdrawal of army units from

Croatia; this has completely disrupted by all appearances the tight connection between official Serbia and the leadership of the Yugoslav army.

Foreign military representatives in Belgrade are informing their governments increasingly often about the examples of open dissatisfaction in army ranks, especially after tens of thousands of officers and their families left Slovenia and Croatia and, together with the remainder of units of the federal army, were located in the interior of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the back country of Montenegro. The reports of foreign military attaches refer to the real shock in the ranks of officers and their families who overnight left comfortable apartments and a whole series of social privileges that they enjoyed in Croatia and Slovenia and found themselves far from such urban centers as Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Ljubljana, Maribor, Kranj. Although it had drawn generously for decades out of the federal account, the army was not able on such short notice to provide an adequate substitute for the living conditions of officers and their families withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia. Officers' children left prestigious schools and faculties, officers' wives left jobs, and what the future holds for them is difficult to say. The clumsy army apparatus is simply too great a burden for those who claim that they want to be Yugoslavia.

Stories are arriving from the field in Bosnia-Hercegovina about how military newcomers from Slovenia and Croatia are moving by decree into apartments already occupied by officers' or some other families, so that about ten people are learning how to live in a two-room apartment. At the same time dissatisfaction in officers' ranks is growing, but the actions of the KOS [Counter-intelligence Service], which oversee everyone and anyone, are also increasing, so the "landlords" and their "subtenants" view each other with distrust and avoid speaking openly about the problems that plague them. Cases of drunkenness and violent behavior under the influence of alcohol are increasing steadily. Because of what is usually called verbal abuse, five officers of the Yugoslav army, including a light colonel, have been sentenced under a summary procedure in Bihac in the past 12 days, three officers were sentenced in Tuzla, and in Sarajevo a case is being prepared before a military court against a whole group of 11 officers who, dissatisfied with what is happening, protested publicly. It has also been observed that, in cities in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro where officers and their families are moving practically by force, prices are rising almost overnight, shortages of some basic groceries are occurring, and crime on the streets is increasing.

The Breakup of the Alliance

Officers and their families, in their new living quarters, are encountering distrust and a unique boycott, because the local population considers them a potential danger that could lead to armed clashes, but also a cause of economic misfortune. The printing office of the National Bank of Yugoslavia on Topcider is continuing to issue, for army needs, large sums of money that is losing value from one day to the next. Increased sums of the "army dinar" are increasing inflation in those parts of the former Yugoslavia in which a greater concentration of officers and their families has formed.

Reports of diplomatic representatives sent to Western governments also indicate the fact that some of the officers are dissatisfied that they did not accept the invitation of the government of the Republic of Croatia to stay in Croatia to live and serve in the ranks of the Croatian National Guard. One thing was promised to them in the army, and the reality is completely different—one of these reports says. Any mention of Croatia as the side in the war with equal rights or even as the side on which war was forced is severely punished in the army, and it has been observed in recent days that large groups of operatives of the military security service have been sent from Belgrade to cities in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro—a classified report sent from Belgrade cites.

While the dissatisfaction of officers of lower ranks has been caused mainly by economic uncertainty and a situation in which they have found themselves overnight together with their families, the military leadership in the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense is dissatisfied for other reasons. According to the assessment of foreign diplomats in Belgrade, Kadijevic, Brovet, Adzic and the majority of other high officers of the Yugoslav Army are criticizing Slobodan Milosevic because he claimed at the beginning of his alliance that Serbia was fighting for the preservation of Yugoslavia, and now he is striving ever more openly for the creation of a greater Serbia. They are particularly affected by the fact that Slobodan Milosevic is shamelessly entering into pacts with extreme right, fascist forces and that he is forcing allies on them like the chetniks of Vojislav Seselj and the "white eagles" of Mirko Jovic. Not understanding, like Slobodan Milosevic either, the real essence of historical, social and political processes in these areas, the generals are attempting to preserve not only the idea about a Yugoslavia but also its incarnations, not seeing that the great majority of peoples who constitute the former Yugoslavia simply do not want to live in some artificially national government creation.

Feeling that playing the military card at this moment is not a guarantee of political success, Slobodan Milosevic and his clique are attempting, whenever possible, to distance themselves from the army and the army leadership. Except for stubbornly repeating that Serbia is not at war, and therefore not even responsible for what is happening in Croatia, and that it is known the Yugoslav army is fighting there, Milosevic and his regime are "forgetting" increasingly often even to mention Yugoslavia declaratively, and are primarily pushing Serbia more and more in their statements. Thus, in a recent speech in the House of the Army in Belgrade, before a gathering of military and political veterans, and right in the museum of wax figures, Slobodan Milosevic praised only Serbia and the interests of Serbs.

The schism in the seemingly monolithic Milosevic-Kadijevic bloc occurred at that moment when the defense minister demanded that part of the units from Slovenia and Croatia be placed in the area of Serbia. The Serbian ruler flatly refused this, explaining that it would be better for those units to be in Bosnia and Montenegro and thus closer to the battlefields in Croatia. However, the real reason is that, in the current catastrophic economic situation, Serbia cannot bear the cost of "military newcomers"; moreover, a large number of officers and military personnel could become a political factor in Serbia that would block the moves of Milosevic and his clique.

Unconvincing Fear of the "Ghosts of Fascism"

The economic blockade of the West will affect not only Serbia and Montenegro, but also the remainders of the federal army. According to the army's assessment, that blockade is the result of erroneous political and diplomatic moves by Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian government and especially its minister Vladislav Jovanovic. Serbia, and through it the army as well, have lost certain political allies as of yesterday such as France, England and America. No indications are forthcoming that the West could change its viewpoint towards Serbia as the instigator of aggression against Croatia. Therefore, according to reports from foreign diplomats in Belgrade, Kadijevic and part of the army's general officers are considering the possibility of overthrowing Slobodan Milosevic with a classic coup. The question is, however, who would follow him in that case. According to some assessments, it could be the current minister of internal affairs, Petar Gracanin, while according to others Dusan Ckrebic would pull himself out of the "political pipeline."

Naturally, the other side is not resting easy. Milosevic realizes that he can no longer deceive the military leadership with the story about preserving Yugoslavia, and the question is whether the fear of "ghosts of Fascism" is stimulative enough for the military leadership to follow him further in the foolish war adventure even with a foreseeable end. Just because of this, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic is looking for a way out of the "marriage" with the Yugoslav army, which began as a "marriage for love," has become a connection of mutual interest, and is ending as a divorce lawsuit because of "incompatibility of temperament." Two days before the last trip to The Hague for a meeting with Lord Carrington, a secret, closed meeting was held in the building of the government of the Republic of Serbia between Slobodan Milosevic and part of the regional leaders of the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia at which the political, military and security situation in the republic was analyzed in detail. According to a shorthand report whose contents were delivered to a west European ambassador in Belgrade a day after the meeting in The Hague, Milosevic had said on that occasion how obvious it was that part of the army leadership is no longer prepared to support the efforts of Serbia and the Serbian people, so that means must be found in the shortest possible time for Serbia to proceed alone without the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] umbrella. Now it must be clear to us—the shorthand report from the meeting reads—that many obstacles await Serbia on its road and that yesterday's allies, even in the highest army ranks, are not reliable... However, we will find a way out and solutions that will perhaps surprise some, but that will be in the tradition of our love of freedom, said Slobodan Milosevic. The question is obviously burning under the feet of many in Belgrade as to who will be the first of the conspirators to draw aside his toga and pull out a dagger. In the judgement of foreign diplomatic observers, democracy in Serbia will have the most benefit, no matter how drastic it might be, from the clashes between Milosevic and Kadijevic. Specifically, foreign observers do not believe that either of the parties in the conflict could win such a victory as to assure himself power and political control.

Army Spokesman Attacked for Misrepresentation

92BA0279A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Manojlo Vukotic: "Shooting at the Wrong Target: An Open Letter to Colonel Milan Gver, spokesman of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The Hague that the 26 November report from the EC observer mission in Yugoslavia exists, and is official in nature; can both hemispheres of the war be covered objectively, truthfully, and impartially? Denial of his own statements and concealment of the most important facts; attempt to find "healthy forces" in BORBA.

Esteemed Comrade Colonel,

It was with very great surprise, and even more amazement, that I read (on a business trip) your statement in connection with the report by the EC observer mission. BORBA published that statement, given to TANJUG, in its entirety, and thus also the last two sections, in which you harshly, unfairly, and provocatively attacked this newspaper.

Your statement would not deserve a response if it were not for the clumsily framed construction from which you launch smoke bombs and hit the wrong targets; this is not appropriate for a colonel, and moreover the spokesman for the Yugoslav Army Ministry.

In the very first section of your statement, you fall into a trap by stating, "A few days ago certain European agencies and media carried the contents of what, from all indications, is a nonexistent statement by the EC observer mission."

Why, Comrade Colonel, is it a "from all indications, nonexistent statement"? As a person who speaks on behalf of the Army Ministry, which is after all characterized by precision and accuracy, you should have told the

public whether that statement existed or not. You could easily have checked it. You probably know that it exists, and have it in your hands or in your drawer.

A completely different and secondary issue is the fact that the contents of that report are not pleasing at all to your superiors, your commanders, or you personally; as well as the fact that you assess it as "one-sided, politically biased, full of inventions and unfounded accusations against the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]," "an open anti-army propaganda pamphlet..."

After criticizing the report with the usual worn-out terminology ("insinuation," "propaganda effects," "specially chosen time," "dangerous and irresponsible playing with particularly serious matters"), you attempted to use BORBA for the final blow. "I also point out with regret the fact that, aside from Tudjman's controlled Ustasa press, the most attention was given to this pamphlet by BORBA," you said.

The Report Is Official

Comrade Colonel, do not have regrets about BORBA—about it least of all. And why? BORBA, observing only the principles of its editorial policy—as on innumerable occasions in the past—wanted to provide, authentically and with documentation, a report that world agencies had already begun to broadcast and official institutions had already begun to analyze. Along with the report, we also published information from our correspondent in The Hague. At that time there was no reliable and precise confirmation in it of the report's arrival and of who had signed it.

Comrade Colonel, BORBA is offering the additional information to you, as well as your superiors—and the interested parties.

The report from the EC observers in Yugoslavia, dated 26 November, does exist, and is of an official nature. This is the very latest confirmation given to BORBA's correspondent by an official representative of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. At the end of November, the report was received by the EC Presidency, and officially registered, along with the several hundred other reports from the EC observer mission that have previously arrived at the EC Presidency.

The observer mission sends daily reports to the Presidency, and the Presidency then periodically sends them to the member states of the EC and to the chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington. The report in question was probably sent to Lord Carrington at the beginning of December. It is quite possible that he did not receive it before the moment that certain parts of that report were being publicly interpreted.

Following a similar procedure, Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance also send their reports to the EC Presidency. The Presidency is not authorized to release those reports to the public, nor does it do so, as our correspondent was informed by an authorized representative of the Dutch Foreign Ministry.

After this, can you talk about a "nonexistent report"?

For you and yours, all of this will not be sufficient, worthwhile, serious, or documented. For you, it will remain a pamphlet, because the bitterness of its contents is unacceptable, unbearable, and poisonous to you.

Two War Hemispheres

You continue by saying that "BORBA's responsibility to its own readers is typified by the fact that for months now, this newspaper has been starting many leading articles with 'according to a HINA [Croatian Information-News Agency] report,' 'as reported by Croatian Radio,' 'in an HTV [Croatian Television] broadcast,' etc."

Comrade Colonel, you have fallen into a jungle of falsehood and malice that is not appropriate for even a third-callup conscript, and particularly not a person with such serious and confidential tasks. Not even our most ordinary reports begin with the words "according to" or "as reported by," much less "many leading articles." There are not many leading articles from the battlefield. One or two a day can be singled out. That is less important, however. The important thing is that you want to insinuate that BORBA's coverage is the same as that of the "controlled Ustasa press."

The reader will find in our reports from Croatia citations of HINA, HTV, and the Zagreb or some other press. You are upset by this, although these are all official media and official institutions of a state and an authority that at one time was recognized by the army leadership.

BORBA has attempted and desired to show both sides of the battle line, both hemispheres of the war—and it stands by this. The only thing is that if one can see the whole front, one can know about what is happening, being destroyed, disappearing, being separated, being conquered, being abandoned, about people moving, fleeing, suffering, bleeding, going mad, weeping, being wrapped in black... In order for that war geography to appear as objective and contoured as possible, we have attempted to mix the sources of our information, knowing in advance that in this chaos, conflagration, and madness not all information can be precise, objective, true, and comprehensive.

After all, Comrade Colonel, haven't you, who are so well supplied with information, made mistakes and blunders? I will not torment you with old examples. Here is just the latest one: last Saturday the newspapers published your statement in which you say, "The JNA did not bombard Dubrovnik, and not a speck of dust from the JNA has fallen on that city." You also added once more that corrupt phrase that this was "perfidious disinformation aimed at blackening the JNA at a sensitive time." Just a day later, the newspapers (in which you also believe)

published this news: "The Yugoslav federal army has apologized to the Croatian authorities for yesterday's bombardment of Dubrovnik, and announced that it will undertake an investigation to determine who ordered the attack against this historic city."

Concealment of the Most Important Facts

And you, Comrade Colonel, from that command pool, from that service disseminated within the large building of the Army Ministry, not only could have, but should have offered the public innumerable facts, information, and materials about the terrible Yugoslav war which has destroyed almost all our ideas, dreams, and hopes. Perhaps there could have been fewer lies and speculations, less one-sidedness and bias.

You were not able to? You did not know how to? You did not want to? You did not dare to?

Are you really not yet able to say, even approximately, how many young soldiers and members of the JNA have perished? They were on lists, in formation, in records, under commands.

Do you really not know how many people in uniform, and with JNA insignia, have been wounded, crippled, made invalids? It was announced for the first time yesterday that more than 1,700 wounded have been treated at VMA [Military Medical Academy] alone. And other hospitals throughout the country...

Are you really unable to announce, even today, how many members have abandoned the army's ranks, deserted, changed their uniform?

After so many weeks, are you really unable to announce the names of the young soldiers who voluntarily, on their own initiative, went to their death with Major Milan Tepic? His family has already been handed the National Hero decoration; about 20 newspaper lines were devoted to a congratulatory speech from a respected official, and about 10 lines were devoted to a list of the high-level guests. Devote just one line to the names of the soldiers (six are spoken of), or the name of the soldier (now just one is being mentioned) who went to heaven with the same conviction as the Major.

Are you really unable to explain whether 60 percent of the JNA personnel have already left Macedonia, and whether the guardhouses on the border with Albania have been left empty?

Does the Army really not have any analysis of how much has been cost so far by this war, this destruction, this dreadful abyss into which we have all been driven, this despair in which we have all been pushed together—from generals to the ranks, from heroes to deserters, from academicians to doormen, from presidents to journalists?

Comrade Colonel, you could have and should have given the public answers to many similar questions, and offered serious facts so that the situation we are in could be distinguished. Many people are demanding this. Many people are hungry for the truth.

That is more important, and you have much more of an obligation to do that than to catch, weigh, and invent a newspaper's mistakes.

And how much you have enjoyed that role and how much it does not become you, because of the stars shining on your shoulders, is demonstrated by the last observation in your statement. You say that you also had to point out those quoted "mistakes" by BORBA "in spite of the fact that several young colleagues at that newspaper, in recent months, have succeeded in placing in it more authentic testimonies about the army and its people."

What sort of an sneak attack is that now, Colonel? How did you "cleverly" learn that the "young colleagues... succeeded in placing more articles"? All of those young colleagues, Comrade Colonel, were employed (or are not yet employed) and selected by and with the consent of the chief editor and the same editors who approved the publication of the "pamphlet" report, and those "leading articles which begin with..." and without whom it is by no means possible to "succeed in placing articles," without their editorial hand and observance of the criteria of valid editorial policy. That would be as if you did not carry out the orders of General Kadijevic, or on your own initiative assumed command, for example, in some military region. Would that be disintegration or a coup? It is all the same.

It seems that you are playing a dirty card, Comrade Colonel; it seems that you would like to create "healthy forces" in BORBA, a "militant nucleus" or a nucleus for some sort of mini-antibureaucratic revolution, right? What do you want it for? Aren't you already participating in a big war?

BORBA is one point, one elevation. Admittedly, it is a very significant one, and perhaps extremely significant. But you should also believe that it is very difficult to capture. Consequently, Comrade Colonel, practice your psychological warfare in some other terrain—BORBA is not suitable for it.

SPS Member on Serbian-Macedonian Relations

92BA0278A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 91 p 9

[Interview with Dr. Rados Smiljkovic, SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] executive committee member, by Dragan Bisenic; place and date not given: "Dr. Rados Smiljkovic, Member of the Executive Committee of the SPS, on Relations Between Serbia and Macedonia; No Stray Bullets"—first four paragraphs are BORBA introduction]

[Text] Macedonia and the Macedonian nation are recognized only on this soil, the soil of so-called southern Serbia. Macedonians have lived not only in this part of

the Balkans, but only here are they recognized. It would not be possible for the Serbian nation not to accept this.

For a long time now, sparks have been flying in relations between Serbia and Macedonia, whereby these two republics have half accused each other of an unjust attitude one towards the other. In Macedonia, ambitions of conquest and hegemony, and even the blame for the breakup of Yugoslavia, are imputed to Serbia, its leadership, and to a certain extent the Serbian nation. Some opposition circles in Serbia deny the existence of both Macedonians and the Macedonian state, while official policy insists on the "non-sovereignty of the republic" within the context of the struggle for the federation, which runs counter to the present-day decisions and political situation in Macedonia.

"Over the course of postwar history, Serbia has never occupied either a systemic or a de facto position of most responsible republic in Yugoslavia in order that it could be accused of being the most responsible one even today. The theory of 'weak Serbia—strong Yugoslavia' is well-known. That is how things were, but we have still seen the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In this process, Serbs and Serbia have taken steps to save anything that can still be saved. Gosev says that Serbian politicians should ask themselves why everyone around us is afraid, but he does not provide the arguments for a question of this type. Do the Macedonians have cause to be afraid? Serbian politics and the people of Serbia have accepted and assisted in the emergence and development of Macedonia and in the emancipation of the Macedonians," says Dr. Rados Smiljkovic, a member of the executive committee of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] in an interview with BORBA on relations between Serbia and Macedonia.

Questions are being raised about whether Serbia endorses the federation as a state or Serbia as a state. Serbia opts for Serbia as a state if the survival of Yugoslavia is not possible. Not for a Lesser Serbia or a Greater Serbia, but rather for Serbia. It wants Serbia wherever Serbs live.

[Bisenic] However, people in Serbia speak publicly about Macedonia as "southern Serbia," and naturally that provokes discontent among political circles in Macedonia, but also amazement that there is no reaction to this in Serbia.

[Smiljkovic] We are criticized for not distancing ourselves enough from extremist positions towards Macedonia. All right. Perhaps we can indeed do more to distance ourselves. But this would not represent any sort of improvement in the quality of our relations towards Macedonia and the Macedonian national question. In no sense does that which we have noted in our program, in the Serbian Constitution, ignore either Macedonia or the Macedonian nation. What we are doing in practice confirms this position of ours. However, there is something more that the present Macedonian political leadership could do. It could fight for an attitude towards Serbs in Macedonia as a nation, and it could fight against the violence being inflicted on Serbs. Under this condition, they will contribute much more to a change in attitude by individual structures in Serbia than we could by daily, verbal qualifications. As long as they do not do this, then we too will lack ammunition in the fight against these extremist positions.

Instrumentalized Mirage

[Bisenic] I would say that Serbs and Serbia have an offended attitude towards Macedonians, that some things are done simply to spite the Macedonians.

[Smiljkovic] There is an offended attitude, and it is shared by a large part of the population for the reasons of which I spoke. Macedonia and the Macedonian nation are recognized only on this soil, the soil of so-called southern Serbia. Macedonians have lived not only in this part of the Balkans, but only here are they recognized. This would not have been possible if the Serbian nation had not accepted this, naturally with a corresponding policy.

[Bisenic] In Macedonia there is fear of the "northern Big Brother," that history will regress. Is there any understanding for this fear in Serbia?

[Smiljkovic] We in the SPS see no reason for this fear. Personally, I feel that this is a mirage in which the Macedonians have instrumentalized their policy of attacking Serbia. What danger? Serbs do not account for one-third of the population of Skopje. Macedonia is not 30 percent Serb, but rather 30 percent Albanian.

In no sense do the Serbs exhibit any tendency towards smothering Macedonian autonomy. Macedonians and Macedonia exist in the being and consciousness of Serbs.

Unclear Attitude

[Bisenic] I do not know whether there are 300,000 Serbs in Macedonia, as Kosutic says.

[Smiljkovic] I do not know the exact figure. When Macedonia was formed, it was around 10 percent Serb. As we left the war behind us, it was difficult to estimate how many Serbs there were from official statistics. We know about pressures, and then the exclusion of "them." You will have to ask Kosutic how he arrived at that number, and where the figure of 40,000 came from. I heard from a Macedonian 10 or 12 years ago that there are 30,000 Serbs in Skopje alone. At the time, that bothered neither them nor me.

[Bisenic] It is said that there is a tendency within the leadership of Serbia to think that if Macedonia explicitly endorses the federation, then everything will be all right, but if autonomy and independence are declared, then relations between Serbia and Macedonia will be set up like relations between two states.

[Smiljkovic] As long as the monarchy existed, the Serbs were the standard bearers of the monarchy and of

unitarism. When the federation was established, the standard bearers of the federation were again others, while the Serbs, once again, supported unitarism. When the options are the disintegration of the state and the federation, it is said now that the Serbs are for the federation, because they do not want the situation to change, which is how the disintegration of Yugoslavia is understood. It is natural for the Serbs to want a clear stance: "Are you for the federation or are you not, are you for a confederation or are you not, are you for a completely independent Macedonia or are you not?" There is no pressure being applied in terms of "you must do this, you must do that," but there is still no answer to whether Serbia too has decided on its attitude towards Macedonia.

The attitude, "we are for Yugoslavia, but not for the federation" or "we are for the federation, but only if it includes Slovenia and Croatia" is legally and politically unclear, since Slovenia and Croatia have left Yugoslavia. You cannot expect us now to ensure that they remain with you. What would happen if we were to say, "we will be with you, but we want Greece to be with you too."

This is a time when there is a war going on in Yugoslavia, when people are shooting at each other, and when it is necessary to know exactly who is on whose side. So that there are no stray bullets.

[Bisenic] Another meeting between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia has been announced. This is also interpreted in Macedonia as activity by Serbia behind Macedonia's back.

[Smiljkovic] Is it? The days are gone when Serbia has to ask its brother republic about every action towards foreign countries. During the period when the Kolisevski leadership had a progressive attitude towards Serbia and the Serbs, that policy held up. It is no longer possible now. Nor do we demand that we be consulted when Macedonian representatives go to Germany, Austria. Serbia has a border with Bulgaria, and it has long been necessary to cooperate and have contacts with that country. Serbia has a traditional friendship with Greece. It is one of the two neighboring countries that has not fired on Serbia. Should Serbia not cooperate with them? I wonder who in the previous period had the right to break off these ties?

[Bisenic] So what are the prospects?

[Smiljkovic] I can tell you what I want, but I would not say anything about prospects in the sense of prophesies, because everything right now is changing rapidly. It is in our mutual interest that economic cooperation continue, and not only here, but also wherever we have mutual interests. Otherwise, talk of national emancipation will be meaningless.

[Box, p 9]

Nation and Leadership

Serbs are denied their right as a nation in Macedonia, and are covered by the rights of national minorities, about which it is said, "this is a nation because they are Serbs, but they are not talked about." Yes. But then it is said that the Serbs are a nation just like the Macedonian nation, and that they have the same rights as Macedonians, the standard-bearers of sovereignty. This is an attempt to deceive the Serbs, and it is said that "we get along fine with the Serbs, but not with the leadership." Really! As if the Serbs do not know that they chose their own leadership; rather, now you must decide for them who should be their leadership.

It is obvious that the Serbs in Macedonia did not come from another planet. There are native Albanians and Gypsies living there, but Serbs are not mentioned. It is impossible to cover up the history of the 400-year Serbian state that was located there. A different approach must be taken, just as Serbs of a socialist and democratic orientation accepted the fact that a Macedonian nation was being created and developed, so that they too must accept the minimum fact that the Serbs too are authentic.

Moreover, people must be allowed to declare who and what they are. Have any Macedonians learned from their past how they were convinced?

BORBA Reports Data on Proposed Federal Budget

92BA0306C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 91 p 10

[Article by Jasna Kesic: "A Budget Neither for War Nor for Peace"]

[Text] When he submitted his resignation on 20 December, Prime Minister Ante Markovic said that the "budget being requested of the FEC [Federal Executive Council] is meant to provide financial and political support to continuation of the war, because about 81 percent of the proposed budget goes to finance the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. That means not only a continuation of the war, the death, and the destruction, but also the loss of any economic or social prospect for the future...."

The very next day Aleksandar Mitrovic, vice president of the FEC, reacted to this statement in the Yugoslav Assembly, saying that it is absurd to refer to the proposed budget as a war budget, that it is true that funds for the JNA amount to 70 percent of it, 81 percent if military pensions are included, but if the method from previous years is used, it would amount to less than 40 percent of the budget. He also said that the FEC had adopted the budget by a vote and that only Prime Minister Markovic was against it. "There is no war budget, because no one ever presented such a proposal,"

Dr. Nikola Cubra, assistant secretary in the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, announced to TANJUG the same day.

All Forecasts Are Futile

It is futile and almost impossible today to judge who is right. Time will be the best indicator. In and of itself, however, it says much that the budget for next year was proposed in two alternative versions which the republic assemblies are to take up this week. The one given the "green light" is to be adopted in the federal parliament as well on 28 December.

While the proposed amount of funds in the federal treasury for the entire year is 305.1 billion dinars, 245 billion are envisaged to finance the JNA, or 213.4 billion if military pensions are omitted. Those 213.4 billion dinars for the current financing of the Army represent 4.6 percent of the national income for the coming year, which is estimated at 4,639 billion. Exactly as much as regulations call for it to be, although the country's social plan (whose extension the Assembly is supposed to adopt) envisaged 5.2 percent of the national income for the JNA. Approximately the same percentage as over the last 10 years, when the JNA spent between 3.08 and 4.81 percent of the national income, is proposed for the coming year. There is, then, really no basis for saying that it is a war budget.

At the FEC, they say that the assumption taken as the base for budgeting resources for the JNA was that armed conflicts would cease over the entire territory of Yugoslavia and that transformation of the JNA in keeping with the country's new arrangement would begin during 1992.

Because of the transfer of units of the JNA from Slovenia and Croatia, the out-of-the-ordinary expenses of the Army are immense. A second large (and expensive) problem is housing the refugee families of military personnel. So far, there are about 13,000 such families with more than 36,000 members. It will be necessary, those in the FEC feel, to provide at least the seed money for a more permanent solution of these and other social problems which are arising because of the political (and certainly also military) situation in the country. This will be the predominant concern of the JNA, while only minimal money will be provided for equipment programs and the most necessary renewal of material reserves. Smaller resources than in 1991 are planned for regular activity (personal incomes, meals, training, medical treatment, and so on).

That is how the people in the federal government explain the funds proposed for the JNA. The same substantiation is contained in the three-month minibudget proposed as a temporary budget until such time as the Yugo-crisis is resolved. Of the 86 billion dinars which are supposed to be in the federal treasury by the end of March, 62.9 or 73.2 percent is envisaged for the JNA. It is significant that in that first quarter more funds are planned for the JNA than for the second, for example. And the question immediately arises: Is this not because of the war?

There Simply Is No Money

With all due respect for all the needs of the Army, things nevertheless can be cast in a different light. The very structure of the budget from which all interventions in the economy, the financing of social welfare programs, etc., have been omitted also says much. In earlier years, those purposes took up about 45 percent of the budget, but for next year not a dinar has been planned, because there simply is no money. But for the Army, in spite of the utter lack of money, funds are nevertheless increasing, and that by 383 percent! And that is for the JNA without Slovenia, Croatia, possibly even Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina.... Does it not say much that there simply has to be money for the JNA when it is not necessary for others?

A quite different question, one that also deserves a great deal of attention, is whether the benefit would be greater if some of the funds earmarked for the JNA (because there are no other beneficiaries) were committed to interventions in the economy? While we fully understand the problems of military personnel that have moved, of their families, the garrisons, and so on, we must not forget the hundreds of thousands of people who are without jobs and families, the crowds of the homeless, the hungry, those below the poverty line. Aid to the economy would be direct assistance to them as well, but now even the social welfare programs that have always had a place in previous budgets have been discontinued. It is difficult to accept the thesis that military personnel and their families are more important than other ordinary people, about whom today no one seems to be concerned. Unless we are nevertheless not talking about financing the war?

The way in which it will be financed—from the primary note issue of the National Bank of Yugoslavia—that is, without backing in the social product and the national income—indicates how important it is to provide money to the Army. The restrictive monetary policy that has been conducted in recent years and the firm hand of the central bank have all of a sudden loosened their grip entirely, and next year Topcider will print 229.5 trillion dinars just for the federal treasury. This can cover all the needs of the Army and something more as well. Now that we are already hurtling ourselves into hyperinflation, perhaps we could also print a few billion for the economy or for social welfare programs. If we are going to have a ball, then let it be a ball with music. This way, it turns out that the entire federal administration making decisions about money cares only about the Army and its needs. Or perhaps that is not the case?

Slovene-Croatian Economic Relations Discussed

92BA0263A Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 14 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Ivan Krasko: "Normal Economic Relations: Meeting Between Slovene and Croatian Government Delegations on the Border in Mokrice"—first paragraph is NEODVISNI DNEVNIK introduction]

[Text] Mokrice, 14 Dec—It has already become a sort of practice for Slovene and Croatian government delegations to meet at least once a month and try to solve mutual urgent problems in a joint meeting. The very composition of the Slovene delegation eloquently indicates what the two delegations talked about this time. In addition to Prime Minister Peterle, the Slovene delegation also included Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ocvirk and Ministers Bavcar and Basti.

At a brief press conference after the meeting, both prime ministers said that they had first of all informed each other about the economic situation, and also about the military and political situation in Croatia. The delegations agreed in Mokrice that the governments would accelerate the work of the border commission. That commission, in fact, has the assignment of preparing the demarcation between the two states. The demarcation is necessary because, on the basis of the documentation, certain sections of the border are unclear.

Croatia and Slovenia will sign several agreements, among others ones regulating joint ownership, local border trade, employment, and so forth, but the most significant one is the trade agreement that will be signed after Christmas, and certainly before New Year's, according to Prime Minister Dr. Franjo Greguric. A commodity list that regulates economic relations next year, in fact, is tied to that document.

In the talks, the delegations also discussed transportation, among other things the construction of the Phyrnska [as published] highway, in which both states are interested, according to the two prime ministers. It is no secret that the issue of the Ljubljana Bank branch in Zagreb has burdened relations between Slovenia and Croatia, and that is why the delegations agreed in Mokrice that they would appoint a tripartite joint commission, to which they would appoint representatives of the central banks, commercial banks, and government ministries.

For residents of the surrounding area of Mokrice comes the gratifying news that the two prime ministers discussed their problems, and decided that the border crossings should be simplified as much as possible. In this regard Dr. Greguric emphasized that it was necessary to coordinate the categorization of border crossings, in order to avoid unnecessary complications.

The next meeting of the prime ministers will be on Tuesday in Zagreb, when Slovenia and Croatia will sign an intergovernmental agreement on embassies. In announcing this event, both prime ministers did not conceal their belief that at that time Croatia and Slovenia would already have been recognized by several members of the European Community.

Adria Airways Reported on Verge of Bankruptcy

92BA0259B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Darja Verbic: "Adria Is Sliding Uncontrollably Into a Hopeless Situation"]

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 10 Dec—Adria's planes have already been standing on the ground for 45 days. The employees are becoming nervous, since rumors are spreading that a list of 28 percent of the employees who are superfluous has already been compiled, and even that at the same time, through the Belgrade authorities' issuing flight permits to small companies in Pristina and Sarajevo, Adria is threatened by bankrupcy.

"Bankruptcy... I hope not," said director Janez Kocijancic. Adria is getting deeper under water every day. All 880 employees are receiving 70 percent of their salaries. The money they have in their accounts is no longer sufficient, there is no new income, and they have large expenses. "I do not know of any airline that could survive in such a situation without assistance. We must be aware that we are a company whose tourist market has been completely destroyed, four aircraft have been bombarded, and Slovene air space has been closed. Anyone would say that there is no possibility for bankruptcy [sic]."

According to Kocijancic, there is no list of excess workers. It has been agreed at Adria that as part of their strategy for survival they will also carry out a thorough restructuring of the work force: in this regard they determined that approximately a third of the workers were superfluous. About 10 percent of them have already left, and another 20 percent are to leave Adria gradually, not through dismissal, but rather through voluntary decisions, and regular and early retirements. The pilots are staying. The labor force market abroad is mostly closed, or else strong union interests prevent "penetration" by foreign pilots. Things are worst for them, Janez Kocijancic thinks.

It is no longer any secret that in the kind of situation that Adria is facing, it has decided to sell several aircraft. According to Kocijancic, two MD-80 aircraft are for sale; demand is lower than supply, "but we will not sell the planes cheaply." [passage omitted]

Slovenia

Democratic Party Backs Bavcar for Prime Minister

AU1001102092 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Interview with Slovene Internal Affairs Minister Igor Bavcar by correspondent Bojan Veselinovic in Ljubljana on 9 January—recorded]

[Text] [Bavcar] Since the congress of the Democratic Party, it is clear that we, the Democrats, want our share of responsibility on the Slovene political scene. The latest statements that we made—especially when it became apparent that it will not be possible to hold elections in Slovenia soon, that is to say, by April as we specially insisted upon—of course, led to our party's offering our own solutions and also to introducing our own prime minister-designate [mandatar]—myself, to be precise.

Therefore, the correct information is that the Democratic Party is proposing me as a prime minister-designate of the new Slovene government, and I can confirm this.

[Veselinovic] Could you tell us, will this happen at the January session of the Slovene Assembly?

[Bavcar] Bearing in mind that this is the proposal of the Democratic Party, we have to reach an agreement with other major parties that would support this proposal, before we can propose a constructive vote of no confidence in the government. You know, at least it is rumored, that there are several proposals for the new prime minister-designate. I think January will be very interesting in this respect, and many things will happen in this month.

If the inter-party talks—which are very intensive, and our party has quite a number of them scheduled—are successful, then this could happen in January.

[Veselinovic] Well, I know it is a bit inappropriate to ask which parties are also interested in your candidature, but could you, nevertheless, at least hint at the political orientation of the parties with which the Democratic Party held talks regarding your candidature?

[Bavcar] Democrats wish to talk with the parties of the center on the Slovene political scene. In forming a new coalition, we particularly wish to cooperate with the Green Party, Social Democratic Alliance, and Liberal Democratic Party.

New Government, Constitution, Elections Discussed

92BA0304C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Dec 91 p 14

[Article by Stevan Petrovic: "Bavcar the New Slovenian Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Maribor, 22 Dec—Slovenia will soon be getting a new government, according to what is being publicly said here in official circles and what is being announced in the news media. We have learned from the same sources that the prime minister could be none other than Igor Bavcar, the present minister of internal affairs in the government of Lojze Peterle. This at the same time fulfills the desire Janez Jansa has had for a long time to bring down Peterle and replace him with his very close friend Bavcar. Slovenia would thereby become in essence a kind of police-militarist state, exactly the opposite of what it loudly proclaims to be before the whole world—a country that has achieved "the highest degree of every kind of democracy."

The New Constitution and Elections

This thesis is also supported by a headline in today's VECER, the Maribor newspaper, to the effect that for Europe Slovenia could become a "military krajina," which to even the least well-informed as to its history of warring traditions and its present military force cannot but sound funny and, to put it frankly, ridiculous.

Feri Horvat, former deputy prime minister in the FEC [Federal Executive Council] cabinet of Ante Markovic, is mentioned as a possible deputy prime minister in Bavcar's government, while according to this imagined scheme the Ministry of Internal Affairs would be taken over by Dr. Janez Drnovsek, whose skill in this area enjoys the exceptional confidence of a majority of Slovenia's politicians.

Nothing is being said, however, about who in the new Slovenian cabinet, which is supposed to be formed shortly, would take up the position of the head of defense. But, because Jansa's "warring abilities and virtues" have been raised to the pedestal of someone just short of Napoleon Bonaparte because of the June-July military conflict with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], thanks again to his close and family friend, Jelko Kacin, information minister, it is difficult to escape the impression that anything at all will change in this area of the new Slovenian government.

Along with the replacement of what has been the government up until now, that is, the fall of Lojze Peterle, a politician both unsuccessful and unpopular, they are also announcing here adoption of a new constitution, which also presupposes the scheduling of new multiparty elections, which the coalition Demos is opposing in every way it can so that it can remain in power as long as possible.

Demos Without Any Confidence Whatsoever

But when we speak about the extremely poor rating which Lojze Peterle, chief of the Christian Democrat Party, has on the list of public opinion, we also need to mention the names of those whom Slovenes find most impressive at this moment.

The last official poll of the Public Opinion Research Center shows that Milan Kucan is still in first place with respect to popularity, followed by Drnovsek, Jelko Kacin, Janez Jansa, and Dimitrije Rupel. Joze Pucnik, president of Demos, is in last place by a convincing margin.

This offers particular support for the assertion that the policy of the Demos coalition up to this point does not enjoy any confidence of the Slovenian people whatsoever.

The figures of the Research Center also show that Slovenes have, so to speak, given up on the political parties that have been in the Demos coalition. Many people have already forgotten for whom they voted a year and a half ago in the first multiparty elections.

However, all we know for sure is that potential voters are most inclined toward the Party of Democratic Reforms—the former Communists. That is, toward a return of the leftwing option, because under the Demos leadership the citizens of Slovenia have reached the edge of disastrous poverty, that is, the standard of living they had way back in 1963.

DELO Views Results of 'Mini Monetary Reform'

92BA0325D Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
21 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Alenka Brezovnik: "Tolar More Expensive and Rarer"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The Bank of Slovenia has protected the currency; "surplus" tolars are going out of circulation.

Ljubljana, 21 Dec—The effects of the "mini" monetary reform that the bank began to carry out on 8 October are already apparent. According to the National Bank's estimate, in fact, there was six times too much money in circulation in October. As Deputy Governor Bogomir Kos explained to us, it was first of all necessary to establish a system; then came a freeze on bank deposits, and thus a limitation on the growth of book money. At this time the necessary instruments have been prepared, through which the National Bank has started to exert pressure upon surplus liquidity. The results are already apparent, and the tolar is becoming not only relatively but also absolutely rare. Deputy Prime Minister Andrej Ocvirk had already predicted some time ago that about 5 billion tolars too many were in circulation.

Money is obviously like any other good: The rarer it is, the more it is respected. The Bank of Slovenia's policy at this time is most restrictive, and it has protective instruments and is working on the weakest link in the chain (each one of the banks). The Bank of Slovenia is solving this problem by means of diverse instruments, without affecting overall monetary policy too much. According to Kos, they are consistently implementing the goal that they announced when starting to enter the tolar system, namely to coordinate the liquidity of the banking system with the balance, and to protect the new Slovene currency within the limits of their ability. Unfortunately, the rest of macroeconomic policy is not helping such plans on the part of the central bank. This particularly applies to price policy and the budget.

The Bank of Slovenia hopes that it will be able to solve this problem as soon as possible. This would mean good possibilities for stabilizing the currency with consistent operation of all the central bank's macroeconomic policies. According to Kos, a stable currency is not the intention in itself, but rather makes possible a reduction of the national economy's expenditures, and, if certain prerequisites are fulfilled within some reasonable period (depending upon the economic situation within the state and outside of it), a transition to convertibility. The bank's present restrictive policy, however, does not mean by any means that citizens could not use the tolars that they have in their bank accounts. It is also up to them to decide whether they will use them in the form of cash or checks.

Economic Chamber Advocates Cutting Costs

92BA0259A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
11 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Public Spending Under Control"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Excerpt] The board of directors of the GZS [Slovene Economic Chamber] on the republic's budget for 1992; the economy requires a realistic assessment of spending; the government's free indexing authority should be taken away.

Ljubljana, 10 Dec—In many respects, the draft Slovene budget for next year is reminiscent of the times of the criticized federal budget. The projected proportion of tariffs in it is even higher. It is obvious that the state is not dealing thoroughly enough with the regulation of public spending, as was noted at today's meeting of the board of directors of the Slovene Economic Chamber.

Facts on this year's budget and this year's spending, which have not been prepared by the Slovene Executive Council, would be essential for adoption of the new budget. The praise for the decline in spending this year is exaggerated, since it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Slovene economy has not paid 6.8 billion in debts for taxes and electricity. In any case, this year's public spending, in terms of its share in the social product, exceeds that of 1989, and will be far above the spending known by developed countries.

The board of directors consequently thinks that it is necessary to assess the planned spending for 1992 realistically, and to express it in December 1990 prices, so that it would be easier to compare it with prices next year. Public spending's share in the social product should be reduced and put on the same level as in similarly developed states. It is necessary to prepare a balance-sheet for the budget situation, and determine the total public debt and the method of paying it. Furthermore, in addition to borrowing money abroad for the budget, money should be borrowed at home as well. The government should ensure and publish a proposal for monetary interventions in the economy. The new obligations of the independent state should be determined. A

comprehensive balance-sheet for all public spending is necessary, along with control of it, which should be provided by an independent professional institution. The Executive Council's authority to determine free indexing regardless of the social product actually achieved should be taken away. Since there will not be time for expert adoption of the budget by the end of this month, the Chamber is proposing the introduction of temporary financing during the first quarter of next year. [passage omitted]

Croatia

HDZ's Mesic Expects Peace 'Relatively Soon'

LD0901222792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1840 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Zagreb, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—The president of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, Stipe Mesic, told journalists today that, "despite everything, the end of the war could be expected relatively soon."

"We will enter a quiet period within a shorter time, and then there will follow reconstruction in Croatia," Mesic told a regular HDZ news conference. He pointed up the "strong pressure of the world public for the war in Croatia to end." After his party carried off the parliamentary elections in Croatia, Mesic was chosen to represent his republic in the Presidency of Yugoslavia. He was subsequently elected president of the collective state leadership at the insistence of the European Community, which deepened the Yugoslav crisis.

Mesic was formally at the helm of the state for five months, of which the last two he did not attend the Presidency sessions in Belgrade or call them. The Croatian Assembly on December 5 formally decided to withdraw Mesic from the Presidency of Yugoslavia, which the Croatian Assembly had not actually recognized for quite a while anyway. "I have done my duty. Yugoslavia is no more," Mesic said on that occasion. His statement was greeted with a tumultuous applause by the deputies of the secessionist republic.

Mesic was next appointed president of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Democratic Union.

Babic: UN Troops Constitute 'Fresh Occupation'

LD0901210992 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1723 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Paris, Jan 9 (TANJUG)—President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Babic assesses in a statement carried in today's LE FIGARO paper of Paris that the arrival of "blue helmets" in Krajina "would be experienced as a fresh occupation."

Babic said that the United Nations plan on engaging peace forces in Yugoslavia was unacceptable. His major objection was that the "United Nations wanted to disarm Serbs, but not Croats." Another objection was that Krajina representatives had not been invited by anyone to the relevant negotiations.

President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic "can solely represent Serbia," Babic remarked. He said that Milosevic's representing the Serbs in Croatia meant "the usurping of rights."

On Wednesday, Milosevic said that Babic's refusal of a U.N. peace-keeping force's protecting Krajina's territory was "an extremely irresponsible act." In addressing reporters in Knin today, Babic announced he would answer on Friday Milosevic's open letter.

In his statement to LE FIGARO, Babic wondered who would defend the Serbs in Krajina "from Franjo Tudjman's units if some day the point of withdrawing the blue helmets had also to be considered." Babic explained that "no force in the world is capable of disarming the Serbs in Krajina... Not because of indiscipline but because of fears. He warned that Krajina 'has sufficient arms to war the next four years."

Babic cautioned that he would not be able to see to it that his combatants laid down their arms once blue helmets arrived in Krajina, and added that he did not believe either in the Army's pull-out. LE FIGARO quoted him as saying "troops with arms will stay."

The U.N. peace-keeping plan in Yugoslavia provides for 10,000 soldiers and police monitors to be deployed in Croatia's "three crisis areas under U.N. protection (UNPAS)," notably east Slavonia, west Slavonia and Krajina.

Babic demanded that blue helmets be deployed along the demarcation line between the now conflicting sides in order to prevent another genocide of Serbs in Croatia.

Talks With JNA Representatives in Zagreb Viewed

LD0901171892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1446 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Zagreb, 9 Jan (TANJUG)—Talks have been continuing in Zagreb's Hotel "I" between representatives of the Croatian Army and the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA), accompanied by the mediation of representatives of the European observer mission.

Most discussion in these talks, in which Colonel General Andrija Raseta is again also taking part, this time as Deputy CGS [chief of General Staff] of the JNA, was of the implementation of the Sarajevo agreement, and mostly about the serious incident [incident] with the helicopter in which five EC observers were killed.

In statements to journalists on the causes of this tragic incident [dogadjaj], Gen. Raseta this morning said: "As far as the information that we have goes, which has not been verified 100 percent, the flight of the helicopter on

the Kaposvar-Zagreb flight path was not announced in advance. In other words, it was requested but the Federal flight control did not give their approval."

Brigadier General Imre Agotic, a member of the Supreme Command of the Croatian Army, has stated however that the commission that has been formed has probably already completed its work on the examination of the advanced announcement of the flight. However, he stressed, he "does not believe at all that one can say that the flight was not reported or announced in advance."

The talks are continuing.

Serbia

Seselj Blames Hungary, EC Mission for Incident

AU0901165492 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] The Serbian Radical Party regrets the incident involving the EC observers mission and thinks that this should not be used for a propaganda campaign against the Yugoslav People's Army. This was said by [Serbian Radical Party President] Vojislav Seselj at a news conference that was organized by the Serbian Radical Party. Radovan Pantovic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Pantovic] Vojislav Seselj said that the Serbian Radical Party sees Hungarian flight control and lack of caution on the part of the mission—since it had not informed Belgrade flight control of its flight—as the culprits for the incident. Seselj also pointed out that six aircraft—which were carrying arms out of Hungary for Croatia—have so far been shot down in the same area.

The resignation of National Defense Minister Veljko Kadijevic was interpreted as an attempt to destroy the Yugoslav People's Army. Seselj explained this with the claim that many more reasons have existed in the past for Kadijevic to resign. The resignation was also a relief for the Yugoslav People's Army, but Seselj claimed that the remaining Slovene and Croatian generals and officers should also be replaced. He also thought that activity by any political party should be banned in the ranks of the Army, and particularly that of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia.

As regards the letter that republic President Slobodan Milosevic sent to Milan Babic, president of the Serbian Krajina, Seselj stressed that such conflicts should stop as soon as possible. He said that he understands both Slobodan Milosevic's and Milan Babic's reasoning but he added that there is no reason for the quarrel.

[Seselj] We think that this is basically only a question of a disagreement, and this disagreement should be eliminated as soon as possible. Once all the arguments of both sides are weighed up it will be seen that they are not in conflict and it will be seen that their aims are the same. Common aims can only be achieved with joint effort and, therefore, in the name of Serbian harmony and unity, we are demanding that this quarrel stop immediately, that all public backbiting be halted, and that they come to agreement as soon as possible in the interests of the Serbian people.

[Pantovic] As regards the law on banning the work of communist organizations in the Krajina, it was said that this law should have been passed earlier but only for the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, which Seselj described as an illegal and a terrorist organization. [end recording]

Kosovo

Police Raid on Prekaz Village Condemned

AU0901170692 Pristina BUJKU in Albanian 3 Jan 92 p 3

[B. Haliti report: "People Defending Their Own Doorsteps Are Not Terrorists"]

[Text] The Kosovo Democratic Alliance [LDK] held a special news conference on 31 December, at which Deputy Chairman Fehmi Agani informed journalists about what had happened the previous day in Prekaz i Ulet [Donje Prekaze] near Skenderaj [Srbica]. We recall that Fehmi Agani, together with Anton Kolaj, Zenun Celaj, Dr. Zekeria Cana, and Veton Surroi, on hearing that Prekaz was surrounded by large police forces, went to the scene of the incident at once, after making contact with Serbian police officials in Pristina, in order to prevent a possible massacre of the innocent population.

Beatings, Raids, Looting

Professor Agani began the news conference by saying that, on the pretext of searching for weapons and as part of an action in which we were told that militiamen had been ordered to use firearms only in self-defense, a large number of citizens from Decan to Skenderaj were arrested. At about 0530 on 30 December, the Serbian police surrounded the village of Prekaz i Ulet with the aim of searching for certain citizens and raiding various houses. The inhabitants resisted this police intervention and fired guns, which is quite understandable in the case of a raid on a winter night, when people do not know with whom they are dealing.

According to our information, Agani said, the inhabitants' resistance continued for several hours, and the police withdrew. The police intervened again between 0800 and 0900, raided about 14 houses, and seized all the adult men. The police took about 52 people and sent them to the police station. Some were released, but about 30 were detained. It is significant that all those sent to the police were beaten so badly that three of those who were released and three of those who were detained are in a serious condition. We have information that two Prekaz citizens were wounded, and that the police ransacked the houses they raided and seized objects of

value. One citizen's savings book containing 15,000 German marks was taken, and all those possessing passports had them confiscated.

Agani said that the police did not find any weapons, as they pretended, but only one gun, one hunting rifle, and a revolver, all held with licenses. We also have information that the police brutally beat the father of the young men who were wanted. The beating began in his home, and continued on the way to the police station, where he was detained. A large number of policemen took part in this action, and reinforcements were even brought from Peje [Pec] and Mitrovica. About nine armored personnel carriers, dozens of cars, and hundreds of people were seen. One must also add that a helicopter continually circled above the village and fired twice at targets considered to be strategic.

Agani said that all this is part of a large-scale action being carried out by the Serbian police in Kosovo. The action purports to be a search for large quantities of weapons and for a network called the "National Resistance and Liberation Front" [Fronti i Rezistences dhe Clirimit Kombetar], said to be a terrorist organization. A major trial is also being prepared. Without wishing to prejudge this trial, Agani observed that the regime, which is waging state terror against the Albanians in Kosovo, requires such things to be staged, at least in order to explain and justify past, present, and possibly future terror. At a time like this, when various different Seseljs, Arkans, and Dragans [references to Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan and "Captain Dragan," leaders of Serbian irregular forces in Croatia] and their entourages are wandering round Kosovo, what sense is there in police raids in search of the odd gun and revolver?

Agani then spoke about the group that is accused of allegedly forming a terrorist organization that, according to Serbian accusations, wishes to detach Kosovo from Serbia. This is an attempt to justify the persecution of all those who desire Kosovo's sovereignty. The attempt to tie the group of those imprisoned to the Albanian political parties is similarly malicious. Although some of them were indeed members of our parties, and we do not disown their work, the political parties have their programs, political platforms, and declared policies. The activities and goals of the Albanian political parties can, therefore, not be called into question.

Agani called the intervention in Prekaz i Ulet a typical police raid. There was absolutely no reason to enter houses with technical equipment of all kinds after midnight and in winter, especially when people do not know if a Pollate [village raided by Serbian police forces in 1990] is being prepared or who they are dealing with.

The police have now withdrawn from Prekaz and the situation in the village is calm. (This information reports the situation at 1330 on 31 December.) However, the most terrible scene we saw in Prekaz was when 27 people were stood up with their faces to a wall while policemen aimed their automatic rifles at them. A police armored personnel carrier also aimed its guns at these citizens. The police held these people in this manner for between seven and eight hours, in the snow and the cold weather. Agani concluded by saying that children were also maltreated and were, in some cases, used as hostages while houses were raided—children in front, and militiamen behind them.

Four Questions From Journalists

The correspondent of the Croatian news agency HINA asked whether the international public had been informed about the events at Prekaz. Agani said that the fact that many world radio and television stations reported what happened at Prekaz shows that we informed the world as well as our technical resources permit. I think, Agani said, that this helped to prevent something worse from happening.

The correspondent of the Zagreb paper VECERNJI LIST asked whether the Prekaz incident resembled the campaigns of 1956 [campaign for the "collection of weapons" in Kosovo organized by Aleksandar Rankovic]. Agani said that not only the Prekaz case, but all the terror in Kosovo, resembles 1956, except that it is no longer the case that tens of thousands of people can be beaten without the world knowing.

BUJKU's correspondent asked whether this terror in Kosovo has created conditions for the arrival of blue helmets. Agani replied that the request for the deployment of blue helmets here was not a kind of ploy, but was made necessary by the explosive situation in Kosovo. The most recent violence also proves the reasonableness of our demand for blue helmets in Kosovo, Agani said.

Radio Sarajevo's correspondent, referring to the articles about the Prekaz case in the Serbian press, asked whether someone defending his own doorstep or someone attacking at night deserves the name of terrorist. Professor Agani said that the best reply is implicit in the formulation of the question.

Census Indicates Low Number of Albanians

92BA0287A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Dec 91 p 16

[Article by Z. Zejneli: "Initial Results of Census in Kosovo and Metohija; 8,593 Albanians Live in Kosmet"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] That many of them included in the census. A rough estimate of the population figure for the Albanian national minority because of the census boycott. There are 195,301 Serbs, 20,045 Montenegrins, 57,408 Muslims, 10,838 Turks, and 42,806 Gypsies.

Pristina—The Provincial Statistical Office of Kosovo and Metohija has recently published the initial results of this year's census of the population, of households, of homes, and of farms. The data have been systematized on the level of the Province of Kosmet, opstina, village,

and according to national composition, and processed on the basis of the census material.

According to the preliminary data, there are a total of 355,650 people living in Kosmet. Of that number, Serbs account for 195,301, Montenegrins 20,045, Muslims 57,408, Croats 8,161, Yugoslavs 3,070, Albanians 8,593, Turks 10,838, Gypsies 42,806, Egyptians 5,984, and others 3,444.

Albanians Wrote Themselves Off

The published data reflect the true state of the population figure based on the census and the will of those who did not want to provide the requested data about themselves. As we know, the Albanian national minority, based on its own will and under orders from Ibrahim Rugova and the separatist leadership, refused to take part in the census. Consequently, there are as many of them as was included in the census and according to the published results. Thus, the Albanian national minority drastically reduced its own figure, as well as its own existence. When it is known that a census is a civilized act that covers everyone, regardless of national origin or political views and convictions, then the data obtained are verified and accepted.

Consequently, it is also accepted that the census reflects the correct figures for who reported themselves and how. Keeping in mind the total population, the Albanian national minority in Kosmet constitutes only 2.4 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the largest number of Albanians, according to the census, live in Djakovica, with 1,401, compared to as many as 1,725 Serbs. According to the initial results of the census, there are fewer Albanians than Serbs even in those ethnically pure opstinas where the Albanian populated has dominated. For example, there are 481 Serbs in Malisevo and only 15 Albanians, while of the 1,773 recorded residents of Podujevo 1,152 are Serbs and only 52 are Albanians.

The only place in Kosovo and Metohija in which, according to the census, not a single person lives, and thus not a single Albanian, is the village of Opolje in the opstina of Dragas, or Gora, which was exclusively inhabited by Albanians up until this year's census.

Thus, the politically inspired boycott has nearly erased Albanians from Kosmet as a population group. Despite this, the Albanian separatist leaders continue to bandy about the figure of around three million Albanians supposedly living in Serbia, mostly in Kosmet. Based on their data, the Albanian separatists have developed the theory of a so-called "majority nation," and from that they have even given themselves the right to live in some sort of "Kosovo Republic," which, like it or not, will not be that easy to create with 8,593 Albanians.

Inexorable Statistics

Statistics are inexorable, and since they provide data that are recognized all over the world, the Albanian separatists and political leaders of the Albanian national minority, by calling a "boycott," have practically erased their fellow citizens from this part of the territory of Serbia.

Nevertheless, with regard to Albanians, the Provincial Statistical Office has made only an estimate of the number of members of the Albanian national minority. According to this rough estimate, there should be 1,607,690 Albanians living in Kosmet. Of course, this rough estimate, which was forcibly extracted, certainly will not satisfy Albanian leaders, who have their own estimates that they regard as official.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Serbian Assembly Discussion, Decision Detailed

LD0901191192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1622 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 9 Jan (TANJUG)—At today's session of the Assembly of the Serbian People, which was described as historic in all the deputies' speeches, a debate was conducted on the declaration proclaiming the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the declaration, as well as in the discussion, it was noted that the Serbian people decided on the proclamation of a republic because of the illegitimate and illegal decisions of the Muslim-Croatian coalition, which began before the elections with the "combining of the party flags", and continued from the first day of the new government with the attempt to abolish the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in official state communications.

The culmination of this coalition and of the ignoring of the will of the Serbian people was reached with the demand by the representatives of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] for Bosnia-Hercegovina to proclaim its sovereignty and be granted international recognition. This, in the view of the Serbian deputies, was out of a desire, as stressed, to continue to ignore and to attempt to subjugate the Serbian people of this republic.

The said coalition did not agree to the request of the Assembly of the Serbian People to rescind its illegitimate and illegal acts. It, once again, thereby ignored the sovereign will of the Serbian people, the declaration also stresses, and indicated what else the Serbian people could expect in a possible independent Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The declaration on the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina was adopted unanimously, and the only dilemma was over the suggestion in the text itself that the declaration would not come into force if the representatives of the Muslim and Croatian nations rescind their demand for international recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the very beginning of the Assembly, there was a call for this paragraph to be deleted, and for the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People to be carried out today, because, as

it was stressed, there was no need to make it conditional upon anything. This proposal was unanimously adopted at the end of the Assembly. Thus, the declaration and proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina comes into force today.

During the Assembly discussion, it was underlined several times that no one can force the Serbian people of this republic out of Yugoslavia, nor separate it from its whole. This was confirmed by the plebiscite of the Serbian people on remaining in Yugoslavia. The more so since the Serbian people are a nation-building factor [drzavotvoran] and have 65 percent of the land in Bosnia- Hercegovina.

Biljana Plavsic said in this connection that Bosnia-Hercegovina today is under one government and one man, alluding to Alija Izetbegovic, who is accused of only representing the interests of the Muslim nation and its extremists in creating an Islamic Bosnia-Hercegovina. Deputy Jovo Tintor maintained, in this connection, that Izetbegovic, with the policy of the SDA, is committing worse genocide against the Serbian people than Broz [Josip Broz Tito]. According to him, the SDA is attempting to eliminate the Serbian people from Bosnia-Hercegovina or to turn it into a minority.

Dr. Radovan Karadzic, chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Bosnia-Hercegovina, stressed that two or three days ago the most responsible political personalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina asked him whether a united Bosnia-Hercegovina had a chance. This was asked by those, Karadzic says, who one-sidedly make moves and violate, he says, both God's and human laws.

Surely there is no chance for a united Bosnia-Hercegovina, Karadzic added, when its leaders are requesting that this republic be in a community of Islamic countries. Surely there are no chances when Alija Izetbegovic alone adopts decisions in the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina and does not consider it to be a rump presidency, although two members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina of the Serbian nationality "have frozen" their work in it. This, Karadzic says, in the opinion of Alija is not a rump presidency but, on the other hand, for him the SFRY Presidency is a rump presidency, because Bogicevic [Bosnia's representative in the SFRY Presidency] and the secessionists are not present at its sessions. Izetbegovic behaves as if the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina are his accoutrements [dekor].

In the opinion of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina have recently "been forced to make all their moves." Izetbegovic formed the first national party and then the HDZ and the SDS appeared only as the third national party. Dr. Radovan Karadzic says that the Serbian nation had to do this because Dr. Nijaz Durakovic, with his Communist Party, was preparing to play the role of "the left wing of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]." In other words, the Serbs were being deceived.

The coalition parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina—the SDA and HDZ—are trying to destroy all unity and everything Yugoslav in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Dr. Karadzic says. Even Yugoslavia is no longer mentioned. They have even thought up, he adds, the neologism togetherness instead of unity. Today, we are angry with them because of the fact that they have pushed us aside, while perhaps we will tomorrow be thankful to them, Karadzic said, for offering the Muslim and Croatian people a situation in which they also clearly organize themselves in this area and then initiate a dialogue on the possiblilty of living together. Then it will be clear what we can and what we cannot do, without there constantly being deception at the expense of the Serbian people. We can build togetherness on the unity of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, Karadzic says.

In the opinion of Karadzic, there is no way to make an Islamic republic out of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is possible up to Kozja Cuprija (the entrance to Sarajevo), but from Pale you have the Serbian Autonomous Region of Romanija, Serbian territory, and everyone must be clear about this, Karadzic said.

Numerous journalists followed the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, as Velibor Ostojic says, there was no live relay, because Sarajevo TV did not permit or make it possible for Serbian TV to organize live coverage.

The stripping of the legitimacy of Alija Izetbegovic and Dr. Haris Silajdzic to represent the Serbian people in international affairs was met with stormy applause. Besides Carrington and Butrus Ghali, all participants of the European Conference will be aquainted with this.

Army, Refugee Commission Hold Talks on Refugees

AU0801124492 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] In accordance with the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government conclusions, the representatives of the republic Commission for Refugees and Exiled Persons, which is chaired by Miljenko Brkic, Ibrahim Colahodzic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government, and Vitomir Zepnic, deputy minister of internal affairs, held preliminary talks with the Army representatives—General Pavle Strugar and his assistants—on resolving the current open questions regarding the refugees end exiled persons in our republic.

They exchanged views on the sequence of tasks that need to be done in the villages of the Trebinje commune, starting with the identification of persons that fled under pressure, the formation of a working group that will visit the area and (?film) the situation, the line on which the Yugoslav Army units will be transferred, the location of the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as the [word indistinct] of special police stations in the villages of the Trebinje commune which their residents abandoned under pressure.

It was also said that the republic Commission for Refugees and Exiled Persons will start implementing this agreement, which will help secure the conditions for the return of refugees to their settlements in Eastern Hercegovina, at its first session on 8 January.

Montenegro

Liberal Party Leader Calls For Sovereignty

92BA0282A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Dec 91 p 8

[Interview with Liberal Party leader Slavko Perovic by Branko Vojicic; place and date not given: "There Is No More Important Interest Than a Good Neighbor"]

[Text] Montenegro does not want to be a sovereign state, it does not want to be neutral in the present war, and Branko Kostic's extensive activities in the rump federal Presidency have its full support. That is how one could interpret the position of the majority of deputies in the Montenegrin Parliament, which rejected a proposal from the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (also supported by the Deputies' Club of the Reform Coalition) that that republic finally define its status, recall the combative and arrogant Kostic, adopt a declaration on sovereignty, and proclaim its neutrality in the present war. The proposal was explained in the Montenegrin Assembly by Slavko Perovic, the helmsman of the liberal ship, who has long ago "earned" for what he has done the epithets "100 percent Montenegrin," "a Green," and recently, even "Ustasha." They have been uttered not only by the Montenegrin Serbian "populists," inspired by epics, but also unsparingly by the official media under the auspices of the current authorities and with their blessing.

[Vojicic] Mr. Perovic, is there any greater criticism of the present Montenegrin authorities than the fact that Dr. Branko Kostic is still speaking on behalf of Montenegro?

[Perovic] Personally, I am crushed by the truth that Dr. Kostic received 100-percent support in a secret ballot in the Montenegrin Assembly at one time, when he was elected as a member of something that was then still called the Presidency. The Liberal Alliance did not participate in that vote, nor did the rest of the Montenegrin opposition, except for the National Party, because we felt that a person who is supposed to represent Montenegro in the Presidency should be elected in a citizens' referendum. Consequently, I have not been able to find any parallels or signs of continuity between these present-day Communists, as far as the national issue of Montenegrins is concerned, and those of 1936, when in the glorious Belvedere event they rose up in defense of the Montenegrin national identity. The Communist candidate Branko Kostic is a person who has on several occasions quite openly and clearly denied the existence of the Montenegrin and Muslim nations, considering them, in the best Memorandum [of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts] interpretation, to be inventions of the Vatican, the Comintern, and who knows who else.

On the other hand, such amazement may also be experienced by the "ordinary," that is, uninformed observer of political trends and circumstances in Montenegro. As you know, I belong to that other category of fortunate or unfortunate people in Montenegro who have not yet been deceived in their own political assessments. Of course, in the horror we find ourselves in today, that does not provide any satisfaction at all. I was personally crushed because among the ranks of the Communist deputies there are a considerable number of people whom I know well, and I know that they have the same opinion of Kostic as I do, but even in a secret ballot they were not able to display enough civic courage to say their little, historic "No!"

Tragedy of the Greater-Serbian Project

Kostic has nevertheless done great things for Montenegro. His political behavior, in an enormous number of cases, has been the straw that broke the camel's back. Many people who were our fellow-sufferers, but for one reason or another had not been ready for political involvement, joined the Liberal Alliance. Many people filled the places of open sympathizers thus vacated. Kostic's greatest contribution, however, lies in the quite rapid and fully effective exposure of the tragedy and anachronism of the Greater-Serbian project, especially in the eyes of the outside world. Once again, as a golden rule, it has been confirmed that in every misfortune there is also a little fortune.

[Vojicic] You recently described Kostic as a cynical metaphor for the kind of sidetrack and corner the once glorious, proud, and respected Montenegro has found itself in. What would you add?

[Perovic] Dr. Kostic represents a walking monument of the system that was called self-managing socialism. Only that kind of machine was capable of producing such robots—in a Montenegrin version, of course. And Montenegro knows how to be original, doesn't it?

[Vojicic] What sort of Yugoslavism do Kostic and his gang actually advocate?

[Perovic] When Yugoslavism is mentioned, I always recall Strossmeyer and Njegos with a feeling of profound reverence. When that word is abused today for propaganda, for the purpose of creating a completely new Greater-Serbian creation, I always remember, with a tragicomic feeling, that hall with the enormous round table in which Kostic-Kostic-Sejdo-Bora meet. Even though it is a desecration of the highest possible degree, nevertheless, so that history will not repeat itself like an evil fate but rather like a code that can be successfully deciphered through rational methods, we have to compare the former spiritually with the spirituality (sic!) of these others, and realize that we have to flee from the state that they are offering as the devil flees from the cross. There is no Yugoslavism there at all; it is Greater-Serbianism in its saddest and most tragic version, at the root of which lies an indescribable primitivism.

Between Sovereignty and a Rump Yugoslavia

[Vojicic] How is it that Montenegro is still hesitating between sovereignty and the kind of rump Yugoslavia in which there will not be any sovereignty?

[Perovic] All the political forces that have attempted genuine consideration of the interests of Montenegro during this century have been relentlessly satanized. Starting in 1918, thanks to the powerful machinery of the powerful Belgrade propaganda industry, both then and today (with honorable exceptions, both then and today), everything that has been Montenegrin, without being Greater-Serbian at the same time, has been persecuted as Greenist, separatist, and recently—this is an original product of the post-January period—as Ustasha?! Yes, after this a person can only be revolted by the amount of insanity, infinite hatred, and intoxication with their own mission on the part of those who are willing, in the name of their goal, to produce such atrocities as a means. All this leaves traumatic consequences and terrible divisions for Montenegro in view of how small its political essence is. Entire families have been set against each other, relationships between former friends have been disrupted, etc. Horrible! In "our" schools Montenegrins are not taught that a people emerges at the moment when a majority of the members of that collective body realize that they do not have any more important interest than a good neighbor; their textbooks never provide them with the popular wisdom that they, that is, their forefathers, found out. Houses do not lean against each other for the sake of the side wall of the house, but rather so that people (as a moral category) can meet! Briefly, Montenegro can only continue to exist if it is sovereign. To make the irony even greater, it is only that kind of Montenegro that suits its neighbors, which is something that those loyal to the Memorandum cannot understand at all. There will be serious problems with Montenegro in the Memorandum concept.

Since sovereignty is the only way out for Montenegro, the Liberal Alliance has been recognized as the chief advocate of such a project. A very brutal satanization of us has been under way for two years now, but the Liberal Alliance is likewise gaining more and more supporters every day. The Montenegrin leadership's loop in The Hague contributed to an even greater awakening of the citizens of Montenegro. I believe in that outcome.

[Vojicic] Is Montenegro a democratic country?

[Perovic] Montenegro is the kind of country in which the president of the Parliament can call the members of the opposition a "gang of traitors," and, in front of the entire Parliament, call a person who has proven the truth a liar; a country in which radio, television, and the daily newspaper, which, by the way, was founded by the Parliament itself, spread unprecedented lies; a country in which hundreds of people have been fired from their jobs just because they risked political involvement in which they openly opposed the authorities, etc. I would say that this is nothing unusual for the entire Yugoslav area at this time, but in Montenegro all of this has additional brutality. It really was interesting when one Communist deputy came to me during a break in a session of Parliament, after having learned that Bulatovic had accepted point 1 in the Hague document, and said, "Well, Slavko, everything will come to your people. Now we are also advocating a sovereign Montenegro." I answered him, "It is not true," I said, "that the Liberal Alliance has advocated a sovereign Montenegro." He was dumbfounded, and I continued, "We have always advocated a sovereign and democratic Montenegro, but a sovereign and totalitarian one does not interest us. There are many higher-quality prisons in the world." He agreed with me, and then went to vote as he was told.

[Vojicic] Can you assess the policy of the Montenegrin leaders: I said, I did not say; I signed, I did not sign; a step forward in The Hague, then a step backward. Does such a policy have any prospects?

[Perovic] Such reversals, which are made without any consequences, are only possible in this kind of prepolitical milieu. The ruling party is not even a party. I would say that it is a sort of self-managing community of interests. You do not have people in it who belong to it for the sake of an idea, a program, etc. People are in it for the sake of acquiring privileges, or protecting those already acquired at any cost. Only one thing is important: that one's immediate personal interest not be jeopardized; and everything else is unimportant. With that kind of majority, the minority that is in the so-called party for the sake of the idea of membership and loyalty to the Memorandum gains in strength. Through their conviction, they are reminiscent of the communist agitpropists of the first years after the war. Primarily through their own aggressiveness, they articulate the formless mass; they were Bulatovic's main support before The Hague, and after it they are the main threat to him.

Montenegrins and the Destruction of Dubrovnik

[Vojicic] Will Montenegrins go down in history as the destroyers of Dubrovnik?

[Perovic] From Dubrovnik, Montenegrins have become a people like every other one, in the sense that all the peoples raised by Western civilization have had pages in their own histories of which they were and are deeply ashamed. That is what the Dubrovnik page of the Montenegrin history book is already like, and will be more and more so every day. Because of the unprecedented cultural genocide committed against their spirit, Montenegrins never reached a collective awareness of their own exceptional quality in the stated sense, about what kind of capital was unused until now, and how it could have been used in the new European environment.

It is clear to me that Dubrovnik was used as a way to discredit Montenegro internationally; all the world's radio and television stations are buzzing about how the Montenegrins are destroying Dubrovnik, and Dubrovnik is several times more well known in the world than the former state to which it belonged. Those

who are allegedly fighting against genocide, as the ones giving the orders for that disgraceful operation, have once again, continuing the political traditions of their political forebears, committed cultural genocide against Montenegro, cutting off its possibility of normal communication with the outside world. Whether Montenegro is sovereign or not, at some time someone has to appear in its name outside its borders in order to conclude some sort of transactions, cultural, scientific, athletic, or any other kind of cooperation. Regardless of the possible courtesy of the hosts, the idea will remain behind their polite faces that they are talking with representatives of the people which turned its cannons against Dubrovnik. No denials will help here, and no justifications like Bulatovic's, about how he did not have any influence at all over Kadijevic when Montenegrin citizens were being sent to battlefields outside Montenegro. From the moral, historical, and cultural aspects, the aspect of civilization, that is the kind of moment that required that the Montenegrin head of state go personally to the Dubrovnik battlefield, kneel down before those people, who I believe are innocent, and implore them, beg them to come back to Montenegro's borders. Between Kadijevic and Dubrovnik he should have chosen Dubrovnik, no matter how hard that was, or else submitted his resignation....

The aim of the Dubrovnik operation also has a deeper intention—to set up a mental border, in addition to the actual one, between Montenegro and Croatia, between two peoples that had never been at war with each other in history, and especially between two friendly cities, the two fraternal cities of Herceg-Novi and Dubrovnik.

The greatest responsibility in the Dubrovnik campaign, in everything specifically done in the battlefield, lies with the Montenegrin media, especially POBJEDA. It was the amount of hatred prescribed by a secret hand for Montenegrins that they had to drink every day, from January 1988 on, in order to do what they did beneath the walls of Dubrovnik. I believe—I am an optimist, that can be seen at every step—that very little time still separates them from the realization that the true enemy of everything that is human in them is the untouchable rigidity of POBJEDA and the structure that supports and maintains it, and not by any means Dubrovnik, to which they were led through serious and disgraceful manipulation.

Macedonia

President Gligorov Discusses Serbian 'Untruths'

92BA0281B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 4 Dec 91 p 8

[Interview with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov by Dragan Djuric; place and date not given: "Macedonia Can Be Only a Friend"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] A referendum has been held, a constitution has been adopted and we are not threatening a single one of our neighbors. Therefore, there is no need for the former allies of 1913 to become active again in order to discuss Macedonia! It is not possible to discuss this today without Macedonia. The very word "integration" should not frighten anyone in these areas, because this can be achieved only on the basis of real, economic interests. We are staying to live in the same area, we are remaining neighbors. Goods must be moved.

We spoke with the 74-year-old president of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, at a moment when Macedonia, after passing a new Constitution, had formally become an independent and sovereign state. The successful helmsman of the Macedonian ship up to now has again been pressured—as well as otherwise been elected president of the southernmost republic—between the hammer and the anvil. While a letter from Milan Kucan in Slovenia is arriving in which he proposes that Macedonia recognize Slovenia as an independent state as soon as possible, announcing that the Slovene side will do the same for Macedonia, the vice president of the Serbian government, Dr. Budimir Kosutic, is expressing concern about the "threat to the rights of the Serbian people in Macedonia."

[Djuric] How do you view the initiative of the president of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, in which he proposes that the Macedonian Parliament recognize an independent Slovenia and establish diplomatic relations with it?

[Gligorov] I have not yet received that letter personally. I only heard about it partially on television. At one of the meetings of The Hague conference, when the document on recognizing republics that want it became current, I said that this should simultaneously mean mutual recognition among republics. Although the negotiations in The Hague are not yet completed, president Kucan sent the letter. When I receive it and read it, we will see what we are going to do. I appreciate that gesture and the initiative of Mr. Kucan.

Early for a Macedonian Army

[Djuric] In what sequence will Macedonia make its moves after the proclamation of the new Constitution, under which it is defined as an independent and sovereign state with indivisible and untransferrable sovereignty?

[Gligorov] The government has announced the preparation of a series of laws; there are about 70 of them, which mean the gradual realization of that which is written in the Constitution. We do not want to go the way that the experience of some other republics has suggested, that we accept the greater part of the Yugoslav laws according to the principle of a change of label. We are going to work out laws that will be something new, and we will attempt to take into account the way individual questions are treated in the European Community. Of course, we will first pass those laws that are most essential for the functioning of every state.

[Djuric] What about an army in Macedonia? What are the chances for the establishment of a Macedonian army?

[Gligorov] For the answer to this question, we believe we should await the final outcome of the conference in The Hague. For now we have a territorial defense. We don't have any paramilitary units, nor have we tried to do anything in that regard. This question should be approached realistically and resolved by agreement. Both the modalities and time periods should be agreed on for how the question of the remaining army in Macedonia will be resolved. We don't want any conflicts and we want to achieve this by agreement.

[Djuric] Have there been concrete talks about this complex of problems?

[Gligorov] Up to now there have mainly been talks about questions that have periodically arisen as current. For example, there were talks about sending recruits. Our general determination is that we do not wish to participate in the war, so, therefore, we do not want to send our recruits and reservists to the battlefield either. We will persevere with this.

[Djuric] Are there nevertheless a significant number of Macedonians in the Army?

[Gligorov] Our position is also that those who are currently on the battlefield should return to their homes. However, we do not now have the means, unfortunately, to bring this about completely. But much has changed, nevertheless. In contrast to the situation at the beginning of the conflicts, when there were about 23,000 men from Macedonia in the Army, that number has been reduced to 5,000 or 6,000, recruits who were recruited up to June. Since then not a single new recruit has left Macedonia.

Two of Kosutic's Untruths

[Djuric] How do you view the complex of relations with Serbia in the context of the statements made by Serbian Vice President Dr. Budimir Kosutic about the need for the protection of the rights of around 300,000 Serbs in Macedonia?

[Gligorov] I must emphasize that up to the statement made by Mr. Kosutic there was no incident, I'm not thinking about individual Serbian parties, groups, or their leaders, but exclusively of official organs of the Republic of Serbia, which would initiate conflicts between Serbia and Macedonia. Mr. Kosutic was the first to do that in his capacity as vice president of the government, and in his statement, unfortunately, he uttered two great untruths. The first is connected to the number of Serbs in Macedonia. The difference between what official statistics have shown in the last 45 years, that there are about 44,000 Serbs in Macedonia, and the fantastic number of 300,000 cited by Mr. Kosutic is certainly huge. However, it is fantastic precisely because it would serve for political propaganda.

The second of Mr. Kosutic's major untruths is related to the position of Serbs in Macedonia. There is no Serbophobia in Macedonia. I'm not talking about the way individuals or some party in this republic view the question of Serbs, but the fact is obvious that Serbs in Macedonia are not persecuted, nor is any special relationship established toward them. Life itself refutes Mr. Kosutic. However, the media situation in Serbia is such, unfortunately, that this cannot be explained or refuted to the Serbian public.

[Djuric] Kosutic used correct information on one point, and that is that Serbs are not mentioned in the new Constitution?

[Gligorov] That statement of his also includes some illogical points. Serbia emphasizes that Serbs have the status of a nationality wherever they live on the territory of Yugoslavia. The fact is that they have not been mentioned in a single Macedonian Constitution for the past 45 years. Mentioning them in the Constitution would cause a problem because no other people of Yugoslavia are mentioned either.

If they are cited in the Constitution together with Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, etc., then it would be understood that they were being put in the position of a national minority. They are a nationality in Yugoslavia, and until the relations among existing republics are resolved from the standpoint of a future situation, it is difficult to define them as a national minority. Finally, Macedonians are not mentioned in the Serbian constitution either, although they are greater in number than the Serbs in Macedonia.

But, the fact is that this nationality problem is being used for propaganda aims. We have received a number of letters from Serbia in which it is "claimed" that we have "wiped out the Serbian people," but the facts speak about no such thing. But the media situation in Serbia is such that one can say whatever one likes, and that people remain deprived of a complete explanation of the problem. However, in the case of Mr. Kosutic, I must say that representatives of the government should speak at least on the basis of elementary facts; this is not the case in this specific instance.

Greece Is (Not) a Hard Nut

[Djuric] A hard nut in relation to the question of Macedonian independence is Greece. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis is traveling to Belgrade. Agreement is also near between Greece and Bulgaria on an alliance for defense questions, and the Greek press stubbornly writes about how Macedonia, at the very least, is under some natural interest umbrella of Serbia.

[Gligorov] I claim responsibly that Macedonia has no conflicts with Greece. Everything speaks in favor of the fact that Greece and Macedonia should cooperate in a friendly manner. Misunderstandings arise where the Macedonian national minority is concerned. However, we have never claimed anything else except that the

human rights of Macedonians in Greece should be recognized under the Paris Charter.

We do not have territorial pretensions, nor do we have the intent to do anything that would disturb the Greek state and its share and position in the Balkans and the EC. Little Macedonia, which doesn't threaten any of them, can be only a friend, a neighbor with which fruitful and friendly relations can be developed.

Everything that is a topic of this discussion is in large measure a historical legacy. Since we are all moving toward a European community, of which Greece is a member, and that community is building relations so that borders between European states will be formal, I don't see a single reason that would prevent coming to an agreement on establishing normal, friendly relations with Greece. We are prepared to speak about this at any level.

We are deeply convinced that there is no reason today for making any commotion or for seeking, because of Macedonia, some contacts and concluding agreements between countries that once waged war with each other, and under the arrangement in Bucharest, divided Macedonia. That's the distant past, and today it would be a new Balkan irrationalism.

Macedonia has used its right to self-determination and this must be respected. A referendum has been held, a Constitution has been adopted, and we are not threatening a single one of our neighbors. Therefore, there is no need for any kind of pact, nor is there any need for the former allies of 1913 to become active again in order to discuss Macedonia! It is not possible to discuss this today without Macedonia. It is no coincidence that the first point of the Hague document notes that every republic in Yugoslavia that seeks it can be recognized as an independent and sovereign state.

Customs Union

[Djuric] On the occasion of the formal proclamation of the Constitution, you announced the possibility of building a new type of association among the Yugoslav republics. Do you think that any type of union is possible after the war in Croatia? If it is possible, what level of integration is this?

[Gligorov] According to the Hague document, only a customs union is possible. It is what five republics agreed on. If something more is wanted, that will be a matter of bilateral arrangements between republics.

Slovenia has not agreed even with this, emphasizing that only a free trade zone is acceptable for it. However, even it does not reject some form of association, therefore....

The very word "integration" should not frighten anyone in this area, because this can be achieved only on the basis of real, primarily economic interests. We are staying to live in the same area, we are still neighbors. Goods must be moved. We will have to agree on postal services and railroad transport, transmission of electric power and many other matters, which are a part of life and development in the territories in which we live. This is particularly pertinent if we want to enter the EC!

What this cooperation will be like and in what form, that's a question for the future. Naturally, it is difficult to speak about any kind of cooperation when people are shooting and dying. However, when we deviate from this a little, we will again have to come to an agreement. What Mr. Genscher has been proposing lately seems encouraging to me. I wouldn't want it to be viewed wrongly, but I personally proposed this in the first negotiations with EC representatives.

[Djuric] To which proposal of Genscher's are you referring?

[Gligorov] I am thinking of the resolution under which it is proposed that an association with the EC be proposed to all Yugoslav republics. When we realize that this is the only way out, we will again move toward some type of integration, but not a forced one, one with respect for those trends that are unavoidable. That is the gradual erasing of borders and the linking of peoples to that European home, as is frequently said.

[Djuric] You say that the minimum from which one can start is a customs union. Does this mean that Macedonia is on the way toward creating its own national currency?

[Gligorov] Certainly. If a customs union is the minimum that is acceptable for all, then there's nothing else except for every republic to establish its monetary system and create a national currency. With the European option, some other solutions can be sought in the sense that we are tying it to one of the European currencies; this will gradually lead us to European integration.

[Djuric] Macedonia, judging by its political moves, is following in the steps of Slovenia and Croatia. However, in the current war in Croatia it is staying on the side. It is taking a position of equidistance, distancing itself equally from both Serbian and Croatian policy. How do you interpret this?

[Gligorov] First, we are going pretty much our own way to independence. Although the aims may be the same, we are still located in another region, with other neighbors, and different internal problems.

As far as the war in Croatia is concerned, we indeed do not want to participate in it. The reasons are those of principle. Not only because it's an ethnic clash, but also because war is not the way for us, and we are sorry that they are trying to resolve problems between two republics and those two peoples in such a terrible manner. However, our direction is clear: We do not accept the forced changing of borders and we do not accept war as a means of resolving problems.

In truth, we do not see what our participating in that war would contribute, except to increase the number of needlessly killed and wounded. You have seen what an

escalation in the conflict resulted from the participation of Montenegro in that war in connection with Dubrovnik. How many new victims there have been. Imagine now that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia also join the war, what would general civil war be like in Yugoslavia, how difficult would it be for everyone to pull out of it together. Even if they pulled out, the consequences would be terrible.

We are painfully feeling the fate of Dubrovnik and Vukovar. It's not a question of indifference, or that we've been reduced to mute observers. We just don't see that our effective participation in that war in any way would contribute to that for which we must all strive, and that is peace. The internationalization of the conflict and the peace-keeping force is express proof of this.

"Blue Helmets" the Only Solution

[Djuric] Do you perceive the end of the conflict, and what chances do you give to the arrival of the "blue helmets"?

[Gligorov] I don't see another possibility, considering how far the war madness has spread, but that a truce be assured, and then for UN peace-keeping forces, which will assure a lasting character to the truce, to come into this area. I don't see another way.

The conflict in Yugoslavia has been internationalized, and I think this was unavoidable. A truce is also a condition for successful negotiations. It must first be assured in order for people to talk with cool heads about how to resolve mutual relations and how, in the final analysis, to part peacefully.

It is interesting that a new phase in the negotiations about who is the real successor of the previous Yugoslavia is already being declared. Some are arrogating that right for themselves, while others consider that all republics are equal heirs. I personally proposed such an amendment to the Hague document by which all republics would be equal heirs. It is not only a question of rights regarding foreign countries, signed international conventions, etc., but it is also tied to the extensive rights and obligations of all republics. The Hague negotiations and their continuation are the only chance for a way out to be found from this and the overall situation in these areas.

[Djuric] Albanians boycotted the referendum, and representatives of Albanian parties did not vote for the Constitution. Part of the Macedonian public has perceived them as turning their backs on the Macedonians at a time when they were most necessary to them. How do you view this segment of the problem?

[Gligorov] I think that we must carry out a long-term policy in Macedonia of good international relations and understanding, tolerance, dialogue. I am an opponent of any legal measures that would lead to a worsening of those relations, because nothing would be resolved that way. We are attempting to solve all problems, and there are a lot of them, exclusively by political and democratic methods.

You noticed that in my speech, on the formal declaration of the Constitution, I devoted half of my presentation to international relations. I know that many objected to this, having the vote of the Albanians in mind. However, I believe that every party must take its own responsibility, its own acts into account. Let the Albanians think about whether it was good that they didn't vote for the new Constitution, because this is their homeland, and they claim that too.

We are prepared, and this is our obligation, to carry out a long-term policy that will not change depending on whether the Albanians went to the referendum or not, whether they voted for the Constitution or not. This is our position on principle. We must simply continue our tradition. Macedonians have never been in a direct conflict with Albanians, our grandfathers and fathers were able to live together, and we must develop this further. I hope that such a policy, regardless of whether someone does not agree with it, will bring positive results in regard to the need for living together.

Behavior, Status of Political Parties Discussed

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[Article by Milisav Krstic: "European Democracy Is Not Within Arm's Reach"]

[Text] Skopje—Macedonian "pluralistic" life has already entered its second year. Many things have changed in the meantime. The initial enthusiasm of the "Macedonian political spring," when it seemed to many people that European democracy and contemporary Europe were really "within arm's reach," has been replaced by a gloomy everyday life and an uncertain future. It is not just a matter of a threatened economic collapse, but of a general hopelessness being confronted by ordinary citizens of the "new independent, self-sufficient, and sovereign Macedonian state."

In the period we mentioned of the "Macedonian spring," a sizable number of political parties (22) were established, and the democratic programs they drafted deserve attention. Yet by all appearances most of the diverse programs and declarations concerning democracy have remained merely a "dead letter." Which for that matter is also true of most of the parties registered and those which were unable to win any seats in the Macedonian parliament.

The Two-Pronged Behavior of the VMRO-ites

In any case, events are becoming more and more interesting every day on the Macedonian multiparty scene. Following the recent parting of the ways of the leaders of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian

Unity]—Dragan Bogdanovski, the honorary president, and Ljupco Georgijevski, this party's president, the Executive Committee of the VMRO in Skopje recommended to its Central Committee that it "reexamine the role played by D. Bogdanovski up to now" and decided to form its own "shadow government."

Before that, this party announced in the republic Assembly that it was passing over to the opposition, which in "practical" terms meant it was distancing itself from the government, which many other people consider a VMRO government. However, it has not escaped those who chronicle Macedonian events that the deputies of this very party fight ferociously for the government's projects and bills in sessions of the Assembly, although officially the VMRO almost always distances itself from the "government of experts." In the last marathon session of the Assembly, the VMRO representatives even called upon their colleagues from other parties to "support the government without reflection" and vote for its request for emergency powers. After all, they said, emergency powers would above all suspend certain federal laws which "are hindering flows in the republic's economy."

Quite a few citizens have asked the reason for this two-pronged behavior of the "VMRO-ites," when this is the party that has the most deputies in Macedonian parliament and even has its own members in the government. Ljupco Georgijevski, the very young president of the VMRO-DPMNE, has attempted an answer indirectly; the other day, in a "historic" justification of his resignation as vice president, he went on to say that a "constitutional putsch" had actually taken place in the Macedonian parliament itself and was aimed at preventing his party from forming a "pure" VMRO government. The VMRO leader, however, did not present a single argument to support this assertion of his. With these statements, which in many respects were shocking, the young "duke" did not succeed in restoring even his own very much shaken political "rating." Especially after the split at the very top of this party, which is without question pro-Bulgarian. He was recently charged with "bulgarianism" even by his protector, Dragan Bogdanovski, "spiritual father" of the Skopje VMRO, who is in any case the most controversial Macedonian political emigre.

In an "open letter," he accused not only "Duke" Georgijevski, but also explicitly the Skopje VMRO organization of a "pro-Bulgarian political orientation." However, in the assessment of political observers here, the loss of popularity by the VMRO-DPMNE does not automatically signify a "gain" for the other parties, in particular for the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] (the former Communists), which is second with respect to the number of deputies in the Macedonian Assembly. The latter party, at least a few months ago, upset the public in its own way with assertions that "fascism was beginning to boil up" in Macedonia, and certain national-chauvinist parties were charged with being the vehicles of these particular manifestations. Even politically "illiterate" citizens were able to recognize that this charge was aimed at the Skopje VMRO, the MAAK [Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action], and the Skipetar parties PDP [Democratic Prosperity Party] and NDP [People's Democratic Party]. Certain other parties which are not in the parliament, such as the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia, were "said to be anti-Macedonian." As for the Party of Yugoslavs in Macedonia, which has more and more followers every day, it has been charged with conducting a "pro-Serb policy" and of supporting a "nonexistent yugoslavism."

The Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, actually former Communists, is charged with having long ago abandoned its democratic program, its deputies in the Assembly are said to be "making too much noise" just in order to maintain their "political image." They are especially criticized for having issued harsh demands for resignation, as was the case with Jordan Mijalkov, even now the minister of internal affairs, and then simply forgetting that they had made such a demand. Those who are well-informed say that the SDSM has nevertheless "taken" those positions once held by the pro-Bulgarian VMRO-DPMNE.

Third Most Numerous in the Macedonian Parliament

The Skipetar party PDP is "making its points" very industriously day after day. The deputies of the Democratic Prosperity Party, together with deputies of the People's Democratic Party, have already carried out a part of their political program, even though they were not able to have the Albanian minority in this region officially proclaimed a nationality in the Macedonian Constitution. Nevertheless, this Skipetar party has already set international arbitration in motion so that at least in constitutional documents "Macedonia would become a state representing a partnership between Macedonians and Skipetars."

Ante Markovic's Party of Reform Forces is for all practical purposes not functioning, although it has less than 20 seats in the Macedonian parliament. As a matter of fact, its deputies long ago abandoned their political program in the parliament and have at times been acting like "VMRO-ites" and at times like "reformed Communists." Almost all the Macedonian political parties have lost contact with their base, with the voters, with their members and their followers.

The multiparty political panorama in the new Macedonian state would not be complete if we did not mention the Party of Yugoslavs, the only Macedonian party with a Yugoslav orientation. After the increasingly frequent statements by Slobodan Ivanovski, its young president, it is difficult to say that this "party is not fighting to preserve Yugoslavia at any price."